The Politics of Uneven Mobilization: Caste in Colonial India Online Appendix

August 19, 2014

1 Additional Tables

2 Case Studies

In this section I will briefly describe the historical experiences of three Indian castes in the colonial period. They were chosen to illustrate different levels of the key independent variable, literacy: One group (the Madigas) with a very low level of literacy and a correspondingly low level of political engagement, one group (Shanans) with intermediate level of literacy and high levels of caste mobilization, and one group (Bihari Kayasths) with very high levels of literacy that produced weak caste mobilization, but very high levels of political involvement overall.

2.1 Intermediate Literacy leads to Ethnic Mobilization: The Shanan/Nadars

The Shanans of Tamil Nadu were a large caste traditionally associated with the harvesting of coconuts and the production of toddy liquor, though in practice the majority of Shanans worked as ordinary tenant farmers. The caste was not considered a prestigious

Table A.1: Summary statistics

Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Variable	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max
Varies by Jati-Province-Year					
Male Population Share	1130	0.028	0.033	0	0.277
Male Population 000s	1130	259.99	365.63	1.5	3226.
Literacy Rate	920	0.129	0.166	0	0.936
Litrate Sq.	920	0.044	0.102	0	0.877
Prop of Province with higher Status	1130	0.054	0.112	0	0.476
Proportion Cultivators and Landowers	606	0.390	0.272	0	0.991
Proportion In Public Administration	606	0.019	0.053	0	0.592
Proportion in Traditional Occupation	606	0.452	0.282	0	0.985
Proportion Govt. Officers	732	0.00038	0.0015	0	0.0204
Industry Owners Rate	730	0.001	0.003	0	0.035
Industry Owners Rate Sq.	730	0	0	0	0.001
Prop. of Gazetted Officers	730	0	0.002	0	0.02
Prop. of Congress Delegates	521	0.016	0.08	0	0.728
Absolute change in pop.	1079	0.216	1.090	0	29.88
Varies by Province-Year					
Proportion Urban	1130	0.060	0.026	0.018	0.134
Proportion Literate	1130	0.056	0.033	0.023	0.174
Proportion In Public Administration	969	0.011	0.007	0.001	0.023
Provincial Population	1130	27532	16350	2033	51087
Congress Attendees/Pop. 000s	616	0.007	0.014	0.0002	0.067
Logged Land Revenue per capita	758	22.57	9.187	7.83	40.7
Prop. Brahmans	1130	0.068	0.032	0.022	0.131
Proportion Hindu	1130	0.780	0.170	0.315	0.959
Prop. Arya Samaj	1130	0.001	0.003	0	0.017
Prop. Christians	1130	0.021	0.052	0.001	0.315
Prop of Petitions Granted	1101	0.124	0.271	0	1.
Status Based Census Classif.	1130	0.598	0.490	0	1.
Varies by Jati					
Untouchable Caste	1130	0.218	0.413	0	1.
Lower OBC Caste	1130	0.381	0.486	0	1.
Upper OBC Caste	1130	0.181	0.385	0	1.
Intermediate Caste	1130	0.116	0.320	0	1.
Upper Caste	1130	0.105	0.307	0	1.

Figure 1: Average Male Literacy Rates of Selected Castes by year, 1891-1931



one in Tamil society, and Shanans shared with other lower castes a set of humiliating markers of their low ritual status, most notably a ban on Shanan women to cover their upper body. Despite the general poverty of the community, there existed a literate Shanan elite associated with tax collection and small trade. There even existed a wealthy subcaste, the Nadans, who owned whole villages and adopted the manners of local aristocrats (Templeman 1996: 18-29.) This elite grew in size in the 19th century, as the growth of the South Indian economy improved the position of tenants and Christian missionaries expanded access to education among traditionally poor groups (Hardgrave 1969: 43-55.) While some escaped the most hated aspects of the group's low ritual status by conversion to Christianity, on the whole the social aspirations of the Nadar elite were channeled into attempts to gain a more prestigious position within the caste system through traditional means. This process was opposed by upper caste groups and often turned violent, most notably in the Upper Cloth Controversy of 1857-58, when Shanan women in the state of Travancore won the right to cover their upper bodies, and the Sivakasi riots of 1899, where the demands of wealthy Nadars to be admitted to temples led to violence between them and members of the Maravan caste (Sobhanan 1985.)

These mobilization demands only became more strident in the late colonial period,

and the Shanan elite began to pursue its goals through formalized political organizations, most notably the Nadar Mahajana Sangam. The Sangam led efforts to improve the social status of the Nadar community through the adoption of normatively desirable Hindu practices such as the wearing of the sacred thread, the abandonment of toddy tapping, and the feeding of Brahmans. This was coupled, especially in the 20th century, by the development of a massive private social service network, which included not only scholarships and aid to the needy but a well-capitalized bank and one of India's first private universities. The Sangam repeatedly petitioned the colonial census to help it avoid the name Shanan, which it considered derogatory, and replace it either Kshatriya or Nadar. The Nadar elite also became a key player in Tamil politics, becoming closely identified with the anti-Congress (and anti-Brahman) Justice Party before switching their allegiance en masse to the Congress after independence (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967.)

2.2 No Elite, No mobilization: The Madigas

The Madigas, the traditional leatherworking caste of the Andhra coast, suffered even more extreme forms of discrimination in early colonial India than the Nadars. Considered untouchable, they were forced to perform degrading village chores like the preparation of latrines and the burial of the dead, while earning their living as the dependent laborers of upper caste landlords. The social changes of the 19th century were also less kind to the Madigas than they had been to the Nadars. The Andhra region was less heavily influenced by Christian missionaries than the Tamil areas, its agricultural sector substantially less advanced, and its cities smaller and poorer. The result was that an elite group never emerged among the Madiga as it had among the Shanans. At the 1911 census, only .8% of Madiga men were capable of writing their name, and a caste of 808,000 people recorded exactly 24 lawyers, doctors and teachers. With no educated group to speak on their behalf, the Madiga remained politically quiescent during the colonial period, neither forming a sabha, petitioning the census authorities, nor adopting Sanskritic behaviors. Only in the 1970s and 1980s, when a class of literate Madiga had finally emerged, did Madiga identity become politically important.

2.3 Too Rich to Mobilize: The Bihari Kayasths

The Kayasths are a North Indian caste traditionally connected with writing and scribal services. The Kayasths occupied a slightly ambiguous position in North Indian society, being well regarded but usually considered to be shudras rather than members of the three upper varnas. However, their bureaucratic tradition meant that the Kayasths were the first caste in Bihar to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by the spread of English education and the colonial civil service. This head start enabled the Kayasth elite to dominate Bihari politics in the first decades of the 20th century. In 1911, the Kayasths had 1.2% of the Bihari population but 32.5% of the gazetted civil service officers and 47.9% of the local delegates to the Indian National Congress.

Unlike The Kayasths of Bengal and UP (who faced a more competitive political environment,) the Kayasths of Bihar never emphasized their caste identity, instead claiming to represent the interests of all Biharis or all Indians, either within the idiom of bureaucratic service or Gandhian nationalism. Similarly, in electoral politics they did not function as a homogenous caste block, but rather as a set of personalist factions (Jaffrelot 2003.) As the group with the best access to western education in an extremely poor society, the Kayasth elite did not need caste sabhas or petitions to reinforce their power.

3 Data

Colonial India was divided into areas ruled by the British government, and areas in which sovereignty was delegated to native princes, usually descendants of early British allies. The directly ruled areas were divided into fairly large provinces, of which the most important were: The United Provinces, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Madras, Punjab, the Central Provinces and Berar, and Assam. Four very small provinces (two of which are overwhelmingly Muslim border areas) have been ignored.

The indirectly ruled areas were divided into three main groups: Four large states (Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad, Mysore and Baroda) that enjoyed a direct relationship with the central government, two large groups of states (the Rajputana Agency and

the Central Indian Agency) that reported to a political agent appointed by the central government, and a large number of states who reported to the political department of the local British province. The policy followed here has been to report the large states and agencies separately, as the equivalent of British provinces, and include the other states with the province that controlled them. The only exception to this was the large princely state of Travancore, which has been treated as separate from Madras.

There were several changes to provincial boundaries during this period, so I have consolidated and divided provinces to keep the unit of analysis consistent. For the 1891 and 1901 census years Berar has been treated as part of the Central Provinces even though it was in fact independent, and for the same years, Bihar has been treated separately even though it was in fact part of Bengal. In 1931 the recently created Western Indian States Agency is treated as part of Bombay, and for 1911, 1921 and 1931 Gwalior state is treated as part of the Central Indian

Subcastes (on which we have very limited information) will be treated as part of their parent jati. This choice is largely pragmatic: There is a large amount of ethnographic and case study evidence that jati was and is the primary identity on which castes are mobilized politically, and the primary focus of individuals identification in a local context.

Two major challenges in the collection of the data was the multiplicity of small castes in India and the large number of alternative names (and alternative spellings) for castes in different areas. The census superintendents generally tried to keep jatis separate, but at times they differed as to what constituted an independent jati. The most usual cross-year difference is that in the later census years, officials sometimes clubbed together castes practicing the same occupation but using different names and speaking different languages. The practice I have followed is to use the caste classifications used in 1891 (when nearly all the jatis were listed separately) and to divide aggregated groups using their relative proportions in the most recent year in which they were listed separately. Hyderabad in 1901, and Kashmir and Assam in all years, used highly aggregated and rapidly changing groupings of castes, making it difficult to trace any continuity from year to year. These province-years have been excluded from the analysis.

There were five province-years in which the census superintendent either did not

mention petitioning at all or noted receiving petitions but neglected to list them; all jatis in these province years have been coded as missing. Coding all these province years as having no petitions would slightly strengthen the reported results.

The caste hierarchy dummies are coded using the infamous tables of precedence compiled for the 1901 census, supplemented with information from the Castes and Tribes series for each province that were published in the same period. In all but a few cases the classifications agree with those made by the post-independence government for the purpose of affirmative action. The status variable is constructed as an ordinal variable four to nine, with each jati being assigned to a category. From highest to lowest, the categories are Brahmans, other clean twice-born castes (upper castes,) high status cultivating castes (Intermediate castes, middle castes, dominant castes), low status cultivating castes (Upper OBCs, unclean shudras), low status occupational castes (lower OBCs, artisan castes) and former untouchables (dalits, harijans.) While the terminology varies, this six-fold classification is familiar to India scholars, as it lies at the heart of most previous work on caste politics (Jaffrelot 2003, Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009, Frankel and Rao 1989) and is the format used in most contemporary surveys. While there is much blurring at the edges, particularly among the shudra categories, this scheme seems to capture certain important aspects of status hierarchy in India.

4 Robustness Checks and Alternative Tests

The theoretical mechanisms we have discussed are obviously not the only ones which may affect caste mobilization. This section discusses several alternative mechanisms that may be driving caste petitioning and examines whether they affect the primary results reported in section five.

4.1 Caste Status

One of the most basic alternative hypotheses is that petitioning is driven by pre-existing levels of social status ascribed to groups. Groups with a high level of status within the traditional caste hierarchy might have a lesser incentive to change their caste name, or

to take other steps for their political advancement. All the reported models thus include either fixed effects for the jati, or a set of dummy variables indicating the various level of the caste hierarchy. The reported result should thus be seen as showing the effects of divergence in literacy among groups of similar ritual status.

Table A.2: Number of Petitions by Caste Status

Caste Status	Castes with No Petition	Castes With Petition	Total	Petition Percent
Untouchable/Dalit	200	45	245	18.37
Lower OBC/Shudra	322	108	430	25.12
Upper OBC/Shudra	143	61	204	29.90
Intermediate/Dominant	101	30	131	22.90
Upper/"Twice Born"	62	17	79	21.52
Brahman	39	1	40	2.50
Total	868	262	1130	

In fact, there is considerable variance in petitioning, even among groups with a similar social status. Table Five shows the number of petitions by caste status level. The major empirical pattern is the virtual absence of petitioning among Brahmans, the groups at the top of the hierarchy, who cannot envisage improvement in their traditional social status. Otherwise, the differences among the various levels of status are relatively minor.

4.2 Instrumental Variables

The key identification strategy for the effect of socio-economic statuses of castes has been the panel design, which is based on the assumption that within jatis, provinces and years the relationship between mobilization and socioeconomic status is unlikely to be influenced by unobserved variables. It could be, however, that there is an endogenous or reverse causal relationship between ethnic mobilization and socio-economic status, with the ethnic mobilization causing a group to gain in wealth rather than the other way around.

To examine if this variable is affecting the reported results, I use an instrumental variables model that treats literacy and squared literacy as endogenous. The principal

instrumental variable is a vector of changes in global prices for the traditional products of a caste. The intuition is that a caste, while doing the same occupation it has been associated with for centuries, may receive an economic windfall when this product becomes more desirable in world markets.[1] The global price is calculated as the export price paid at the leading Indian port for that product, with prices being normalized relative to their 1891 levels. Global price changes are uninfluenced by Indian social and political patterns, and thus satisfy the exclusion restriction in that they influence the socio-economic status of castes without being correlated with the unobserved political and social factors affecting ethnic mobilization. As an additional instrument (intended to predict squared literacy,) I follow Wooldridge (2004:435-7) and use the squared predicted values from a version of the first stage regression for literacy rate.

There are several practical limitations to the price shock instrument, the most obvious being that it is only available for agricultural castes in British provinces, and that it varies relatively little within province-years, given that most provinces contain only a few weaving, toddy or oil pressing castes. It is impossible to include province dummy variable in the specification without perfectly predicting the majority of observations and grossly inflating the standard errors. The results presented below should be interpreted as reflecting cross-provincial as well and within-provincial differences in price changes. However, independent of the year and the proportion of the province under cash crops, there is also no reason to think that the price shocks are correlated with unobserved attributes of provinces or time periods.

Model One of Table A-2 Tests the simple first stage, with literacy rate as the dependent variable. Price shocks do in fact have a modest effect on literacy rates, one that just misses statistical significance. Models Two and Three report the two real first stages for literacy and literacy squared, both of which use as instruments the price shock variable and the squared predicted values from model one. Model four reports the second stage probit regression. The quadratic relationship between literacy holds good, with the effects of both literacy and literacy squared being statistically significant. This gives us some confidence that the reported results are not the result of the endogenaity

[1]The traditional products are jaggary sugar for toddy tapping castes, cotton for weaving castes, linseed oil for oil pressing castes, and a weighted average of all the province's agricultural products for agricultural castes. This last step is similar to that used by Jha and Bhavani (2011.)

of socioeconomic status.

4.3 Caste Hierarchy

One obvious potential hypothesis is that the variation we see in petitioning is not the product of variation in the spread of literacy, but rather variation in preexisting cultural conditions. Many have argued that caste norms are stronger in North India, the area first occupied by the Aryan invaders thought to have created the caste system and the area most influenced by Sanskritic culture. In particular, many observers have pointed to the small and "incomplete" position of the upper varnas in south Indian society, with the far south having only a few Brahmans and no groups universally acknowledged as Kshatriyas or Vaisyas (Frankel and Rao 1989, Kothari 1970.)

In its basic form, much of this cultural heterogeneity is already accounted for by including provincial and jati-level fixed effects. If norms about caste are stronger In Bihar than in Tamil Nadu, or among Brahmans than among Marathas, this should be accounted for in the fixed and random effect coefficients already included in the models.

Local variations in social status, however, might vary within jati. Model One of Table A-3 adds a variable for the percentage of the province who have a higher social status than the caste in question. This is intended to account for the uneven "spread" of the caste system across regions of the country: Due to the smaller number of high castes in the south, some peasant castes in that region occupy a higher local social status than would otherwise be the case in the north. This variable has a small positive effect on petitioning–Groups at the bottom of the local status ordering are more likely to petition than those above them–but does not affect of the value of the literacy variables.

4.4 The Arya Samaj and Christianity

Closely related to this concern is the possibility that ideological efforts by outsiders could influence the willingness of groups to embrace or reject the caste system. One group in early twentieth century India, the Arya Samaj, was especially notable in such efforts. The Samaj was a social service organization strongest in North India, whose ideas have at various times been described as Hindu Protestantism, Hindu fundamentalism and

Hindu reformism. The group's leadership set itself against the caste system, at least in its existing form, favoring instead some sort of purified varna division (Bakshi 1991.)In general, we should expect the rapid growth of Arya Samaj to have a negative effect on petitioning, which represented that kind of jati-centered division of Hindu society that the Samaj was at pains to avoid. Model Two of Table A-3 includes variables for the percentage of Arya Samajists in each province in a given year. The growth of the Samaj does seem to have a marginal negative effect on petitioning, though does not change the values of the reported results.

Another over-time change that might affect the level of petitioning is the growth of Christianity. The Christian missionaries who arrived in India in 19th century were also opposed to caste distinctions and the caste hierarchy in a more comprehensive way, though they never succeeded in eradicating caste consciousness among Indian Christians. More notable was the missionaries' role in promoting primary education, particularly among their primary converts, lower caste groups in Southern India. While I have noted the effect of missionaries on literacy, it is possible that Christianity influenced caste mobilization more directly, for instance if this exposure to non-Hindu ideals led to greater self-assertion of lower caste groups (Jaffrelot 2003.) Variables for the percentage of Christians in the province, along with its interaction with caste status, are included in Model Three of Table A-3. While Christianity has a negative effect on hierarchical petitioning in some models, this effect does not substantially reduce the effect the literacy variables.

4.5 Region

The contrast between the north and south of the subcontinent is at the center of much social scientific and historical work on South Asia, with the south often being portrayed as less "caste ridden" than the north, though in general it seems that traditional strictures on ritual pollution were stronger in the south. Despite the presence of province fixed effects in all reported models, it is possible that these results are driven by one region. To test this possibility, Models Four and Five of Table A-3 report results with certain regions of the country excluded: Model Four reports the results excluding the non-Hindi-

speaking provinces, and Model Five for the non-Dravidian-speaking provinces. Despite the smaller sample, the non-linear effect of literacy remains a robust and statistically significant predictor of caste petitioning.

4.6 Petition Granting

The interpretation of petitioning advanced here is that approaching the census authorities was a primarily rhetorical act, a piece of public claim-staking that was part of a wide-ranging set of strategies for identity formation and mobilization. While a successful claim would give a caste's mobilization efforts an added level of legitimacy, the chance of success was not the primary goal of the petitioning process. What if this was not the case, and petitions were motivated by the desire for official recognition? In this situation, the dynamics of petitioning could be influenced by the dynamics of the census itself, as spurts of petitioning a caused purely by changes in the official attitude. To test this hypothesis, Model One of Table A-4 includes a variable for the rate of petition granting for that census year. The inclusion of this variable does not affect the reported results.

4.7 Census Classification Schemes

The secondary literature on the census of India has often promoted the view that caste petitions are the products of the ideas of the census takers, and of official support for a reified and Sanskritized caste system (Dirks 2002, Cohn 1987.) In general this explanation seems to account for little of the variance, since the census was one of the most nationally unified of Raj institutions, with strong national rules even in the princely states. However, there was one important area which varied both from province to province and from year to year: the arrangement of castes within the census table. The most common alternatives were alphabetical classification and occupational classification though in 1901 most provinces followed national policy and attempted to rank castes based on their ritual status. For the purposes of analysis, I simplified these differences into a binary variable, with a "1" indicating occupational and "precedence"-based classifications. Model Two of Table A-4 includes this hierarchical classification variable

and its interaction with caste status. Neither of these variables has a statistically significant effect on caste mobilization, and the inclusion of these variables does not affect the values of the coefficients for the independent variables of interest.

4.8 The Coding of Jatis

The main models assume that the petition made a claim on behalf of the whole group (even if it was only submitted by a handful of individuals) and that only one petition was submitted on the group's behalf (or, if multiple petitions were submitted, that they were substantially similar in content.) In fact, neither of these conditions is always the case. In some cases, a petition was submitted on behalf of a subcaste of a jati claiming to be either a separate caste or the members of a different jati entirely. In Bengal, for instance, a subcaste of the Kayasth caste claimed to be Kshatriyas while fully admitting the shudra status of the remainder of Kayasths. More rarely, two groups made differing claims on behalf of the whole caste. Model Three of Table A-3 drops these split cases from the analysis, which have no effect on the results.

In section four we discussed the problems presented for the coding for the caste merger movement among Dalits in south India. Not only does it mean that some groups are exiting the dataset (into the artificial "merged castes,") but the broad anti-Brahman or pre-Hindu identity advanced by the campaigners made it difficult to know whether castes were actually active in a political movement or were merely "annexed" by activists from other castes. In addition, the broad environment of the non-Brahman movement in interwar South India could be seen to be an ideological confound affecting all groups. To test this hypothesis, Model Four of Table A-4 excludes the province-years affected by the non-Brahman movement (Madras, Mysore and Hyderabad in 1931 and Mysore in 1921.) This exclusion does not substantively affect the reported results.

4.9 Population Shifts

While the units of observation in this study, jatis, are constant over time, their compositions are not, as individuals could easily shift jati for census purposes. Despite the efforts of census officials, there are frequent references to such shifts in the census

records, and such shifts are also detectable in quantitative analysis (e.g. Casson 2010.) A major concern here is that such ground-level status shifts may serve as a substitute for large-scale collective action like petitioning. Any jati that sees a major gain or loss might also see changes in its other covariants do to the influx of outsiders. To test this hypothesis, Model Five of Table A-4 includes a variable for the absolute percentage of gain or loss that a caste had in male population over the previous census year. However, this variable appears to have no significant effect on petitioning or the size of the literacy coefficients.

Additional Works Cited

Sobhanan, B. *Temple Entry Movement and the Sivakasi Riots.* Madurai: Raj, 1985.

Templeman, Dennis. *The Northern Nadars of Tamil Nadu : an Indian Caste In the Process of Change.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Table A.3: Endogenous Socio-Economic Status: Two Stage Least Squares Regression

VARIABLES	(1) Literacy Rate	(2) Literacy Rate	(3) Literacy Rate Sq.	(4) Petitioning
Squared Predicted Values		3.213***	2.164***	
		(0.760)	(0.397)	
Change in Price	0.0187	-0.000355	-0.00784	
	(0.0139)	(0.0141)	(0.00733)	
Population Share	-0.584**	-0.156	0.121	11.04
	(0.253)	(0.270)	(0.133)	(6.742)
Male Population	2.42e-05	7.16e-06	-1.04e-05	-0.000491
	(2.40e-05)	(2.40e-05)	(1.17e-05)	(0.000581)
Prov. Area under Cash Crops	0.151	0.0519	0.00535	-4.442
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.0513)	(2.906)
Traditional Oil Pressers	0.0682**	0.0423	-0.000367	-1.443
	(0.0323)	(0.0325)	(0.0156)	(0.924)
Traditional Liquor Sellers	0.125***	0.0606	-0.0163	-3.056*
	(0.0450)	(0.0470)	(0.0227)	(1.656)
Literacy Rate				49.24**
				(20.44)
Lit. Rate Sq.				-95.87**
				(46.95)
Constant	-0.0436	0.000299	0.0102	-2.005**
	(0.0411)	(0.0417)	(0.0204)	(0.972)
Observations	287	287	287	252
Number of casteid	111	111	111	
Caste Status FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

See section 6.2 for a detailed explanation.

Table A.4: Province Level Robustness Checks: Logistic Mixed Effects Regression with Petition as Dependent Variable

VARIABLES	(1) Petitioning	(2) Petitioning	(3) Petitioning	(4) No Hindi Belt	(5) No South
Population as Proportion	11.31**	11.64**	12.08**	11.51*	12.87
	(4.966)	(4.908)	(5.362)	(5.896)	(7.935)
Population 000s	0.000203	0.000167	0.000163	0.000560	0.000208
	(0.000442)	(0.000438)	(0.000453)	(0.000959)	(0.000549)
Male Literacy Rate	6.878**	6.971**	6.380**	8.218***	7.704**
	(2.726)	(2.740)	(2.741)	(3.173)	(3.280)
Male Literacy Rate Sq.	-9.260**	-9.774**	-8.349**	-10.82**	-11.01**
	(4.164)	(4.196)	(4.203)	(4.777)	(5.010)
Local Social Status	6.092*				
	(3.372)				
Prov. Prop. Arya Samaj		-133.3*			
		(78.12)			
Prov. Prop. Christian			43.29**		
			(16.82)		
Prov. Prop. Christian			-8.205**		
*Caste Status			(3.484)		
Constant	2.574	1.995	3.510	-4.801	6.632
	(3.954)	(4.006)	(4.017)	(6.149)	(4.927)
Observations	887	887	887	497	680
Number of groups	1	1	1	1	1
Caste Status FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province-Year Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province-Year RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Jati RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1

These are mixed effects logistic models, with fixed effects for caste status, year and province and random effects for Jati and Province-Year. Only the fixed effect constants are reported. The province-year controls, proportion urban, proportion in public employment, provincial population, provincial employment in agriculture, and the provincial literacy rate, are not reported for reasons of space.

Table A.5: Caste Level Robustness Checks: Logistic Mixed Effects Regression with Petition as Dependent Variable

VARIABLES	(1) Petitioning	(2) Petitioning	(3) No Splits	(4) No Combinations	(5) Petitioning
Population as Proportion	11.26**	11.27**	11.29**	9.242	11.18**
	(4.933)	(4.918)	(5.282)	(6.030)	(4.930)
Population 000s	0.000228	0.000228	0.000334	0.000276	0.000181
	(0.000439)	(0.000443)	(0.000457)	(0.000588)	(0.000441)
Male Literacy Rate	7.168***	7.117***	8.961***	7.804**	6.551**
	(2.765)	(2.737)	(3.057)	(3.246)	(2.731)
Male Literacy Rate Sq.	-10.07**	-9.709**	-12.93***	-12.28**	-9.003**
	(4.240)	(4.141)	(4.757)	(5.175)	(4.146)
Petition Grant Rate	1.902**				
	(0.846)				
Hierarchical Census Classification		-1.169			
		(1.094)			
Hierarchical Census Classification		0.201			
* Caste Status		(0.181)			
Change in Population 000s					0.0973
					(0.0836)
Constant	5.376	3.927	6.668	5.455	4.279
	(4.311)	(4.048)	(4.205)	(4.404)	(3.962)
Observations	858	887	820	832	861
Caste Status FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province-Year Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province-Year RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Jati RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1

These are mixed effects logistic models, with fixed effects for caste status, year and province and random effects for Jati and Province-Year. Only the fixed effect constants are reported. The province-year controls, proportion urban, proportion in public employment, provincial population, provincial employment in agriculture, and the provincial literacy rate, are not reported for reasons of space.