Faculty

William T. Bluhm
Nora Bredes
Kevin Clarke
Alexandre Debs
Richard Dees
John Duggan
Richard Fenno
Mark Fey
Edward Fiandach
Gerald Gamm

Hein Goemans
Ewa Hauser
Gretchen Helmke
Thomas Jackson
Bruce Jacobs
James Johnson
Stuart Jordan
Tasos Kalandrakis
Mark Kayser
Bonnie Meguid
Richard Niemi
Michael Peress
Charles Phelps
G. Bingham Powell
Lynda Powell
David Primo
Peter Regenstreif
Lawrence Rothenberg
Joel Seligman
Curtis Signorino
Valeria Sinclair-Chapman
Randall Stone

  John Duggan
Professor of Political Science and Economics

Director of the W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy

dugg@mail.rochester.edu
Harkness Hall 111
585-273-4999
homepage

PhD, Caltech, 1995. Positive political theory, social choice theory, game theory. Managing editor of Social Choice and Welfare, former editor of Journal of Economic Theory and Mathematical Social Sciences. Current work is on dynamic models of bargaining and elections, multi-dimensional spatial models of political competition, informational aspects of voting and elections, and incentives in social planning problems. Publications include "Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates," Games and Economic Behavior (2007); "Endogenous Voting Agendas," Social Choice and Welfare (2006); "Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model," Journal of Economic Theory (2006); "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior (2001); "Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information," Economics and Politics (2000); "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," American Political Science Review (2000); "Strategic Manipulability without Resoluteness or Shared Beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Generalized," Social Choice and Welfare (2000); "Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica (1997); and "Arrow's Theorem in Public Good Environments with Convex Technologies," Journal of Economic Theory (1996). Teaches courses in the field of positive theory.
...................................................................................................................................
Courses:
PSC 281 Formal Models in Political Science
PSC 407 Mathematical Modeling
PSC 408 Positive Political Theory
PSC 575 Political Economy I
PSC 585 Dynamic and Computational Modeling

© 2008 — University of Rochester
Last modified: April 25, 2008 10:55:28 am EST