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Her research interests are in American politics with a focus on Congress, parties, and ideal point estimation. Her dissertation examines the causes and consequences of party polarization in Congress. In the first of three essays, she argues that the dramatic increase in polarization over the last 30 years can be attributed to changes in the distribution of evangelical members among the two parties' congressional contingents. The remaining essays examine the responses of presidents and party leaders to the increasingly polarized environment. The second essay argues that Republican presidents gain leverage in nomination battles with ideologically distant senators by nominating women and minorities, exploiting senators' reluctance to oppose such nominations. The final essay explores the role of party loyalty in the committee assignment process during a period of high polarization using new measures of preferences and party support.

Publications: "Female and Minority Judicial Nominees: President's Delight and Senators' Dismay?" Forthcoming in Legislative Studies Quarterly, November, 2011

Awards: Patrick J. Fett Award for the best paper on the scientific study of Congress and the presidency presented at the 2009 MPSA Conference

"New Faces in Political Methodology" Conference participant, 2011

She defended her Ph.D. thesis in July 2011.

She is now on Post-doctoral fellowship at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Vanderbilt University

Advisors: Lawrence Rothenberg, David Primo, Michael Peress

His dissertation asks the question: do states behave differently when they are being observed? He addresses the puzzle by investigating how observation by hostile third parties affects international crisis bargaining. Paper one presents a formal theoretical model of state behavior under observation. It shows that a state will bargain harder when being observed, in the hopes of keeping the third party unsure about its strength. This should increase the likelihood of war. Paper two uses a new estimator, the local logit, to assess the empirical implications statistically. Finally, paper three applies the framework to mediation both theoretically and empirically, examining whether observation affects a state's willingness to accept terms offered by a mediator. When offers are made by an outside mediator, observation can make states more willing to settle, reducing the likelihood of war.

Publications: "Being bin Laden: An Applied Decision Analysis Procedure for Analyzing and Predicting Terrorist Decisions." In Ami Pedahzur, ed., Suicide Terrorism: Root Causes of the Culture of Death. Routledge 2006. (With Alex Mintz and David Brul'e)
"The Effects of Trust in Government on Rallies 'Round the Flag" (invited to revise and resubmit, Journal of Peace Research)

Awards: Humane Studies Fellowship, Institute of Humane Studies, 2011-2012; W. Allen Wallis Fellowship in Political Economy, 2010-2011.

He presented papers at Midwest 2006, 2010, 2011; ISA 2007; Southern 2011; Methods 2011. He also has a co-authored book and a paper under review.

Advisors: Curtis Signorino, Hein Goemans, Mark Fey

His dissertation focuses on how institutional rules affect decisionmaking in the United States. The first essay uses a formal model to examine how bureaucratic appointments are made when bargaining takes place over both agency preferences and competence. Under perfect information, agency incompetence does not result when the principals are solely concerned with policy. He then shows that the inclusion of nonpolicy incentives can induce incompetence. In the second essay, he estimates the influence of interest groups in the nominations process, then showing how this influence affects agency performance. The final essay introduces to political science the Weibull count model, which, under certain conditions, provides more accurate results than conventional count models. He uses this model to argue that the ability of the president to rally public support for his or her cause plays a larger role than previously thought when determining how bureaucratic agencies are designed.

Publications: "Does it Really Hurt to Be Out of Step?" (with Lawrence S. Rothenberg and Kristin K. Rulison, invited to revise and resubmit, Political Research Quarterly)

Awards: Latino Caucus Award (best paper by a Latino scholar at Midwest), 2011. Provost's Diversity Fellowship 2007-present.

He presented papers at Midwest 2010, 2011; APSA 2011; Methods 2010; Southern 2011. He has papers under review.

Advisors: Lawrence Rothenberg, David Primo, Stuart Jordan

Her dissertation consists of three essays on the UN Security Council. The first chapter examines the nomination and election process of nonpermanent members, and finds that pro-U.S. countries and countries that do not have a reputation for free-riding are more likely to obtain seats on the Council. The second chapter analyzes agenda-setting of the Council, and finds that domestic conflicts in countries that are allies and former colonies of the permanent members are negatively linked to the agenda while conflicts involving permanent members are more likely to enter the agenda. The third chapter examines the voting patterns of Council members when the Council imposes sanctions, and finds that while democracies and economic giants were less inclined to use sanctions during the Cold War, they became frequent supporters of sanctions in the post-Cold war era. Three data sets have been produced from this research: data on both elected and nominated members, Council roll-call votes, and states’ contributions to the UN regular budget.

Other research:

• "The Selection and Signaling Effects of Third-Party Intervention." (under review).
• "Estimation of a Simultaneous-Response Model."

W. Allen Wallis Fellow in Political Economy, 2008-2009.

Awards: "Theory and Statistical Research Laboratory Paper Prize," University of Rochester, 2010; "APSA Travel Grant Award" 2010. The Star Lab Fellowship 2011.

Advisors: Hein Goemans, Michael Peress, Curtis Signorino

Her dissertation is a series of essays that explore various aspects of presidential appointments using formal models and statistical data analysis. In the first of three essays, she takes a dynamic approach to show that the timing of Senate approval of presidential nominees depends on the president's popularity, the ideological distance between the president and the Senate, and their interaction. Empirical analysis of appellate court nominations from 1977-2004 supports the implications of the model. The second essay shows that when a politically-appointed agency head cannot completely control her subordinates, the president is often better off by appointing non-allies rather than allies. Finally, the third essay (with Lawrence S. Rothenberg), which is forthcoming in Journal of Theoretical Politics, provides an explanation for why the president sometimes appoints an incompetent and why the Senate is willing to confirm such nomination. The model corresponds with contemporary cases of seemingly incompetent administration.

Publications: "Rational Incompetence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, forthcoming (with Lawrence Rothenberg.)
"Non-uniqueness of the Equilibrium in Lewis and Schultz's Model," Political Analysis, 2011.

She presented papers at APSA 2009, 2010; Midwest 2009, 2010, 2011; Methods 2010.

Advisors: Lawrence Rothenberg, Mark Fey, David Primo

His dissertation is about leaders' incentives for initiating interstate and civil violence. His job market paper, "Why Generals Fight More", proposes a novel theory of international conflict based on leaders' incentives to manipulate the salience of foreign policy for electoral gain. He argues that leaders competent in security matters may provoke hostilities in order to maintain their future value to voters, whereas leaders less competent in this area may make unnecessarily large concessions in order to settle quickly. Empirical analyses using new data on leaders' background support the theory's predictions. His second paper argues that previous analyses on leader payoffs from victory and defeat overlooked their long-term effects. He presents new evidence of substantial long-term benefits to winning wars for parliamentary leaders. His third paper presents a theory of who makes coups. Using instrumental variable techniques it shows that after the Cold War coups have become less harmful for economic growth.

Awards: W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy Fellowship, 2011. Richard F. Fenno Research Grant (for field work), 2009.

He presented papers at Midwest 2009, 2010; APSA 2009, 2011; International Association for Conflict Management 2011.

Field Research: Conducted research at UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and interviews with officials at the UN and Turkish Embassy, collected data on UN peacekeeping personnel and casualties.

Advisors: Hein Goemans, Curtis Signorino, Mark Fey

His dissertation "When Ballots Spark Bullets" examines the political, social, and economic circumstances under which elections spark violence using game theoretic models, statistical methods, and qualitative case studies. At the macro-level, he argues that the persistent differences in pre-electoral violence across Sub-Saharan African countries are a function of the electoral system and the level of economic inequality between the candidates' supporters. At the micro-level, he shows how the structure of the electorate and differences in campaign resources determine the primary perpetrator and targets of campaign violence. The third section focuses on post-electoral violence. It shows formally that the decision of an election loser to accept or challenge an election outcome depends largely on the informativeness of the election process. To assess these arguments, he provides statistical evidence using original and secondary datasets and traces the proposed causal mechanisms with qualitative case studies.

Field Work: Senegal, West Africa, 2010.

He presented papers at Midwest in 2009, 2010, 2011, EPSA 2011, APSA 2010 and 2011.

Publications: "Is There an Environmental Version of the Kantian Peace? Insights From Water Pollution in Europe." European Journal of International Relations 16(1), 77-102 (co-authored with Thomas Bernauer).

Taught his own course: PSC 164 - Politics of Authoritarian Regimes, 2010, 2011.

Advisors: Gretchen Helmke, Alexandre Debs, Bonnie Meguid

Her primary research interests are Conflict, Peace and Security Studies.

Her dissertation explores the relationship between domestic accountability and war and peacemaking. First, she argues that war propensity hinges on the degree to which policy-making power is shared, and not simply whether a regime is a democracy or dictatorship; power sharing rules determine who the public holds responsible for war outcomes, while regime type determines the cost of electoral accountability. Second, she shows how the confidentiality of mediation allows a leader to offer peaceful concessions and avoid domestic punishment: confidentiality fosters audience uncertainty about the origins of offers. Her results show how the public benefits from supporting its leader who potentially backed down behind closed doors: peace is more likely, and any war that results from the breakdown of talks is more likely to be won. She draws from field work to show how audience uncertainty allowed for the success of the 1998 peace accords between Ecuador and Peru. In her third essay, she uses statistical analyses to show how domestic pressure and war expectations affect the choice over conflict resolution forums, and their potential success.

She expects to defend her dissertation in the fall of 2011. This year she is a College Fellow at Harvard University with additional support from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.

Field Work: Interviews with government and military members involved in the Peruvian-Ecuadorian Cenepa War and subsequent mediation, Ecuador 2008.

Publications: "Influence in Terrorist Networks: From Undirected to Directed Graphs" with Steven Brams (NYU), and Hande Mutlu (NYU), Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29(7) Oct-Nov 2006: 703-718.

Awards: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Research Award (2011-2012); Honored Faculty for the Take Five Scholars Program at U of R (2011); Political Science Department Outstanding Graduate Student Teaching Award (2008).

Advisors: Hein Goemans, Mark Fey, Gretchen Helmke, Beth Simmons.