I am interested in defending a robust form of ethical realism that involves a non-naturalistic metaphysics of ethical facts and properties as well as an external reasons theory that allows for the categoricity of moral requirements. In addition to critiquing neo-Kantian constructivism, neo-Humean theories of reasons, and naturalistic forms of realism, I also have particular interests in critiquing common appeals to natural teleology and/or evolution in metaethical or ethical arguments. I have recently focused especially on providing a realist response to evolutionary debunking arguments, and on related issues in moral epistemology. Finally, I am interested in problems concerning normative ignorance and moral responsibility.
Much of my work in normative ethics has focused on resisting consequentialism, particularly through defenses of the Doctrine of Double Effect against various recent objections.
My work in applied ethics has been mainly in bioethics (the moral status of embryos, non-reproductive cloning, ethical issues in human subjects research) and in environmental ethics (the non-instrumental value of nature; climate change and the rights of future generations).
I am Associate Editor at the journal Ethics.