Philosophy Department

William J. FitzPatrick

Quick Facts

Title: Associate ProfessorAssociate Professor in Philosophy

Education: PhD, University of California at Los Angeles

Website

Contact Info

525 Lattimore Hall
Department of Philosophy
Box 270078
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14627

Phone: (585) 275-8107
william.fitzpatrick@rochester.edu

Office Hours: Wednesday 2:00-4:00p

People—William J. FitzPatrick

Research Interests

Metaethics, Normative Ethics, Bioethics, Philosophy of Biology

Metaethics

I am particularly interested in defending a robust form of ethical realism that involves a non-naturalistic metaphysics of ethical facts and properties as well as an external reasons theory that allows for the categoricity of moral requirements. In addition to critiquing neo-Kantian constructivism, neo-Humean theories of reasons, and naturalistic forms of realism, I also have particular interests in critiquing common appeals to natural teleology and/or evolution in metaethical or ethical arguments.

Normative Ethical Theory

Much of my work in normative ethics has focused on resisting consequentialism, particularly through defenses of the Doctrine of Double Effect against various recent objections.

Applied Ethics

My work in applied ethics has been mainly in bioethics (the moral status of embryos, non-reproductive cloning, ethical issues in human subjects research) and in environmental ethics (the non-instrumental value of nature; climate change and the rights of future generations).

Courses Offered (subject to change)

  • PHL 103  Moral Problems
  • PHL 225  Ethical Decisions in Medicine

Selected Publications

Books

  • Teleology and the Norms of Nature (New York: Garland, 2000).

Articles and Chapters

  • "How Not To Be an Ethical Constructivist: A Critique of Korsgaard’s Neo-Kantian Constitutivism," forthcoming.
  • "Intention, Permissibility, and Double Effect," forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
  • "Worth/Dignity," forthcoming in the International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
  • "The Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility,” in Philosophy Compass, 7(3): 183-196 (March, 2012).
  • "Biology, Evolution, and Ethics," in the Continuum Companion to Ethics (London: Continuum, 2011).
  • "Ethical Non-Naturalism and Normative Properties," in Michael Brady ed., New Waves in Metaethics (Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).
  • "Recent Work on Ethical Realism," Analysis Reviews 69:4 (October, 2009).
  • "Thomson's Turnabout on the Trolley," Analysis 69:4 (October, 2009).
  • "Morality and Evolutionary Biology," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (December 2008).
  • "Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge," Ethics, Vol. 118, No. 4 (July, 2008).
  • "Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism and Normativity," Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
  • "Teleology," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. William A. Darity, Jr., Vol. 8. 2nd ed. (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008).
  • "Climate Change and the Rights of Future Generations: Social Justice Beyond Mutual Advantage," Environmental Ethics, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Winter 2007).
  • "The Intend/Foresee Distinction and the Problem of Closeness," Philosophical Studies, Vol. 128, No. 3 (April, 2006).
  • "The Practical Turn In Ethical Theory: Korsgaard's Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity," Ethics Vol. 115, No. 4 (July, 2005).
  • "Valuing Nature Non-Instrumentally," The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 38 (2004).
  • "Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents: Normative Relevance Without Motivational Internalism," Mind Vol. 113, Issue 450 (April, 2004).
  • "Ethical Pluralism Without Complementarity," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring 2004).
  • "Totipotency and the Moral Status of Embryos: New Problems for an Old Argument," Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 35 No. 1 (Spring 2004).
  • "Acts, Intentions, and Moral Permissibility: In Defense of the Doctrine of Double Effect," Analysis, 63:4 (October 2003).
  • "Surplus Embryos, Non-Reproductive Cloning, and the Intend/Foresee Distinction," The Hastings Center Report 33:3 (May/June 2003). *Reprinted in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 7th edition, ed. by Bonnie Steinbock, Alex John London and John D. Arras (McGraw Hill, 2007).
  • "Defending Against Biochemical Warfare: Ethical Issues Involving the Coercive Use of Investigational Drugs and Biologics in the Military," with Lee Zwanziger, The Journal of Philosophy, Science and Law (Vol. 3, March, 2003).
  • "O'Neill and Korsgaard on the Construction of Normativity," with Eric Watkins, The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 36, Nos. 2-3 (summer, 2002).
  • "Ethical Concerns Over Testing on Human Subjects," Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: Vol. 7, No. 6 (2001).

Reviews

  • Review of Judith Jarvis Thomson, Normativity (Chicago: Open Court, 2008), Ethics, Vol. 120, No. 2 (January, 2010).
  • Review of Richard Dean, The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Mind, Vol. 116, Issue 464 (October, 2007).
  • Review of Michael Byron, ed., Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Philosophical Books (July, 2007): http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2007.00449_9.x
  • Review of Giovanni Boniolo and Gabriele De Anna, eds., Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, April 2, 2007: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9205
  • Review of Joseph Raz, The Practice of Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Ethics, Vol. 116, No. 4 (July, 2006).

Work in Progress or Under Review

  • "Practical Reason, Good Action, and the Normative Authority of Morality”
  • "Debunking Evolutionary Debunking of Ethical Realism," to be presented at the 2011 Eastern APA, Symposium Session on Evolution and Metaethics, with Sharon Street and Karl Schafer.
  • "Humanity, Persons and Dignity: Kantian and Non-Kantian Approaches"