

Professor David Primo
Harkness 318
david.primo@rochester.edu

Professor Lawrence Rothenberg
Harkness 108
lrot@mail.rochester.edu

PSC 540

Models in American Politics: Theory & Data

Course Description

In recent years there has been an upsurge in American politics research that combines formal modeling and data analysis. In this seminar we will critically examine the strengths and weaknesses of this approach and explore some of the major contributions to this literature. Topics will include party power, interbranch bargaining, delegation, lobbying, and the role of formal rules. You may obtain many of the readings from us electronically, with the exception of starred items which are multiple chapters from books. These books will be made available on one-day course reserve, and of course you may also purchase them. Course readings may change slightly during the semester.

Course Requirements

In-Class Presentations (25% of grade). Each week students will present some or all of the week's readings. These presentations, as well as general class participation, are vital to the success of a graduate seminar.

Midterm Essay (25% of grade). This will be handed out on October 9 and will be due on October 23. We will ask you a question or set of questions that require you to apply what you have learned in the course to date.

Research Design (50% of grade). You will be required to prepare a research design that connects models and data. You will present these research designs during the final class meeting, with the final research design being due December 18.

Sessions

Week 1 (Sept. 11): Introduction and Overview

No Reading

Week 2 (Sept. 18): Connecting Models and Data

*Morton, Rebecca B. 2000. *Methods and Models*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chs. 1, 4-8.

Various Authors. 2004. "Symposium: Two Paths to a Science of Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 2:295-324.

Clarke, Kevin A., and David M. Primo. 2006. "Modernizing Political Science: A Model-Based Approach." Working Paper. University of Rochester.

(Optional) National Science Foundation. 2002. "EITM: Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models." Political Science Program Report.

Week 3 (Sept. 25): Legislatures I

Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. "The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data." *American Political Science Review* 98:355-370.

Snyder, James M., Jr., and Tim Groseclose. 2000. "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 44:193-211.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. "The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 95: 673-687.

Snyder, James M., Jr., and Tim Groseclose. 2001. "Estimating Party Influence on Roll Call Voting: Regression Coefficients versus Classification Success." *American Political Science Review* 95:689-698.

Snyder, James M., Jr., and Michael M. Ting. 2003. "Roll Calls, Party Labels, and Elections." *Political Analysis* 11:419-444.

(Optional) Patty, John W. 2005. "Conditional Partisanship: Looking for Partisan Effects on Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House." Working Paper. Harvard University.

Week 4 (Oct. 2): Legislatures II

*Cox, Gary W., and Matthew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chs. 1-3, 5.

Chiou, Fang-Yi, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2003. "When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 47:503-522.

Krehbiel, Keith, Adam Meirowitz, and Jonathan Woon. 2005. "Testing Theories of Lawmaking." In *Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks*, eds. David Austen-Smith and John Duggan. New York: Springer-Verlag, 249-268.

Clinton, Joshua D. 2006. "Testing Lawmaking Theories." Working Paper. Princeton University.

Week 5 (Oct. 9): Legislatures III

Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane, and Antonio Merlo. 2005. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers." *American Economic Review* 95:347-373.

Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 95:981-1004.

Frechette, Guillaume R., John H. Kagel, and Steven F. Lehrer. 2003. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules." *American Political Science Review* 97:221-232.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Michael M. Ting. 2003. "Bargaining in Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter?" *American Political Science Review* 97:471-481.

Krehbiel, Keith, and Douglas Rivers. 1988. "The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage." *American Journal of Political Science* 32:1151-1174.

(Optional) Dietz, Nathan, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2003. "Valuing Policy Alternatives: A Generalization." *Political Analysis* 11:397-418.

Week 6 (Oct. 23): Presidency

Moe, Terry M. 1993. "Presidents, Institutions, and Theory." In *Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches*, eds. George C. Edwards III, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 337-385.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Michael C. Herron, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2001. "Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:532-550.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2004. "The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 48:690-706.

*Howell, William G. 2003. *Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chs. 1-4.

Week 7 (Oct. 30): Interbranch Bargaining I

*Cameron, Charles M. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chs. 4-6.

Groseclose, Tim, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:100-119.

McCarty, Nolan M., and Keith T. Poole. 1995. "Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 11:282-312.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1988. "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions." *American Journal of Political Science* 32:713-736.

(Optional) Cameron, Charles, and Nolan McCarty. 2004. "Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:409-435.

Week 8 (Nov. 6): Interbranch Bargaining II

Krehbiel, Keith. 2006. "Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game." Working Paper. Stanford University.

Primo, David M., Sarah A. Binder, and Forrest Maltzman. 2005. "Who Consents? A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Pivotal Senators in Judicial Selection." Working Paper. University of Rochester.

Shipan, Charles R., and Megan L. Shannon. 2003. "Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations." *American Journal of Political Science* 47:654-668.

Snyder, Susan K., and Barry R. Weingast. 2000. "The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 16:269-305.

Week 9 (Nov. 13): Judicial Politics

Caldeira, Gregory A., John A. Wright, and Christopher J.W. Zorn. 1999. "Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 15:549-572.

Segal, Jeffrey A. 1997. "Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts." *American Political Science Review* 91:28-44.

Segal, Jeffrey A. 1998. "Correction to 'Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts.'" *American Political Science Review* 92:923-926.
(See Groseclose and Schiavoni for a correction to the formal theory.)

Songer, Donald R., Jeffrey A. Segal, and Charles M. Cameron. 1994. "The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions." *American Journal of Political Science* 38:673-696.

Cameron, Charles M., Jeffrey A. Segal, and Donald Songer. 2000. "Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions." *American Political Science Review* 94:101-116.

Week 10 (Nov. 20): Bureaucracy I

*Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chs. 4, 6.

Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. "Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:330-345.

Volden, Craig. 2002. "Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 18:187-220.

Bendor, Jonathan, and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. "Spatial Models of Delegation." *American Political Science Review* 98:293-310.

Week 11 (Nov. 27): Bureaucracy II

Moe, Terry M. 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." In John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, *Can the Government Govern?* Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 267-329.

Carpenter, Daniel P., and David E. Lewis. 2004. "Political Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints, and the Lifetime of Bureaus." *Political Analysis* 12:201-232.

Banks, Jeffrey S., and Barry R. Weingast. 1992. "The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information." *American Journal of Political Science* 36:509-524.

Whitford, Andrew B. 2005. "A Test of the Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information." Working Paper. University of Georgia.

Scholz, John T., and Wayne B. Gray. 1997. "Can Government Facilitate Cooperation? An Informational Model of OSHA Enforcement." *American Journal of Political Science* 41:693-717.

Week 12 (Dec. 4): Interest Groups

Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. 1992. "Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator's Vote." *Social Choice and Welfare* 9:229-257.

Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. 1992. "Counteractive Lobbying." *American Journal of Political Science* 38:25-44.

Gordon, Sanford C., and Catherine Hafer. 2005. "Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy." *American Political Science Review* 99:245-261.

Wand, Jonathan. 2006. "The Allocation of Campaign Contributions by Interest Groups and the Rise of Elite Polarization." Working Paper. Stanford University.

Week 13 (Dec. 11): Project Presentations