Comments are very much welcome on any of the working papers below:

A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence (with Ahmer Tarar)

We present a unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence -- unified in the sense that we employ our theoretical deterrence model as our statistical model in the empirical analysis. The theoretical model is a straightforward formalization of the extended immediate deterrence logic in Huth (1988), coupled with private information concerning utilities. Contrary to Huth (1988), our empirical analysis suggests that nuclear weapons, military alliances, military arms transfers, and foreign trade all affect deterrence success. Our model correctly predicts almost 97\% of the potential Attacker's actions and over 91\% of the crisis outcomes. Finally, we find strong evidence that the likelihood of deterrence success and of war are not monotonically related to the variables involved in the deterrence calculus. This contradicts a fundamental assumption of most previous studies.

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Discriminating Methods: Tests for Nonnested Discrete Choice Models (with Kevin Clarke)

We consider the problem of choosing between rival models that are nonnested in terms of their functional forms. We discuss both a parametric and distribution-free procedure for making this choice, and demonstrate through a monte carlo simulation that discrimination is possible. The results of the simulation also allow us to compare the relative power of the two tests.

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A Statistical Model of the Divide-the-Dollar Game (with Kris Ramsay)

In this paper we derive a statistical estimator for the popular divide-the-dollar bargaining game. Using monte carlo data generated by a strategic bargaining process, we show that the estimator correctly recovers the relationship between dependent variables, such as the proposed division and bargaining failure, relative to substantive variables that comprise players' utilities. We then use the model to analyze bargaining data in a number of contexts. The current example examines the effects of demographics on bargaining behavior in experiments conducted on U.S. and Russian participants. Examples concerning international conflicts and international trade are currently being added.

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Picking a Fight: Disputes, Deterrence, and War-Time Alliances (with Robert Walker and Muhammet Ali Bas)

We specify and test a game theoretic model of triadic interstate conflict. Scholars of international conflict have elaborated a number of explanations for interstate dispute escalation, reciprocation, and diffusion, but have yet to consider these explanations in an interrelated fashion. We assess the impacts of issues, nuclear and conventional military capabilities, similarity of interests, and domestic political regimes on the decisions to escalate, reciprocate, and join a militarized interstate dispute using an iterated version of \possessivecite{signorino-99} statistical models for extensive form games. The results suggest that potential joiners are of critical importance in understanding the escalation and reciprocation of interstate disputes.

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