From Hierarchy to Ethnicity: The Institutional Origins of Ranked Identities

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Abstract

Scholars of ethnic politics have posited that in some societies ethnic identities are ranked relative to each other, but the origins of such ranked identities, and their differences from unranked ones, are poorly understood. This paper develops a theory of ranked identities and their causes. In particular, it focuses on why the elites of subaltern groups sometimes choose to invest in improving their status within the value systems of dominant groups, rather than in creating their own. This choice is conditioned by the fact that ranked identities are advantageous within informal patronage networks, and are thus more common among groups alienated from the formal state. Unranked identities are advantageous in winning elections, and are thus most common among large groups in areas with participatory institutions. These theories receive some support from a panel dataset of political mobilization efforts by colonial Indian caste groups. Groups with large amounts of land and few government employees tend to emphasize the ranked aspects of caste identity, while large groups in areas with a high proportion of elected officials emphasize other aspects of intergroup difference. These findings demonstrate the existence of multiple templates for the development of political identity, as well as the historical contingency of the modern concept of the ethnic group.

Word Count: 8487

1 Introduction

Classic descriptions of ethnic politics have divided ethnic identity systems into two basic types: *Ranked* identity systems (in which groups create relationships of superiority and subordination to each other) and *Unranked* identity systems (in which groups are conceptually autonomous)(Horowitz 1985, Weber 1958.) This distinction acknowledges the fact that some identity systems, such as the caste system of India and the racial systems of the new world, ethnic group relations are fundamentally structured around social inequality, rather than other types of social difference. Although the differences among these types of identities are widely acknowledged among political scientists, there has been little or no theorizing on their functions or causes. In particular, we know very little of why many subaltern groups participate enthusiastically in ranked systems defined by others, and why over the past century unranked systems have gradually become the dominant paradigm for identity politics.

This paper will develop a theory of why elites choose to develop and participate in ranked identity systems. The choice between these strategies is determined by the nature of the political system. Ranked identity mobilization is motivated by the desire to gain an advantageous position in patron-client relationships, and is thus more common among groups linked to these networks and alienated from the formal state. Unranked identity mobilization is motivated by the desire to link elites to ordinary group members for political purposes, and is thus common among large groups in areas where political power is distributed democratically or quasi-democratically.

This question is examined in the context of colonial India The Indian caste system is the most prominent example of a ranked identity system, but there is dramatic variation in the degree to which groups embrace the norms of ranking. This was particularly true in the colonial period, when both patrimonial and democratic features were present within the political system. For this reason, though the colonial period saw a massive increase in the politicization of caste identities, not all of these mobilization efforts had identical goals. Some castes emphasized their distinctiveness from other groups (very much as the ethnic politics literature predicts,) while other groups chose to emphasize their hierarchical superiority to other groups, a process which often led them to adopt

the values and identities of traditionally high-status caste groups. Among Indians, this later strategy is referred to as "Sanskritization," while a the unranked alternative has attracted names such as "Anti-brahmanism" or "Mandalization."

To probe the plausibility of the connection between group traits, the political climate and groups' embrace of ranking, I use a new dataset of caste petitions to the colonial census authorities, where group embrace of ranked norms is measured by their propensity to adopt upper castes group names. Among petitioning groups, hierarchical rhetoric is dominant among landed groups and groups with few state employees—the groups most exposed to patrimonial institutions. Unranked rhetoric is dominant among large groups in areas with high levels of political participation—the groups which stand to gain the most from competition based upon group numbers. These findings are robust to controlling for some of the more obvious alternative predictors of ranked mobilization, such as a group's position within the caste hierarchy, though the limitations the dataset makes them suggestive rather than probative.

The development of a theory of identity rankings establishes scope conditions for many theories of ethnic politics current in the literature (Posner 2004, Chandra 2004, 2012) that explain variation in the development of ethnicity without specifying the economic and political conditions that made such a concept of identity possible or desirable. More narrowly, the causes of caste ranking are at the center of traditional South Asia studies, particularly in sociology and anthropology. However, whether these authors view the caste system as an unchanging attribute of Indian civilization (Dumont 1980[1966]) or a consequence of the policies of the colonial state (Dirks 2002, Srinavas 1966,) they tend to view hierarchical identities as being uniformly distributed across South Asia and do not examine the variation in the degree to which castes except these identities.

Section two develops and defines what ranked and unranked identities are. Section three will develop a theory of why social ranking is attractive in some cases, while Section Four describes two examples identity change over time. Section Five will discuss the quantitative data, while Section Six discusses the results of the analysis. Section Seven concludes with a discussion of the broader importance in the form political identities take.

2 Ranked vs. Unranked Identities

2.1 Class and Ranking

The most obvious aspect of ranked identities is that ascriptive identities in ranked systems correspond to differences of wealth and political power. Ranking, in Donald Horowitz's view, is based upon "the coincidence or non-coincidence of social class with ethnic origins" (Horowitz 1985: 21-31.) In Max Weber's view:

> A 'status' segregation grown into a 'caste' differs in its structure from a mere 'ethnic' segregation: the caste structure transforms the horizontal and unconnected coexistences of ethnically segregated groups into a vertical social system of super- and subordination... Ethnic coexistences condition a mutual repulsion and disdain but allow each ethnic community to consider its own honor as the highest one; the caste structure brings about a social subordination and an acknowledgment of 'more honor' in favor of the privileged caste and status groups (Weber 1958:185.)


In practice, this means that in ranked systems of identity have no socioeconomic elite, or a small dependent one. In unranked systems, by contrast, each ascriptive group has an elite that considers "its own honor as the highest one." This is an excellent description of classic ranked systems like precolonial India. The basic relationship is shown in Figure One.

2.2 Elites and Class

The most

The distinction between the vertical "pillars" of unranked systems and the hierarchy of esteem between groups in ranked ones is a useful one in dividing these two types of societies. It is worth remembering, however, that this description characterizes an equilibrium, rather than its causes. In practice, class and ethnicity will rarely be perfectly aligned. By military skill, business acumen, or luck, individuals from lower status groups will gain wealth and power. There are numerous examples of such divergence in ranked societies: The impoverished Brahman would consider himself the superior of the wealthy peasant, and the poor white would consider himself superior to the rich black. As long as these cases remain exceptional, ranking can remain the cultural norm. And if a society sees relatively little social change (as Weber claimed that India did) such changes will

Figure 1: Ranked vs. Unranked Identity Systems



Based on Horowitz 1985:22.

in fact be exceptional. But in fact, both ranked social systems in general and India in particular have produced numerous examples of low status social groups whose members attained considerable power and wealth, even in the pre-colonial period (Bayly 1999, Bayly 1983, Kolff 1990.)

If such "anomalies" had been allowed to accumulate, the basis of ascriptive ranking might well have collapsed, as the nouveau-riche groups became the elites of their own unranked pillars. In practice, however, these new elites often sought not to lead their old ascriptive category but to exit it. By behavioral changes, advantageous marriages, and political muscle flexing, previously low status elites often managed to "become" high status within a few generations (Bayly 1999.) Such advancement reinforced the general correspondence of category and power rather than weakening it. This means that studies of ranked identities must focus on the actions of newly rich elites, whose decision to emphasize social ranking ensures the institution's vitality.

2.3 Division and Distinction

Ranked and unranked identities differ from each other not just in their relationship to class, but in how they conceive of themselves. A political identity has two elements: A *theory of category* (who possesses particular identities and who does not) and a *theory of distinction* (which types of identities are normatively desirable and which are not.)

Theories of category sort human beings into groups, while theories of distinction sort groups into the desirable and the undesirable. While the term theory would suggest a sophisticated intellectual apparatus, in practice these theories tend to be inchoate attitudes or schemas. While all projects of identity mobilization try to make identity politically important, they differ significantly on the strategic emphasis that they give to these two types of strategies.

Unranked identities have well-developed theories of category but weak theories of distinction. While they erect well-articulated boundaries around the group, they make only weak claims about the relative status of group members or the relationship of the group to other groups. The tendency of unranked mobilization is thus absolutist. Having taken a particular trait or identity as important, it attempts to put this trait or identity at the center of political relations. Those that possess the mobilized attribute are considered to have something important in common. Those that do not possess the mobilized attribute are considered as the other, defined less by their own good or bad qualities than by their lack of membership in the in group.

Ranked mobilization is focused on creating a theory of distinction rather than a theory of difference. It develops a theory of what traits (both ascriptive and non-ascriptive) are normatively good, and uses this to award social value to both coethnics and non-coethnics. Frequently this project also involves a theory of proper personal interrelationships, in which lower status individuals are expected to defer to higher status ones. Ranked mobilization thus creates a relatively subtle pattern of political distinction, since behavioral differences among similar groups may be quite small. As a consequence, in unranked systems differences in identification are concentrated at the ethnic boundary line, while in hierarchical systems these differences are scattered throughout the system. While the differences between individual subgroups may be very small (and hence relatively permeable,) the overall differences in identification from one extreme of the hierarchy to the other may be very large.

By extension, while unranked systems offers only two types of political relationships (coethnic and non-coethnic) ranked systems offer an almost infinite menu of intergroup relationships based on varying degrees of superiority and inferiority. In colonial Latin America, for instance, a white person would treat a light-skinned African or Indian far

better than a dark-skinned one. In the *traditional* Indian caste system, a Brahman would have a subtly different relationship to a Jat cultivator than to a Chamar leather worker, and be far more willing to enter a political relationship with the former, due to his membership in a "clean" caste. In the far less ranked system that exists in India *today*, he would consider both groups to be equally "other," and would ally with either on the basis of political convenience.

2.4 Internal Relations

One notable aspect of unranked identities is that they have a tendency to elide internal cultural differences within the mobilized group. This is the result of their fixation on the inter-group boundary— any attempt to further divide the in group would render the group boundary irrelevant. In practice, this within-group *fraternite* takes the form of both persuading poor group members to abandon local identities and behaviors in favor of the normative behaviors of the group elite (a la Eugene Weber's French peasants) and of persuading elites to identify themselves closely with the interests of their poorer coethnics, which often involve the abandonment of attempts to link themselves with a more cosmopolitan elite identity. The result, in successful unranked identity projects like the 19th century European nationalisms, is a world of rhetorically homogenous groups, marked by a single set of behaviors and attributes.

Besides assigning differential social value to other identity categories, ranked identities tend to subdivide and assign differential value to individuals within their own category. This is a natural consequence of assigning normative worth based on actual behavior: Inevitably, some individuals will less closely approximate the behavioral ideal of the group than others. This leads to subtle but important divisions in hierarchical status, and thus in political identity, between members of the same ethnic category. As an example, compare again the politics of a Brahman in our own time with those of his ancestor in the more ranked pre-colonial period: A Brahman today would be less attuned than his grandfather to the previously important subdivisions in status (based on occupation, descent, and ritual purity) within the Brahman category, since he would now see these distinctions as less important than the segmentary difference between

Brahmans and other groups.

2.5 Intragroup Relations

While groups in unranked systems may define themselves in opposition to other groups, they tend to view themselves as "conceptually autonomous," (Fearon and Laitin 2000.) This means that legitimate their existence based on a common history, culture and set of myths rather than through their relationship to other groups, and that they are capable of existing as a social whole without either the deference of lower groups or the patronage of higher ones. In addition, conceptual autonomy implies that groups do not rely on myths or ideologies produced by other groups—at least in theory, their existence is legitimated by them themselves, rather than a groups of outsiders. The search for conceptual autonomy means that the development of hierarchical identities is closely associated with the rejection of external ideologies and social hierarchies, such as cosmopolitan imperialism for Gellner's Ruritanian nationalists and Sanskritic hierarchy for Indian caste activists.

By their nature, ranked identities require the existence of other groups to make them meaningful. The Brahman's superiority is established by the inferiority of the groups around him, and would be meaningless in a society comprised entirely of Brahmans. The ethnic cleansing or exclusion so characteristic of unranked identities is entirely alien to the hierarchical mindset, which instead would simply try to maintain other groups in an inferior status. By the same token, ranked identities are incapable of developing the peer relations with other groups that are common among segmentary identities. Societies in which ranked identities are common are thus characterized by deference and resource transfers across groups, in contrast to the unstable and rivalry-prone relations of segmentary groups (Horowitz 1985:29-32.)

3 Theory

3.1 Hypothesis One

H1: Groups linked to informal and patrimonial institutions should adopt ranked identities. Elites make choices about the adoption of identities in order to maximize their access to political power. However, political power is distributed differently in different types of societies. In some societies, often referred to as patrimonial, power is distributed informally through networks of patronage and traditional obligation with little concern for the needs and rights of individuals (see Bendix 1977, Weber 1947.) While this distinction was developed to explain the decline of European feudalism, the concept of the patrimonial society also fits the highly personalized politics of pre-colonial India (Cohn 1962, Fox 1971.)[1]

In patrimonial society, political power can be earned in two complementary ways: by gaining the favor of one's superiors at higher levels of the political system, and by building up a support base of clients at lower levels. In Cohn's case, the Talukdars (large landowners) of Benares must at the same time maintain good relations with both the raja and the village-level elites from whom they are collecting taxes. The raja in turn must manage his Talukdars while at the same time propitiating supra-regional leaders like the Nawab of Oudh. In neither case do the interests of citizens enter into political calculations: The stock in trade of a politically ambitious man is his contacts and reputation among other members of the elite.

Patrimonial elites have a strong incentive to politicize identities that will ease their political relationships. An obvious response would be to adopt the same identity as one's political superiors, thus benefiting from coethnic favoritism. However, this course is uncommon for two reasons. Firstly, elites in patrimonial societies must think downwards as well as upwards, and the same identity that might be an advantage with one's superiors might be a disadvantage with one's inferiors. The Raja of Benares, for instance, might gain a political advantage in his relations with the Nawab by adopting (Shia) Islam, but such a move would create a major division between him and his (Hindu) Talukdars. Secondly, patrons do not necessarily wish to be on equal terms with their clients. On the

contrary, they wish to use identity to emphasize their own legitimacy and the obligations owed them by their clients[2]

Ranked identities fill this need. Instead of emphasizing groups' divisions (which might allow some inferiors to become either too familiar or too distant), ranked mobilization emphasizes subtle distances in individual status. These differences define the patterns of obligation in patron-client relationships and enable an ambitious politician to be at once the humble supplicant and the gracious benefactor. A patrimonial politician with a high status thus receives a helpful degree of legitimation in his dealings with his clients.[3] For this reason, pre-colonial Indian states were deeply concerned with controlling the hierarchical status of their subjects (Dirks 1993.) [4]

Like many Weberian concepts, "patrimonial society" is an ideal type, and few societies fit it fully. In practice, most societies, particularly colonial ones, contain areas and groups that are primarily influenced by patrimonial institutions, while other areas and groups are more strongly influenced by the formal state. Within such mixed societies, we should expect groups whose elites have substantial patrimonial ties to find hierarchical mobilization relatively attractive, and the converse to be true of groups whose elites are closely linked to the state and thus tend to have a more formalized relationship to political authority. When landed or weakly governed groups are more likely to direct their aspirations into winning a better position in the patrimonial system than groups with stronger links to the formal political economy.

3.2 Hypothesis Two

H2: Within areas with participatory state institutions, large groups should be more likely to mobilize along unranked lines. Over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, patrimonial societies were gradually replaced by more modern, rationalized political systems. In such systems, patrimonial politics has broken down and one's political position depends on one's ability to gain the support of a majority of the population (Bendix 1977.) In many such societies, offices are apportioned democratically, and politicians must gain the support of voters.

If politics becomes a competition for mass support, individuals from traditionally

poor groups will be at a disadvantage relative to their more established peers, due to their lower levels of money, contacts and political skills. One way in which they can overcome these disadvantages is to attempt to activate politically social identities that they share with a large segment of the population and argue that this identity is sharply different from others. To the extent that the identity is perceived as relevant, politicians from within the group will gain an advantage in competing with outsiders, either because constituents expect that co-ethnics will favor them in the distribution of resources or because voters gain some more abstract benefit from seeing a co-ethnic in power. By dividing some voters from others and tying them to particular elites, unranked mobilization thus gives politicians a tool for creating constituency groups to which they have privileged access. Ranked identities, which emphasize internal differences rather than internal solidarity, will be much less advantageous in such a setting, since they emphasize cultural differences with the prospective constituents of elite members.[5]

A key factor in such mobilization is the size of the potential constituency, given the vital role of popular support in democratic and semi-democratic political contexts. Elites, being primarily motivated by the rewards of office, are unlikely to cultivate a constituency if it is so small that even a very successful mobilization effort would leave them in a weak position within the electorate as a whole (Posner 2004, 2005.) The potential opportunities opened up by mass politics are thus only attractive to groups that are large in size. Given that changing one's ascriptive traits is difficult or prohibitively costly, the leaders of small groups will prefer to work along hierarchical or non-identity lines, since the creation of hard boundaries would divide them from most of their potential supporters. Unranked mobilization should thus be more common among larger groups in areas where the institutional context makes numbers politically valuable, though neither of these factors in isolation should influence mobilization strategy. This hypothesis establishes a scope condition on the theories of group size common within the ethnic politics literature. In this view, size should only predict a particular type of ethnic mobilization under a particular set of institutional conditions.

4 Historical Examples

4.1 From Ranked to Unranked: The Shanan/Nadars

The Shanans of Tamil Nadu were a large caste traditionally associated with tenant labor and the harvesting of coconuts and the production of toddy liquor. The caste was not considered a prestigious one in Tamil society, and Shanans shared with other lower castes a set of humiliating markers of their low ritual status, most notably a ban on Shanan women to cover their upper body. Despite the general poverty of the community, there existed a literate Shanan elite associated with tax collection and small trade. There even existed a wealthy subcaste, the Nadans, who owned whole villages and adopted the manners of local aristocrats (Templeman 1996: 18-29.) This elite grew in size in the 19th century, as the growth of the South Indian economy improved the position of tenants and Christian missionaries expanded access to education among traditionally poor groups (Hardgrave 1969: 43-55.)

In the late 19th century, the Shanan elite began to organize politically against its low social status in the late 19th century. Two very notable aspects of this early mobilization were its constant reference to traditional Hindu norms and its refusal to engage with poor Shanans. In the minds of the Shanan elite, they were a class of warriors who had been degraded by contact with toddy cultivation, and their primary goal was to assimilate themselves to the practices of elite Hindus. The cultural changes they adopted included, among others, vegetarianism, cremation, dowries, Sanskritic child names, the wearing of the sacred thread and the hiring and feeding of Brahmans. To formalize these changes, they petitioned to the census authorities to have Shanans listed as Kshatriyas, echoing earlier attempts by wealthy Shanans to use the name of their subcaste instead of the caste name overall (Hardgrave 1969: 105-136.) The activist's main contact with poor Nadars was adversarial, as their attempts (enforced by violence) to ban the sale of toddy deprived many poorer Shanans of their livelihood (Hardgrave 1969: 136-140.)

However, this Sanskritic and ranked concept of Shanan identity eventually became obsolete, mostly through the efforts of an organization founded in 1910, the Nadar Mahajana Sangam. The Sangam leadership was dedicated to the creation and social uplift

of a united Shanan community under the name of Nadar, which had formerly described only the Nadar upper class. To this end, they gradually abandoned their pretentions to Kshatriya status and demanded that the census bureau classify them as Nadar, a demand that was granted in Madras in 1921 and Travancore in 1931. Much of the Sangam's program was designed to include the Nadar lower classes, setting up mediation boards to resolve inter-caste disputes and energetically lobbying for social welfare measures to help the workers hurt by the toddy prohibition measures they had earlier favored. The organization used the wealth of the Nadar traders to set up a large network of Nadar social service organizations, including elementary schools, scholarships, and the Nadar Bank (Templeman 1996: 82-90.) But the Sangam's most publicized activities (and the reasons for its prominence in the secondary literature) were in the political sphere, where it campaigned on behalf of the lower caste Justice Party and against a Congress Party associated with the Brahman elite and opposition to caste-based affirmative action (Hardgrave 1969, Rudolph and Rudolph 1967.) With the support of their poorer coethnics and the organizational muscle of the Sangam, many elite Nadars, such as Sangam leader W.P.A. Soundrapandian, gained political office in the colonial period and after.

The early efforts of Shanan elites thus emphasized many of the common features of ranked identity systems, and the usual policy of lower status elites within such systems. Instead of trying to become the leaders of their ethnic category, they sought to exit it entirely and assimilate into the high status group. This involved an increased emphasis on behavioral status distinctions, a deterioration of internal relations within the group, and a wholesale adoption of external cultural legitimation. More modern Nadar elites, by contrast, sought to lead an unranked "pillarized" group, a change which was associated with a harder drawing of group boundaries, a de-emphasis on internal social distinctions, and a rejection of other groups as a cultural model.

4.2 Racial Identities in the Americas

Both Brazil and the Southern US were shaped by plantation agriculture and black slavery, and both thus developed into societies where skin color was an essential aspect

of social identity. These societies differed, however, in the way in which these identities were expressed politically. Racial identity in Brazil developed in a context where national political power was exercised in an unapologetically authoritarian manner, and the power of local political bosses, usually wealthy planters, remained virtually unchecked well into the 20th century. In these circumstances, racial identities in Brazil were recognizably hierarchical. While there was an elite consensus on the social value of white skin (and the set of "respectable" social behaviors associated with it,) society was not divided into groups of whites and non-whites but organized along a spectrum, with large groups of racially mixed individuals striving to emulate the values and behavior of the planter class, the only source of political power (Degler 1971.) As in the Indian case, many low-status individuals succeeded in improving their status through strategic changes of behavior and association, and were able to enjoy improved social status due their higher levels of whiteness, often through the use of intermediate social categories such as "mulatto." Ambitious black men usually sought to become mulatto, and mulattos sought to be considered white, rather than attempting to be the elites of the lower (black) status category.

In the United States, by contrast, political identities developed in the context of a robustly democratic political culture, both at the local and state levels. African Americans could thus not be counted out as potential competitors, particularly if they were light skinned and free. The result was the development of one of the world's must rigidly bounded identity systems, with a very small amount of African ancestry necessary to place a person in the African American racial category. This enabled white politicians to appeal successfully to white voters against a perceived racial threat. Interestingly, this segmentary tendency became even more developed in the aftermath of the Civil War, which by formally enfranchising blacks made the system far more participatory, and the need to exclude black elites more immediate. While the US census(and local opinion) recognized the third ethnic category "mulatto" up until the 1850s, the possibility of racial ambiguity faded with the patrimonial power of the planters. This in turn influenced the behavior of black elites, who emphasized their pride in the distinctness of their own racial identity rather than emulating the behavior of the white elite. In the Brazilian case, through a similar process, the gradual democratization the politi-

cal system has led to many blacks developing an unranked racial identity often heavily influenced by American models (Telles 2004.) In the modern system, black elites are self-consciously independent, and rarely attempt to "pass" into the white community, or construct separate intermediate categories.

Racial status in Brazil and 19th century America illustrated the main characteristics of a ranked system. It was very strong associated with social class, it emphasized subtle social distinctions over hard and vast differences, it created elaborate internal differences within ethnic categories, and tended to lead to the subordinate group defining themselves through the ideological tools of the super-ordinate group. In modern America, by contrast, racial divisions are not perfectly predictive of elite status, are relatively rigid, are attended by rhetorical pledges of racial solidarity and racial independence. As in the Nadar case, this transition occurred at the same time as the growth of democratic politics.

5 Data

Colonial India provides an excellent place to test why some groups choose to opt in to ranked identity systems, due to the wide knowledge of Sanskritic norms of ranking and the considerable temporal and regional variation in levels of democratic and patrimonial institutions. This paper will thus make use of a complete panel dataset of Indian caste groups in the 1901-1931 period.[6] The unit of analysis is the caste-province-year, with each caste being counted as a separate observation within each province where it occurs.

5.1 The Dependent Variable

Variation in the level of importance attached to social ranking is often difficult to measure in practice, since much of the expression of ranking norms is cultural and takes place outside formal state structures. The role of the census in colonial India provides an interesting exception to this pattern. The census, which asked individuals to classify themselves by caste, had already led to a reification of caste lines, and encouraged some groups to emphasize their separateness from others (Dirks 2002.) The role of

the census in caste mobilization became even larger after the 1901 census, when H.H. Risley, the census director, decided to organize the census returns by hierarchical caste status. This led lower and middle caste elites anxious to maximize their hierarchical status to petition the census authorities for a new name, typically one that linked them to a "higher" caste or to one of the three higher varnas of the sanskritic caste hierarchy. [7] Other caste elites petitioned for a new name less to claim status than to distance themselves from the ranking system entirely, by disassociating themselves from names that suggested subordination. [8]

Despite its refusal to recognize most new names, the census thus became a place for the validation of caste rhetoric, much to the annoyance of census officials:

> All subsequent census officers in India must have cursed the day when it occurred to Sir Herbert Risley, no doubt in order to test his admirable theory of the relative nasal index, to attempt to draw up a list of castes according to their rank in society. He failed, but the results of his attempt are almost as troublesome as if he had succeeded, for every census gives rise to a pestiferous deluge of representations, accompanied by highly problematical histories, asking for recognition of some alleged fact or hypothesis of which the census as a department is not legally competent to judge. (Hutton 1932: 433)

To test hypotheses one and two, petitions that were submitted were divided into those making ranked and those making unranked claims, based on the name claimed in the petition. In almost all cases, the object of the petition was a new caste name, though often these names had implications for the placement of the caste within the census or implied association with another caste. I classified as ranked those petitions in which the claimed name included either the name of a specific higher status caste (e.g. "Saini Rajput") or the name of one of the higher varnas, which therefore made a claim to higher status within the caste system at the expense of asserting a completely separate identity. This could include either claiming complete identity with the varna (asking the census authorities to use the term "Brahman" instead of the existing caste name) or using the varna name as an adjective modifying the caste name (e.g. "Bhumihar Brahman.")

The petitions coded as unranked are those that make no such claim to belong to another caste or varna. As such, they are more heterogeneous than the unranked petitions. Most commonly, they reject a previous name thought to be insulting or associated with a traditional occupation considered degrading. Frequently, these new names also had positive connotations: The Goalas, for instance, claimed the name Yadava, which implied descent from Yadu, a mythical king. What they have in common, is that they reject the traditional social position of the group without invoking Sanskritic concepts as a source of legitimacy.[9]

Table 1: Disaggregated Types of Caste Petition by Year

	1901	**1911**	**1921**	**1931**	**Total**
No Petition	134	239	267	228	861
Ranked Petitions					
Ranked Petition	17	33	50	65	165
Rankedl Petition by Subcaste	5	10	2	3	19
Unranked Petitions					
Unranked Petition	2	9	9	17	37
Unranked Petition by Subcaste	3	2	1	2	8
Untouchable Caste Seeking Merger	0	0	2	10	12
Other Petitions					
Merged Untouchable Caste ("Adi-")	0	0	1	3	4
Conflicting Petitions	0	2	2	12	16
Previously Granted Petition	0	0	0	1	1
Total	161	294	334	341	1130

In Table One, we can see the changes that occurred in petitioning over time. Overall, the level of petitioning rose over time, paralleling increases in literacy and political awareness in the population (see Author 2012.) Among castes that did petition, the percentage of unranked petitions rises over time, parallel to the democratization of Indian political institutions.

5.2 Independent Variables: Patrimonial Institutions

Two key concepts discussed in the theory section were the degree to which political power was exercised through formal bureaucratic means and the degree to which people were actively involved in politics. Both these concepts are fairly abstract and difficult to measure by quantitative means. Both, however, exhibited considerable variance within colonial India. The colonial state was neither a patrimonial successor of the Mughal Empire nor a modern nation state, but a peculiar hybrid. In isolated rural areas and in the indirectly ruled princely states, local elites collected taxes and administered justice very much as their ancestors had done, while in the cities and towns of the directly ruled areas there existed local elections and mass-based political movements every bit as organized as those in contemporary Europe. This variance gives an opportunity for studying political identity in a context where the "pre-modern" and "modern" were not chronological opposites but existed in uneasy proximity. No other period in Indian history exhibits an equal degree of variation in political participation and institutional form.

To measure the relative exposure of castes to patrimonial and formal state institutions, I use two measures drawn from the occupational section of the census. The first is the *percentage of males in a caste cultivating or owning land*, which should be associated with close links to patronage systems and weaker links to formal institutions. This is in part a function of the spatial distribution of rural groups, since even strong states have difficulty projecting themselves in rural areas. More generally, rural areas tend to be affected more slowly by social changes than urban areas, and thus more likely to preserve older patterns of patronage and obligation. Finally, control over land in colonial India involved a cultivator in an intricate network of social obligations, both to the laborers who did the actual work and to the network of intermediaries (bureaucratic, aristocratic, or village-level) who collected taxes and administered justice in rural areas. The management of these obligations involved linking oneself to patrons and the development of clients, and descriptive accounts of this period emphasizes the importance of patron-client ties among rural Indians (Stokes 1978.)

To measure the direct exposure of the caste to formal state institutions, I use the

proportion of male workers employed in the army and police, taken from the census. This was chosen rather than public employment as a whole because the majority of "public employees" in colonial India were informally employed village servants. Since, in traditional theories (eg. Weber 1947,) the spread of rationalized bureaucracies is associated with the decline of traditional political linkages, we should expect groups with strong links to the bureaucracy to be the first to find patrimonialism irrelevant. Put another way, in the context of a modern state groups with many bureaucrats possess a much more viable alternative to traditional social networks than landed and uneducated groups do.

5.3 Independent Variables: Participatory Institutions

Politics under the colonial state was always a limited business, as the most important decisions were made by European bureaucrats. There was however, a small but expanding level of autonomy granted to local electoral institutions and an expanding sphere of protest against colonial rule. I will use two measures of participation, the spread of democratic elections and the spread of the Congress party. Though the franchise in colonial India was limited to property owners, and the nationalist movement confined to even wealthier elites, both these changes helped create the beginnings of a mass political awareness. To measure electoral institutions, I use the *percentage of elected members of district and taluka boards*. Originally, district board members had been appointed by the district collector, who also chaired the meetings. Gradually, however, the bodies expanded in size and began to include elected members, first as a minority and then as a majority. Despite their modest powers, membership of these bodies, each the only political body in an area with a population of several hundred thousand, conferred considerable prestige, and many future national politicians served at this level.

The timing and extent of the change from elected to appointed boards varied greatly across provinces, and appears to have been driven by local-level demand. The British were confident that granting elected seats would both diffuse nationalist demands and coopt their leaders, and thus tended to expand elections in areas where there existed a politically aware Indian elite. Due to this complex causal pattern, the effect of electoral

institutions should be interpreted very broadly, as an indicator of participatory politics

In addition to measuring electoral institutions, I use a more direct measure of political activity, the province's average per capita attendance at the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress.[10] At this stage of Indian history, the Congress was less a political party than a discussion forum for politically aware Indians, and it admitted virtually any well-dressed individual who wanted to attend. Despite its elite character, Congress attendance thus should be a reasonable proxy for the number of people in a province committed enough to the nationalist movement to invest a week and a long train journey. In fact, the annual attendance figures seem to tally relatively well with trends in political activity described in the secondary literature. Bengal, for instance, sees a peak in attendance around 1911 (during the political turmoil surrounding the partition of the province) and a decline in attendance around 1921.

The political changes that occurred at the province level were obviously correlated with the wide variety of social and economic changes taking place in colonial India. To account for such time-varying confounders, I include three control variables often associated with the level of economic and social modernization: the *provincial literacy rate*, the *proportion of the population living in urban areas*, and *the proportion of the population engaged in public administration*, all taken from the census tables.

5.4 Control Variables: Ritual Status

We have good reason to expect that these differences in status should influence the mobilization strategies of groups: As groups with a higher ritual status have a more advantageous position within the existing hierarchy, they are more likely to desire its preservation. This pattern is broadly borne out in Table Two, which shows the different types of petition by caste level. Aside from the one Brahman petition, ranked petitioning is universal among high caste groups, and less common (though still predominant) among lower caste groups. The exception is in the lower OBC category, which has higher levels of hierarchical petitioning than the untouchable or upper OBC categories. This is probably a result of the small size of many of the groups in this category, which gave them little political incentive to mobilize on an unranked basis.

Table 2: Number of Petitions by Caste Status

Caste Status Caste Status	**Castes with No Petition**	**Ranked Petition**	**Unranked Petition**	**Total**	**Hierarchical Percent**
Untouchable/Dalit	200	12	20	245	62.5
Lower OBC/Shudra	322	23	90	430	79.6
Upper OBC/Shudra	143	21	47	204	69.1
Intermediate/Dominant	101	4	26	131	86
Upper/"Twice Born"	62	0	17	79	100
Brahman	39	1	0	40	0
Total	868	61	201	1130	

6 Analysis

The leaders of Indian castes faced primary choices in interacting with the census authorities: Whether to petition for a name change at all and whether or not to choose a new name that emphasized social ranking. This decision structure is modeled as a sequential logit model with the choice of ranking language nested within petitioning cases. This means that P_r, the probability of a province-caste-year recording a ranked caste petition, can be estimated as the sum of two probabilities:

$$P_r = P_p x P_{r|p} \tag{1}$$

Where P_p is the probability of submitting a petition, and $P_{r|p}$ is the probability of submitting a ranked petition given that a petition is already submitted. In related work, I examine mobilization identity mobilization in general, P_p, which appears to be strongly related to group socio-economic status. This paper will focus instead on $P_{r|p}$, the probability of ranked mobilization among mobilizing groups. This can be estimated by:

$$P_{r|p} = \frac{e^{Y_i}}{\sum_{i \in n} e^{Y_i}} \tag{2}$$

Where Y_i are the independent and control variables of interest.[11] All reported models control for the caste status of the caste at the time of petition, taken from 19th century

anthropological accounts, the province and the census year. These account for the possibility that the results might by driven by lower incentives to hierarchy among higher castes, stronger hierarchical norms in norms in the North of India than in the South.

6.1 Hypothesis One

The effect of caste landedness on ranked mobilization is examined in Table Three, which includes the two independent variables of interest, group ownership of land and Employment in the Army and Police. While landownership has a strong positive relationship with ranked petitioning, employment in the army and police has a negative effect. The effect of landownership is fairly large substantively: Holding all other variables at their means, increasing a caste's percentage of landowners from 10% to 20% would increase the probability that a submitted petition is unranked from 46.7% to 57.1%.[12] Though the effect of police employment is statistically significant, it is much smaller, with a similar 10% increase increasing the probability of ranked petitioning by only four percentage points. These results seem to indicate that, consistent with Hypothesis One, investment in traditional social institutions leads to an emphasis on social ranking, while exposure to the more modern institutions of the colonial state reduces this emphasis.

These effects remain substantial in Model Two, which includes control for group population and literacy, along with measures of provincial social change and fixed effects for caste status. Squared literacy has a positive and marginally statistically significant effect on social ranking, indicating that when very wealthy groups petition, they tend emphasize social hierarchy.

Model Three adds a set of measures of occupational structure of each caste, including the percentage of caste members working as agricultural laborers and the percentage practicing the group's traditional occupation. Neither of these variables changes the effect of land ownership and paramilitary employment.

Another interesting aspect of Model Three is that the percentage of group members employed in the group's traditional occupation is unrelated to their choice of ranked ideological forms. This tells against a well-known argument in the literature that tradi-

Table 3: Traditional Insitutions and Social Ranking: Sequential Logistic Regression

VARIABLES	(1) Ranking	(2) Ranking	(3) Ranking	(4) Ranking	(5) Ranking	(6) Ranking
Caste Land Cultivation Rate	3.517***	4.359***	4.796***			4.698**
	(1.186)	(1.557)	(1.546)			(1.889)
Caste Army/Police Rate	-68.43*	-76.73**	-82.99**			-52.18
	(36.55)	(33.78)	(34.44)			(40.37)
Prop. Local Boards Elected				-2.782		-11.59
				(3.378)		(10.88)
Prop. Local Boards				-91.44**		-219.2***
Elected*Population				(43.44)		(77.56)
Prov. Congress Delegates					188.3**	
					(87.87)	
Prov. Congress					-3,136**	
Delegates*Population					(1,243)	
Population as Proportion		-15.04	-14.52	11.99	-49.90*	40.13
		(14.24)	(15.26)	(30.05)	(28.72)	(36.84)
Population 00000s		0.0244	0.0351	0.236*	0.352*	0.621**
		(0.0699)	(0.0724)	(0.126)	(0.196)	(0.263)
Male Literacy Rate		-10.51	-12.17	2.219	-0.611	-0.855
		(7.926)	(8.458)	(7.935)	(9.721)	(11.93)
Male Literacy Rate Sq.		32.34*	33.70*	10.63	6.512	19.43
		(17.64)	(19.78)	(19.63)	(23.79)	(31.48)
Caste Ag. Labor Rate			-4.792*			
			(2.770)			
Caste Traditional Occupation Rate			-0.743			
			(1.186)			
Constant	-0.642	-4.383	0.0453	3.718	6.915	16.93
	(0.873)	(20.74)	(21.22)	(4.375)	(8.091)	(28.08)
Observations	412	390	390	587	401	300
Province-Year Controls	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Caste Status FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1


These are pooled sequential regression models, with fixed effects for caste status, year and province. This table only reports the results of the second equation, where ranked petitioning is the dependent variable. The corresponding results of the first equation, with petitioning as the dependent variable, are reported as Table A-2. The province-year controls, proportion urban, proportion in public employment, provincial population, and the provincial literacy rate, are not reported for reasons of space.

tional caste arrangements are the product of economic exchange (Frietas 2010, Dubois 1806.) Since the degree to which groups are reliant on out-of-group economic exchange to provide their material needs is unrelated to their emphasis on hierarchy, it seems that

either economic ties or economic intimidation can explain identity ranking among lower castes.


Ranked petitioning is thus most common among landowning groups with weak links to the state, while unranked petitioning is most common among land-poor groups with strong links to the state, providing some support for the hypothesis that this variation is predicted by the distinction between patrimonial and formal politics. These effects can be seen graphically in Figures Two and Three, which present kernel density plots for ranked and unranked petitions relative to land ownership and army and police employment. Figure Two shows clearly that unranked petitions are relatively more concentrated among land-poor groups, while hierarchical petitions are more concentrated among land-rich groups.

Figure 2: Kernel Density Plot of Ranked and Unranked Petitioning Groups by Land Ownership



The relationships between paramilitary employment and petition type is weaker in the raw data, due in part to the small number of groups with very high levels of such employment, though unranked petitioning groups seems in general to have a higher levels of police and army employment than ranked petitioning groups.

Figure 3: Kernel Density Plot of Ranked and Unranked by Police/Army Employment



6.2 Hypothesis Two

From the perspective of the existing literature, one interesting aspect of the results in Model One is the relationship they find between group population size and mobilization. Hypothesis Two, by contrast, posits that this relationship should occur for only a particular kind of mobilization (unranked) under a particular set of circumstances (institutions that value mass political participation.) In practice, this means that increasing political participation should not affect mobilization among small castes (since they will tend to be politically weak even when mobilized) and that increasing levels of population should be unrelated to unranked mobilization in areas with low participation (since they cannot be brought to bear politically.) However, the interaction of the two variables (corresponding to the effect of a large group population in areas with high participation) should be significant and positive.

Model Four adds the crucial variable of interest for Hypothesis Two, the interaction between group population and local elections. While local elections has a little direct effect on ranked petitioning, the interaction of elections with group size is statistically significant and negative in Model Five. This indicates that when large groups in areas with democratic elections enter politics, their involvement tends not to emphasize social ranking. This effect is substantively massive: Holding all variables at their means,

increasing the proportion of local board seats elected from 20% to 50% (a typical increase for the 1920s) would cause the predicted probability that to group with 10% of the population would emphasize ranking in their petition to decrease from 75.4% to 24.9%.

Model Five of Table Four reports the results of the same basic model, with the per capita number of Indian National Congress attendees substituted for the proportion of local officials. Despite a dramatic drop in sample size (Congress attendance data is not available for the princely states, or for the year 1931,) the interaction of population with participation is positive and statistically significant. This supports the hypothesis that group size and regional politicization affect ethnicity only in association with each other. In Model Six this effect is shown to be robust to the inclusion of the occupational variables from Model One, though the inclusion of the election variables causes the effect of police employment to become statistically insignificant, though still negative.

6.3 Robustness Checks

The results in Tables Three and Four are limited by the size of the dataset. It is important to note, however, that the inclusions of state and caste status fixed effects and literacy controls accounts for some of the more obvious alternative hypotheses: That differences in identity ranking can be traced to some unobserved cultural aspect of areas, to positions within existing ranking systems, or group socioeconomic status. Table A-3 explores a few more alternative hypotheses, including changing census policies, Christian and Hindu missionary work, and individual movement between groups.

7 Conclusion

There is no single way for a social identity to be expressed politically. On the contrary, its expression is highly dependent upon the local institutional context, and a group's place within that context. The decision to mobilize on a unranked basis seems dependent on the electoral advantages that can be gained from such a move: This type of mobilization strategy is common among groups with a large share of the population situated in areas with participatory political institutions. The decision to invest in a ranked identity is

guided by a group's position within more traditional power systems: Landed and non-bureaucratic groups are likely to find this option more attractive then groups less tied to the traditional patronage system.

This set of theories offers a fresh perspective on the politics of modern India, establishing the scope conditions for modern ideas of caste and caste politics. In the pre-colonial period, low levels of literacy and patrimonial polities kept caste mobilization at relatively modest levels and within hierarchical norms. The spread of literacy in the colonial period, in the context of a state that was still pre-modern, led to an explosion of ranked mobilization ("Sanskritization") as groups attempted to use new wealth to achieve a traditional set of social goals. In the late colonial and post-independence periods, primary education became the norm and democratic elections became pervasive. The result was an expansion of unranked mobilization: Lower caste elites switched from the cultivation of their social superiors to that of their coethnics, leading to the activation of politicized caste groups with well-marked external barriers and diminishing internal barriers.

These trends are mirrored in the politics of the developing world more generally. As democratic norms have spread and patrimonial states have declined, ranked notions of identity have become increasingly unusual, replaced by the standardized norm of the differentiated, internally homogenous, self-legitimating ethnic group. As it has done so, is has become less common for the elites of subaltern groups to assimilate into groups above them. Instead, like the elites of India's lower caste groups, they have embraced their identity and sought to lead the groups they were born into. This is a development with substantial, and poorly understood, implications for ethnic conflict and cooperation.

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Notes

[1]Indeed, some later Weberians have argued that pre-colonial India was a "purer" example of patrimonialism than European feudalism. See Bendix 1977.

[2]On such relations in contemporary India see Chakravarti, 2001, Shah 2005.

[3]On the role of visible markers of social status in determining power in interpersonal interactions see Bourdieu 1984.

[4]It is important to note that members of the highest status groups have no reason to mobilize to gain hierarchical status, since they have it ex ante. They will concentrate on frustrating the attempts of other groups to gain status, which would devalue their social position.

[5]Political mobilization efforts face the generic problem that people will free ride on the efforts of a handful of activists, potentially making activists hard to recruit. However, decisions about status-seeking made by individuals have implications for their relatives and coethnics in an environment where the value of one's personal connections is an important measure of one's political importance. Status gains by individuals reflect well on people in their social or kinship network, and the gains of individuals are sometimes devalued by the low ritual position of those around them. In the colonial era, the development of new forms of information and publicity rendered these externalities more marked, and made group-based claims thus became a more attractive tactic.

[6]For a more detailed discussion of this dataset see Author 2012.

[7]In Sanskrit texts, society is divided into four varnas: the Brahmins (priests,) the Kshatriyas (warriors,) the Vaishyas (traders,) and the Shudras (farmers and craftsmen.) Individual castes (*jatis*) often attempt to classify themselves within one of varnas.

[8]A few petitions were submitted on behalf of subcastes, rather than the caste as a whole. These are treated as being submitted by the whole caste. Excluding these cases does not affect the reported results.

[9]A complicated chain of events occurred in South India at the 1931 census. In Madras, Mysore and Hyderabad, activists from untouchable groups demanded that their groups be not counted separately, but combined under a common name (depending on the region, Adi-Hindu, Adi-dravid, Adi-Andhra and Adi-Karnataka.) The Adi prefix emphasized the claim that these groups were in fact the original inhabitants of South India, and had been enslaved and degraded by later invaders. In these cases, I coded all the old untouchable castes in these provinces as having submitted petitions, while ignoring the new castes. The major results are robust to the exclusion of these province-years. (Author 2012)

[10]This is calculated as the average number of individuals attending in the census year and the two years immediately before and after, excluding years in which the province hosted the Congress.

[11]Dropping cases of no petitioning and running a simple logit on social ranking produces substantially identical results.

[12]Neither variable appears to affect the overall incidence of petitions.

Supporting Information

Table A.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Prop. Local Boards Elected	0.525	0.228	0.057	0.933	828
Prov. Congress Delegates	0.007	0.014	0	0.067	616
Per Capita Land Revenue	23.207	9.047	7.83	40.7	823
Population as Proportion	0.029	0.036	0	0.277	1428
Population 000s	242.634	348.608	1.5	3226	1670
Male Literacy Rate	0.121	0.162	0	0.936	1300
Male Literacy Rate Sq.	0.041	0.097	0	0.877	1300
Prov. Proportion Urban	0.06	0.025	0.018	0.134	1428
Prov. Literacy Rate	0.057	0.034	0.023	0.174	1634
Prov. Public Employment Rate	0.013	0.008	0.001	0.03	1428
Prov. Population 000s	23705.766	17214.272	1108	68059	1648
Prov. Agricultural Employment Rate	0.66	0.105	0.389	0.839	1428
Land Cultivation Rate	0.381	0.269	0	0.991	703
Caste Public Employment Rate	0.02	0.054	0	0.592	703
Caste Traditional Occupation Rate	0.468	0.279	0	0.985	703
Caste Industry Owners Rate	0.001	0.003	0	0.035	730
Local Social Status	0.054	0.114	0	0.476	1441
Change in Population 000s	0.213	1.026	0	29.885	1279
Hierarchical Census Classification	0.699	0.459	0	1	1670
Hierarchical Census Classification* Caste Status	3.906	2.796	0	9	1670

1 Robustness Checks

Models One and Four of Table A-3 examines the effect of the classifications used in the census table. While in some province-years the census authorities classified castes by ritual "precedence" in other years castes were organized alphabetically. The use of ranked census norms might well encourage the use of ranked language in caste petitions. However, while ranked census classifications do seem to have a positive effect on ranked petitioning (particularly for higher castes) this effect does not reduce the effect of caste employment, or of the interaction of caste population and elections.

Models Two and Five examine the effects of two cultural movements in early 20th century India that might affect the adoption of norms of social ranking: Christianity and the Hindu revivalist Arya Samaj. Christianity is often seen as a contributor to the breakdown of the

traditional social orderings of non-western societies. The Arya Samaj, on the other hand, sought to recreate and idealized form of the original Hindu caste hierarchy. Model Two includes the provincial levels of these variables, and their interactions with caste status. While the Arya Samaj does appear to have an impact on petitioning behavior, neither the Samaj nor Christianity has an effect on petition language. Also, the inclusion of these variables does not alter the effects of the key independent variables.

Models Three and Six of Tables A-3 tests the hypothesis that intergroup movement could serve as a substitute for collective action. Instead of petitioning collectively to raise their caste status, individuals could merely reclassify themselves as members of higher castes. Such individual movement among castes is well attested in colonial India, and is readily apparent in census figures (see Casson 2010.) Model Three includes a control for the percentage change in caste membership since the last census. While caste population changes do appear to be positively correlated with petitioning, their inclusion as a control does not affect the effects of the key independent variables.

Table A.2: Traditional Insitutions and Social Ranking: Sequential Logistic Regression

VARIABLES	(1) Petitioning	(2) Petitioning	(3) Petitioning	(4) Petitioning	(5) Petitioning	(6) Petitioning
Caste Army/Police Rate	-14.27	-16.99	-10.64			-13.04
	(10.91)	(17.91)	(16.74)			(37.45)
Caste Land Cultivation Rate	-0.130	-0.330	-0.388			-1.019
	(0.638)	(0.739)	(0.751)			(0.777)
Prop. Local Boards Elected				0.387		-0.611
				(1.796)		(3.281)
Prop. Local Boards				9.450		3.980
Elected*Population				(19.20)		(29.37)
Prov. Congress Delegates					-38.58	
					(32.09)	
Prov. Congress					392.4	
Delegates*Population					(468.1)	
Population as Proportion		8.313	8.876	-5.369	5.832	3.295
		(5.520)	(5.499)	(11.83)	(12.25)	(13.72)
Population 00000s		0.0856*	0.0927**	0.104	0.0648	0.0950
		(0.0479)	(0.0450)	(0.0737)	(0.0712)	(0.0853)
Male Literacy Rate		12.56***	13.85***	10.81***	10.74***	20.01***
		(4.223)	(4.314)	(3.119)	(3.468)	(6.901)
Male Literacy Rate Sq.		-24.93***	-26.47***	-16.60**	-19.48**	-52.04**
		(9.089)	(8.794)	(6.713)	(7.766)	(20.29)
Caste Ag. Labor Rate			1.232			
			(1.239)			
Caste Traditional Occupation Rate			1.516***			
			(0.551)			
Constant	-2.112***	7.273	5.147	0.434	-1.656	1.747
	(0.494)	(5.734)	(5.766)	(2.440)	(5.077)	(5.576)
Observations	412	390	390	587	401	300
Province-Year Controls	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Caste Status FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1

These are pooled sequential regression models, with fixed effects for caste status, year and province. This table only reports the results of the first equation, where petitioning is the dependent variable. The corresponding results of the second equation, with ranked petitioning as the dependent variable, are reported as Table Three. The province-year controls, proportion urban, proportion in public employment, provincial population, and the provincial literacy rate, are not reported for reasons of space.

Table A.3: Robustness Checks: Sequential Logistic Regression

VARIABLES	(1) Ranking	(2) Ranking	(3) Ranking	(4) Ranking	(5) Ranking	(6) Ranking
Population as Proportion	-14.83	-11.76	-20.80	24.80	10.98	17.27
	(13.74)	(16.50)	(15.23)	(30.70)	(29.24)	(32.73)
Population 000s	0.000243	0.000110	0.000527	0.00283**	0.00245**	0.00243*
	(0.000691)	(0.000744)	(0.000700)	(0.00135)	(0.00120)	(0.00132)
Male Literacy Rate	-9.818	-11.17	-11.42	3.421	0.702	0.641
	(7.990)	(8.330)	(8.801)	(7.265)	(8.195)	(8.406)
Male Literacy Rate Sq.	31.14*	36.74*	39.83*	9.582	14.12	17.00
	(17.69)	(20.37)	(21.13)	(16.01)	(19.40)	(21.39)
Caste Land Cultivation Rate	4.232***	3.934**	4.864***			
	(1.525)	(1.643)	(1.707)			
Caste Prop. Army Police	-69.64*	-72.33**	-72.80*			
	(36.75)	(34.25)	(37.44)			
Prov. Prop. Arya Samaj		-611.3			-59.65	
		(551.7)			(543.8)	
Prov. Prop. Arya		95.45			26.83	
Samaj* Caste Status		(108.8)			(110.8)	
Prov. Prop. Christian		-182.1			168.8	
		(419.9)			(253.2)	
Prov. Prop. *Caste Status		26.21			-30.48	
		(72.61)			(44.06)	
Hierarchical Census	-0.291			-5.188		
Classification	(3.635)			(3.289)		
Hierarchical Census	0.271			1.188**		
Classification* Caste Status	(0.621)			(0.592)		
Population Change			2.286*			1.725
			(1.229)			(1.391)
Prop. Local Boards Elected				-1.675	-3.119	-3.079
				(3.336)	(3.591)	(3.520)
Prop. Local Boards				-123.9**	-91.32**	-101.0**
Elected*Population				(48.47)	(42.64)	(46.13)
Constant	5.650	-1.868	-8.432	2.705	3.506	2.377
	(26.11)	(20.30)	(25.22)	(4.696)	(4.608)	(4.723)
Observations	390	390	388	587	587	556
Province-Year Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Caste Status FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1

These are pooled sequential regression models, with fixed effects for caste status, year and province. This table only reports the results of the second equation, where ranked petitioning is the dependent variable. The corresponding results of the first equation, with petitioning as the dependent variable, are not reported. The province-year controls, proportion urban, proportion in public employment, provincial population, and the provincial literacy rate, are not reported for reasons of space.