

**Political Science 568: International Organization**  
**Friday, 9:30-11:55, Fenno Room (Harkness 329)**

**Fall 2007**

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Harkness Hall 336  
273-4761

**Purpose of the course:** This is an advanced course intended for Ph.D. students. The course conducts a broad survey of the field, focusing on theories of international organization, and historical examples, contemporary .

**Course Requirements:** Each student writes a data-based research paper (20-25 pages, described below). A draft of the research paper is due Monday, December 3, at 5:00 pm, and the final version is due December 17 at 12:00 noon. Each student will have at least two opportunities to present preliminary versions of the paper during the semester. In addition, there will be a take-home final exam, due December 19 at 4:00 pm. Grading: 1/3 class participation, 1/3 final paper, 1/3 final. Note also the Block Seminar on Saturday, December 8, when all students will present their papers. Please reserve the day; we may go off campus for a change of venue.

**Research Papers:** Although the papers are short (no more than 25 pages, please), the standards are high. The papers are expected to formulate a hypothesis, ground it in appropriate literature, illustrate an argument or puzzle using qualitative evidence, and test the hypothesis using quantitative evidence. Please speak to me before the second class so I can get you started.

**Books:**

Bayne, Nicholas, and Robert Putnam. *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the The Seven-Power Summits*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984. Revised Edition, 1988.

John H. Barton, Judith L. Goldstein, Timothy E. Josling, Richard H. Steinberg. 2005. *The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO*.

Blustein, Paul. 2001. *The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF*. New York: Public Affairs.

Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds. 2000. *Legalization and World Politics: A Special Issue of International Organization*. *International Organization* 54 (3) (Summer).

Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006.

IEO. 2003. *The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil*. Washington, D.C.: Independent Evaluation Office, International Monetary Fund. (Available for free download from the IEO website.)

Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, eds. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4) (Autumn 2001). Reprinted as *Rational Design: Explaining the Form of International Institutions*, Cambridge University Press, January 2004.

Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1998.

***Course Outline:***

Sept. 7: Overview

Sept. 14: Public Goods and Transaction Costs

Sept. 21: Institutional Design

Sept. 28: Delegation and Agency

Oct. 5: Student Presentations

Oct. 12: Informal Institutions and International Law

Oct. 19: Informal Governance

Oct. 26: Credibility and Institutional Effectiveness

Nov. 2: Coordination

Nov. 9: No class

Nov. 16: Student Presentations

Nov. 23: Institutional Change: The WTO

Nov. 30: Institutional Change: The European Union

Dec. 7: Thin Institutions

***Course Outline:***

***Sept. 7: Overview***

Stone, Randall W. 2008. Institutions, Power and Interdependence. In Helen Milner and Andrew Moravcsik, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

***Sept. 14: Public Goods and Transaction Costs***

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

Stone, Randall W., Branislav Slantchev and Tamar London. 2008. Choosing How to Cooperate. *International Studies Quarterly*. (Forthcoming, June).

Gilligan, Michael J. 2008. A Defense of the Transactions Costs Approach to Understanding International Institutions. In Milner and Moravcsik, eds., Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. (On his web page.)

Simmons, Beth A. 1993. Why Innovate? Founding the Bank for International Settlements. *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 3. (Apr.): 361-405.

***Sept. 21: Institutional Design***

Koremenos, Barbara. Contracting around International Uncertainty," *American Political Science Review* 99: 549-65, November 2005.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, eds. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4) (Autumn). Reprinted as *Rational Design: Explaining the Form of International Institutions*, Cambridge University Press, January 2004.

***Sept. 28: Delegation and Agency***

Vaubel, Roland. A Public Choice Approach to International Organization. *Public Choice* 51 (1986): 39-57.

Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization* 57 (2) (Spring): 241-76.

***Oct. 5: Student Presentations***

***Oct. 12: Informal Institutions and International Law***

Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan), Chapters 1, 2.

Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds. 2000. *Legalization and World Politics: A Special Issue of International Organization*. *International Organization* 54 (3) (Summer).

***Oct. 19: Informal Governance***

Stone, Randall W. 2007. *The Informal Governance of the IMF: Lessons from Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, Brazil and Argentina*. Manuscript, University of Rochester.

Blustein, Paul. 2001. *The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF*. New York: Public Affairs.

IEO. 2003. *The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil*. Washington, D.C.: Independent Evaluation Office, International Monetary Fund.

***Oct. 26: Credibility and Institutional Effectiveness***

Steinwand, Martin, and Randall W. Stone. *The International Monetary Fund: A Review of the Recent Evidence*. *Review of International Organizations* (forthcoming, 2008).

Stone, Randall W. *Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002).

***Nov. 2: Coordination***

Bayne, Nicholas, and Robert Putnam. *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the The Seven-Power Summits*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984. Revised Edition, 1988.

Rogoff, Kenneth. 1999. International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Autumn), pp. 21-42.

Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1995. Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination. In Grossman and Rogoff, eds., *Handbook of International Economics*, Vol. III, Amsterdam: North-Holland.

***Nov. 9: No class***

***Nov. 16: Student Presentations***

***Nov. 23: Thanksgiving Break***

***Nov. 30: Institutional Change: The WTO***

John H. Barton, Judith L. Goldstein, Timothy E. Josling, Richard H. Steinberg. 2005. *The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO*.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. "Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements." *International Organization* 57 (4) (Fall): 829-62.

***Dec. 7: Institutional Change: The European Union***

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. *International Organization* 52 (2) (Spring): 397-419.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press.

Tsebelis, G. and G. Garrett. 2001. "The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union" *International Organization* 55(2):357-90.

Henning, C. Randall. 1998. Systemic Conflict and Monetary Integration in Europe. *International Organization* 52 (3) (Summer): 537-74.