University of Rochester Political Science Department

Mark Fey
Associate Professor of Political Science

mark.fey@rochester.edu
Harkness Hall 109E
585-275-5810
homepage

PhD, Caltech, 1995. Positive political theory, game theory, social choice theory. Current research focuses on voting and elections, comparative electoral systems, and international conflict. Publications include "Mutual Optimism and War," American Journal of Political Science (forthcoming); "The Swing Voter's Curse with Adversarial Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory (2007); "The Common Priors Assumption: A Comment on Bargaining and the Nature of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution (2006); "Repeated Downsian Electoral Competition," International Journal of Game Theory (2006); "Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates," (with John Duggan), Games and Economic Behavior (2005); "May's Theorem with an Infinite Population," Social Choice and Welfare, (2004); "A Note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Supermajority Rules," Social Choice and Welfare, (2003); "The Swing Voter's Curse: Comment," American Economic Review (2002); and "Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Pre-Election Polls and Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review (1997). Teaches courses in the field of positive theory.

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Courses:

PSC 200	Applied Data Analysis
PSC 281	Formal Models in Political Science
PSC 286	Political Economy
PSC 407	Mathematical Modeling
PSC 408	Positive Political Theory
PSC 575	Political Economy I
PSC 577	Theories of Conflict
PSC 582/586	Theory of Voting and Elections
PSC 584	Game Theory