Did British Colonialism Promote Democracy? Divergent Inheritances and Diminishing Legacies*

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Abstract

Many scholars have argued that British colonial rule promoted post-independence democracy, but there has been considerable debate over the robustness of this result and its causes. Contradicting existing theories, we show that this relationship follows a strong temporal pattern. Although former British colonies were considerably more democratic than other countries immediately following independence, subsequent convergence in democracy levels has eliminated these differences in the post-Cold War period. Neither pre-colonial traits, geographical and policy variation among British colonies, post-colonial influences, nor existing theories of colonial influence account for this finding. We argue that divergent policy approaches to decolonization by European powers contributed to this pattern. Britain more consistently treated democratic elections as a prerequisite for gaining independence, leading to higher initial levels of democracy. However, these policies did not reflect differences in social or institutional support for democracy, leading to mean reversion and convergence over time.

Keywords: Democracy, Colonialism

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1 Introduction

What explains cross-national variation in democracy? This central question of political science is especially relevant for the numerous countries that gained independence after World War II. Although many of these countries have authoritarian governments, numerous others have experienced pluralistic government—some for long periods, some for only short spells—despite lacking structural factors such as high income per capita, European settlers, and strong civil societies often touted as causes of democracy. To explain this variation, many scholars have examined legacies from the colonial period. This focus appears pertinent because most countries outside of Europe inherited their political institutions directly from the colonial state, and considerable evidence demonstrates that colonial institutions have influenced a wide variety of social and economic outcomes (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff 2011; Lindberg and Smith 2014).

The literature on colonial causes of democracy has often focused on the relevance of colonizer identity, specifically: Did British colonialism promote democracy relative to colonization by other powers? Political science research has produced mixed conclusions. Early arguments and evidence championed a positive British democratic legacy (Emerson 1960; Huntington 1984; Weiner 1987; Lipset et al. 1993; more recently see Bernhard et al. 2004 and Olsson 2009), and scholars routinely control for a British colonial rule dummy in cross-national democracy regressions. However, many more recent statistical studies do not replicate the beneficial British effect (Hadenius 1992; Barro 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000; Woodberry 2012). Complementing these inconsistent empirical results, many recent studies have instead examined other aspects of the colonial or pre-colonial era such as Protestant missionaries (Woodberry 2012; Lankina and Getachew 2012), pre-colonial state development and colonial-era European settlers (Hariri 2012), or broader measures of indirect/direct rule (Lange 2004, 2009). Some of this research explicitly rejects the importance of colonizer identity. The literature on economic development features a similar debate, with support for the importance of colonizer identity (La Porta et al. 1998; Grier 1999; Lee and Schultz 2012; Mahoney 2010) countered by arguments that other aspects of colonial rule were more important (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Kohli 2004; Engerman and Sokoloff 2011).

This paper provides evidence that British colonial rule does indeed matter for democracy levels even when accounting for alternative colonial and pre-colonial effects. However, the British legacy changes over time—

a previously unnoticed pattern. Although British colonial rule tended to bequeath a positive democratic inheritance at independence, this legacy diminished afterwards. In countries' first full year of independence, the average difference is over six points on the standard 20-point *polity*2 scale. However, there is no discernible difference in democracy levels between ex-British and non-former British colonies between 1991 and 2014.

We first perform numerous statistical tests to demonstrate the existence and robustness of this pattern. Cross-sectional models estimate a moderately large association between British rule and democracy among all post-independence years, but this correlation is shown to be much stronger at independence and is completely absent in a post-1991 sample. This result is robust to adding a standard set of democracy covariates, to changing democracy measures, to expanding the sample to include the entire period since 1800, and to controlling for compelling alternative explanations studied in previous research. In fact, the findings qualify conclusions about previously posited historical causes of democracy. These temporally contingent findings also hold among many subsets of British colonies, including briefly and indirectly ruled British colonies. We show only a very large amount of bias from unobserved covariates could explain away the estimated effect at independence. Finally, claims that omitted variables explain the finding have difficulty identifying factors that—in addition to covarying with colonizer identity—strongly covary with democracy levels at independence *but not* several decades afterwards.

This temporal pattern contradicts existing theories of British colonialism and democracy. In contrast to standard cultural theories, the effects tended not to be long-lasting. In contrast to theories that reject the relevance of British colonialism or focus on heterogeneity within the British empire, there was a strong relationship at independence and even among indirectly ruled British colonies. Thus, establishing this novel temporal pattern demonstrates the need for a new explanation, despite wide-ranging debates about British colonialism.

The second part of the paper argues that differences during the decolonization era are a central mechanism. Focusing on decolonization builds off a smaller strand of the existing historical literature (Smith 1978; Kahler 1984; Spruyt 2005) and contrasts with existing prominent political science theories focused on long-term cultural or institutional factors. Britain was more willing to allow gradual transition to colonial rule than were other major colonial powers, and one more tailored to local circumstances. Consequently, Britain promoted more competitive elections prior to granting independence and avoided the successful anti-colonial

revolutions that ended European rule in many other colonies. These factors correlate with democracy levels at independence, as do mechanisms that help to explain Britain's decolonization strategy relative to other European powers: democracy level of the metropole and strength of the colonial lobby.

However, the democratic gap at independence emerged from contingent arrangements rather than from British-ruled territories having higher underlying societal demand for democracy. Evidence from time series regressions demonstrate patterns of both (1) democratic reversals shortly after independence in ex-British colonies and (2) greater democratic gains by non-former British colonies several decades after independence, as "Third Wave" international influences engendered liberalization of decolonization-induced dictatorships. Whereas long-term cultural and institutional accounts of British colonialism do not anticipate either pattern, they are consistent with our argument that mean reversion gradually eroded short-term decolonization effects. We also show the decolonization mechanisms that correlate with democracy levels at independence do not correlate with post-1991 democracy levels.

This paper provides three broader contributions to studying each of democracy and colonialism, which the conclusion elaborates upon. First, our evidence forces a rethinking of which colonial legacies are most important for democracy. Contrary to recent arguments, we show that the effects of British colonialism are not reduced to the type of people that populated British colonies (e.g., British settlers, Protestant missionaries). Furthermore, many factors emphasized in the recent literature receive less consistent support than the British colonial legacy. Second, we show that these new findings in part follow from examining multiple samples and periods, rather than a single and potentially unrepresentative time period and/or sample. This suggests that disaggregated analysis—although rare in this literature—is crucial for understanding colonial legacies. Finally, the results provide insights into studying international democracy promotion and externally controlled institution-building, and suggest that international attempts at democracy promotion may often exert stronger short-term than long-term effects.

2 Existing Research on Colonial Origins of Democracy

Existing research has presented three main types of arguments relating British colonialism and democracy. First, Britain fostered post-colonial democracy by altering the political institutions and/or culture of its territories in ways that increased demand for democracy. A second, closely related perspective is that the Britain effect is conditional on the type of colonial rule it practiced and should only appear in certain types of British

colonies. A final school argues against any positive Britain effect, and instead that cross-empire differences can be explained by other colonial-era factors or by pre-colonial differences between empires. Although these three groups of arguments create different implications for the Britain-democracy relationship, they also share a common shortcoming: none can explain why the effect of British colonialism should have been strongly positive at independence *and* should have dramatically diminished over time.

2.1 Culture and Institutions

Scholars have proposed numerous mechanisms to link British colonial rule to stronger post-colonial democracy, focusing primarily on cultural and institutional explanations. Weiner's (1987) frequently cited contribution posits two main mechanisms through which Britain promoted "tutelary democracy" (18). First, Britain promoted bureaucratic structures that maintained order through the rule of law rather than through arbitrary authority. Because these administrative institutions gradually become indigenous, colonial subjects gained experience with law-based governance (see also Narizny 2012, 362; Abernethy 2000, 406; and Treisman 2000, 418-427). Second, Britain provided a limited system of representation and elections that enabled political elites to learn to use and to internalize the norms of democratic procedures (see also Lipset et al. 1993, 168; Diamond, 1998, 8; and Abernethy 2000, 367). Although France also introduced elections in many of its African colonies prior to independence, Britain tended to grant greater responsibilities to its elected legislative organs, whereas France practiced a more centralized style of rule (Emerson 1960, 232). These arguments are closely related to arguments about other beneficial British institutional legacies: common law (La Porta et al. 1998) and parliamentary institutions with strong legislative constraints on the executive (Abernethy 2000, 367). Another closely related argument emphasizes the role of human capital (Glaeser et al. 2004)—specifically, higher education levels in former British colonies (Diamond 1998, 9)—in shaping economic and political outcomes.

A common theme among these cultural and institutional arguments is that the positive British effect should be long-term. That is, if superior culture or institutions enhanced demand for democracy at independence, then these same factors should promote subsequent democratic stability. These theories therefore face difficulties accounting for change over time—especially because, as shown below, British colonies did tend to experience sharp democratic reversals after independence.

2.2 Heterogeneity Within the British Empire

Many have qualified these pro-Britain arguments by instead positing that only certain British colonies received beneficial inheritances. These arguments concern *how* Britain governed its various territories, in particular, how directly it ruled them. One proxy for directness of rule is length of British colonial rule in a territory. Huntington (1984, 206) asserts that British colonial rule should only have promoted democracy in countries it ruled for a long period, whereas the democratic record of former British colonies in Africa, "where British rule dates only from the late nineteenth century, is not all that different from that of the former African colonies of other European powers." Olsson (2009) provides statistical evidence that the length of British colonial rule mattered. Mahoney (2010), though not explicitly discussing democracy, emphasizes the intensity of colonial rule and its interaction with colonizer origin.

Lange (2004, 2009) statistically examines heterogeneity within the British empire by measuring the directness of British rule with the percentage of court cases in the 1950s that were heard in customary rather than British colonial courts. More customary court cases correspond to less direct rule. Among a sample of ex-British colonies, he demonstrates a positive relationship between direct rule and post-colonial democracy (2004, 915). An even more extreme type of British indirect rule occurred in its Middle Eastern colonies, which were acquired as Mandate territories after World War I and/or ruled indirectly through monarchs. There is also evidence that Britain ruled more directly in its forced settlement colonies, in particular by granting metropolitan legal rights to colonial subjects prior to World War II (Owolabi 2015). This is closely related to Mamdani's (1996) hypothesis that two-tiered colonial legal systems, prevalent in African colonies, contributed to subsequent political dysfunction.

These arguments differ from unconditional pro-Britain positions by implying that British rule should be associated with democracy in areas where it was especially intrusive (such as the settler and plantation colonies), but not in other areas (such as the African and Middle Eastern colonies that gained independence after 1945). However, similar to cultural and institutional arguments, these theories do not carry obvious implications for pronounced changes over time in the strength of the Britain effect. British colonies ruled directly and/or for long periods should be stable democracies since independence, whereas indirectly ruled countries should not be democratic at independence or afterwards.

2.3 Alternative Historical Explanations

Other recent work on historical causes of democracy has argued that the identity of the colonizer is relatively unimportant. This research instead posits that alternative aspects of the colonial or pre-colonial era that correlate with colonizer identity offer greater explanatory power.

Two recent contributions critique the British colonialism-democracy thesis by arguing that cross-empire Protestant missionary influence accounts for the beneficial aspects of British colonial rule: "Some scholars suggest that British colonialism fostered democracy ... but this may be because [Protestant missionaries] had greater influence in British colonies" (Woodberry 2012, 254). Although British colonies tended to have higher education levels, stronger civil societies, and more electoral participation prior to independence, Woodberry claims these are entirely accounted for by the larger number of Protestant missionaries in British colonies (255). Lankina and Getachew (2012, 466-7) similarly argue: "With respect to the societal underpinnings for democratic development, the record of British colonialism is not very laudable. ... Our call to isolate the impact of missionary activity from that of colonial authority rests on the role of Christian missions in the promotion of education." Empirically, Woodberry (2012) demonstrates that the British colonialism dummy becomes statistically insignificant and substantively small when controlling for colonial-era Protestant missionaries using a large sample of countries (minus Europe and neo-Europes) with democracy level averaged between 1950 and 1994. This resembles Hadenius' (1992, 133) earlier finding that controlling for Protestant population share explains away the Britain effect.

Hariri (2012) offers a different account that links the pre-colonial and colonial eras, providing evidence that (1) territories with a long history of statehood have experienced lower levels of post-Cold War democracy and (2) a proxy for European settler influence positively correlates with democracy. Although Hariri does not focus on the Britain-democracy thesis, the general thrust of Hariri's (2012) framework resembles Woodberry (2012) and Lankina and Getachew (2012): specific colonial-era actors caused democracy rather any inherent features of different empires. Similarly, pre-colonial characteristics of territories, i.e., selection effects, impact prospects for the directness of rule and for democracy promotion rather than the identity of the colonizer. Acemoglu et al.'s (2001) related contribution about colonial-era European settlers and economic institutions explicitly draws this conclusion: "it appears that British colonies are found to perform substantially better in other studies in large part because Britain colonized places where [large-scale European] settlements were possible, and this made British colonies inherit better institutions" (1388).

Like other existing arguments about Britain and democracy, these alternative historical explanations do not anticipate changes in the efficacy of British colonialism over time. They posit that after controlling for the causally important historical factors—and therefore addressing selection effects—British rule should not correlate with democracy either at independence or anytime afterwards.

3 Empirical Setup

3.1 Samples

A key feature of the current study is to examine multiple time periods. The core models examine correlations among all post-independence years, the first full year of independence,[1] and only post-1991 years. The latter period corresponds with the end of the Cold War, which is theoretically relevant for reasons discussed in the mechanism sections below. However, the appendix also shows the results are similar using different definitions of "early" and "late" periods since independence (Appendix Table A.8). The appendix also presents models that interact British colonialism with years since independence and calendar years (Appendix Table A.9). Using disaggregated time periods provides an important difference between our study and other recent colonialism-democracy articles that only analyze average outcomes over long or potentially unrepresentative time periods. For example, Woodberry (2012) only examines average democracy levels between 1950 and 1994 and Hariri (2012) only analyzes average democracy levels between 1991 and 2007. Studying multiple periods enables distinguishing short-term from long-term effects, which is crucial for theory assessment.

We also examine two different country samples among countries with Polity IV data (Marshall and Gurr 2014): the set of former colonies that gained independence from a Western European country between World War II and 1980, and the set of all non-European countries. The first sample is relatively large (73 countries) and groups together countries that are similar in experiencing decolonization around the same time. This ensures that when examining long-term effects in the post-Cold War era (a commonly studied period in colonialism studies, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001; Hariri 2012), countries have experienced post-colonial periods of roughly similar length. The post-1945 independence sample also alleviates concerns about temporally heterogeneous colonizer legacies—considering different modes of colonial rule and attitudes toward democracy promotion in different waves of decolonization—and concerns that highly unrep-

[1] Polity IV measures its variables in December 31 of the given year.

resentative colonies such as "neo-British" settler colonies (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) drive the results.[2]

However, to demonstrate that the temporally contingent Britain effect does not depend upon this particular sample, we re-run every specification in Tables 1 to 3 with a sample of all non-European countries (including never-colonized countries). The results for all non-European countries show that including the bulk of the former Spanish empire and the neo-Britains do not substantively change the findings for British colonialism, whereas comparing results from the two samples carries important implications for other prominent colonialism-democracy hypotheses.

Appendix Table A.1 lists all countries in the full sample by year of independence, from which we also constructed the 1945 to 1980 sample.

3.2 Data

Colonizer identity. We follow standard definitions of overseas colonialism to measure British colonialism. Some cases are complicated because Britain exerted minimal internal control (Arabian peninsula colonies), were ruled for a very short period of time (Middle Eastern Mandate territories colonized after World War I), or were transferred after World War II (former Italian colonies). We use Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius' (2013) data, which code the former two categories but not the latter as British colonies. However, we show that our results do not hinge on including Middle Eastern countries in the British empire—and, in fact, this coding decision biases against finding a positive Britain-democracy correlation at independence.

Democracy. We use the standard *polity*2 variable from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Gurr 2014) to measure democracy. In addition to wide usage in the literature, this dataset is also advantageous because of its broad temporal coverage: 1800 to the present. The appendix provides robustness checks using Cheibub et al.'s (2013) update of Przeworski et al.'s (2000) binary democracy variable, which has coverage starting in 1946, and Coppedge et al.'s (2016) polyarchy measure from the V-Dem dataset (coverage starts in 1900). Separately, although coding democracy scores at independence may seem to be an error-prone process, there do not appear to be strong concerns about measurement error in *polity*2 at independence relative to other times and places. The Polity coders do not flag any cases of coding uncertainty in the year after independence, compared to 33 cases in later years of our sample.

[2]Owolabi (2015, 45) discusses additional advantages of studying a post-1945 independence sample.


Finally, although it is standard in the literature to use aggregated democracy measures, the appendix also presents robustness checks based on various subindices of democracy drawn from the Polity IV and V-Dem datasets to assess whether British rule only influenced specific institutional features.

Table A.2 details the various covariates used below. Table A.3 provides summary statistics for each variable.

4 Statistical Evidence for a Time-Varying British Legacy

The cross-tabular patterns for British versus non-British ex-colonies are striking. Over half of British ex-colonies were democratic at independence, compared to only one non-British colony (Appendix Table A.4 provides details). However, since 1991, only 23% of ex-British colonies have had an average *polity*2 score of at least 6, compared to 16% of non-British colonies. Figure 1 illustrates these two key cross-sectional patterns in the data by plotting average *polity*2 score for ex-British and non-former British colonies against years since each country gained independence, among post-1945 decolonization cases. It contains the first 35 years of independence because this is the longest time period that enables a constant sample of countries. First, ex-British colonies were strikingly more democratic on average at independence than other ex-colonies. Second, this gap narrowed considerably over time. Because many countries in the sample gained independence in the early 1960s, the period of 30-to-35 years after independence roughly corresponds to the peak of the "Third Wave" in the mid-1990s.

Figure 1: Ex-British Colonies Versus Other Countries, by Years Since Independence



Notes: The vertical axis shows the average *polity*2 score for ex-British colonies and for other countries in our sample, averaged across the number of years since a particular country achieved independence.

This section statistically establishes the core cross-sectional patterns—robustly strong correlation at independence and consistently weak post-1991 correlation—before subsequent sections explain *why* British colonies were advantaged at independence followed by convergence over time. The cross-sectional findings are robust to adding a standard set of democracy covariates, to changing democracy measures, to controlling for variables posited in research suggesting that Britain simply selected better colonies, and to examining either a post-1945 decolonization sample or all non-European countries. These temporally contingent findings also hold among many subsets of the British empire, including briefly ruled and indirectly ruled colonies. We show only a very large amount of bias from unobserved covariates could explain away the estimated effect at independence. Finally, any claim that omitted variables can explain away the temporally heterogeneous pattern must identify factors that—in addition to covarying with colonizer identity—strongly covary with democracy levels at independence *but not* several decades afterwards.

We present results from pooled OLS models that use country-year as the unit of observation and cluster standard errors by country. The basic model estimated in Table 1 is:

$$polity2_{it} = \alpha + \delta BritishColony_i + \beta X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{1}$$

where $polity2_{it}$ is the *polity*2 score for country *i* in year *t*, δ is the main parameter of interest, and X_{it} is a vector of covariates that varies across specifications.

4.1 Core Results

Table 1, Panel A examines countries that gained independence after 1945 from a Western European country, and Panel B uses the expanded sample of all non-European countries with *polity*2 data. Column 1 in both panels pools all sample years. It recovers the common finding in the existing large-N literature: former British colonies are in general more democratic than other countries. Column 2 demonstrates that this relationship remains even when controlling for a set of five standard democracy covariates in Panel A: logged annual GDP per capita, logged annual population, logged annual oil and gas production per capita, Muslim percentage of the population in 1980, and ethnic fractionalization.[3]

[3]Three of the 73 countries in the core sample are missing GDP per capita data in all years (four at independence), which accounts for the discrepancy in sample size between the specifications that include these covariates versus those that do not. Because of missing data on the three time-varying covariates in the 19th century, the Panel B regressions with controls only include ethnic fractionalization and Muslims (two

Table 1: Core Results

	Panel A. Post-1945 independence cases. DV: *polity*2 score					
	All post-indep. years, 1945-		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	3.521***	2.482**	6.290***	6.912***	1.253	0.0463
	(1.151)	(1.038)	(1.439)	(1.574)	(1.279)	(1.331)
Ethnic frac.		-2.630		-0.987		-0.596
		(2.298)		(2.525)		(3.214)
Muslim %		-0.0325**		-0.0309		-0.0341**
		(0.0131)		(0.0186)		(0.0153)
ln(GDP/cap)		1.025		0.424		0.569
		(0.657)		(1.026)		(0.868)
ln(Pop.)		0.669*		0.541		0.372
		(0.388)		(0.478)		(0.456)
ln(Oil & gas/capita)		-0.460*		-0.753*		-0.549*
		(0.235)		(0.397)		(0.279)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	73	69	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.071	0.169	0.218	0.376	0.011	0.145
	Panel B. All non-European countries. DV: *polity*2 score					
	All post-indep. years, 1800-		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	4.512***	4.682***	6.346***	6.360***	0.422	0.250
	(1.224)	(1.008)	(1.178)	(1.106)	(1.165)	(0.967)
Muslim %		-0.0548***		-0.0401***		-0.0769***
		(0.00785)		(0.0129)		(0.0118)
Ethnic frac.		-1.724		-0.203		-1.942
		(1.444)		(1.893)		(1.980)
Country-years	11,088	11,071	129	127	3,147	3,130
R-squared	0.087	0.199	0.226	0.302	0.001	0.222

Notes: Table 1 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Although Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 provide evidence for a positive British colonialism effect, the estimated magnitude of the coefficients is relatively small. The three-point estimated effect in Panel A corresponds to the move from Saudi Arabia to slightly more liberal Kuwait in 2012, or from Guyana to India. Furthermore, as shown below, the coefficient estimate in the full temporal sample is not robustly statistically significant using every democracy measure (Table A.6, Panel B, Column 2) nor across all types of British colonies (Table 3). The estimated effect in Panel B is somewhat larger, although this arises primarily from including four historically exceptional neo-Britains.

The remainder of Table 1 disaggregates the Britain effect into different time periods. Columns 3 and 4 present results for each country's first full year of independence. The Britain coefficient estimate in Panel A is almost twice the size of the corresponding specification for the full temporal sample (Column 3), and the difference is even larger once standard covariates (Column 4) or region or year fixed effects (Table A.5) are

countries are missing data on these variables in the bigger sample).

included. The estimated effect is remarkably large, at more than six on the standard 20-point *polity*2 scale and rising above seven in the year fixed effects model. For comparison, Sweden had a *polity*2 score only seven points larger than Gabon's in 2012. The coefficient estimates are also large in Panel B.

One hint that the findings at independence are unlikely to be entirely driven by unobserved factors is that the coefficient estimate *increases* when adding covariates in both Panels A and B. Therefore, the sign of the bias induced by omitting unobservables must (1) go in the opposite direction as the bias induced by omitting the observable factors in Table 1 and (2) be very large in magnitude in order to explain away the finding. Considering the large magnitude of the coefficient estimate and insensitivity to observables, even without being able to exploit natural experimental variation it appears quite unlikely that selection effects can explain away the positive British colonial rule effect at independence—although the robustness checks below further examine this possibility.

However, if we instead examine the period since 1991, the findings are quite different. The coefficient estimates in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 are not consistent in sign, substantively small in estimated effect, and never statistically significant. Therefore, lingering concerns that omitted variable bias drives the results at independence must additionally address the diminished coefficient estimate in the post-Cold War era, i.e., identify factors that covary with British colonialism and a short-term *but not* long-term positive democracy effect.

4.2 Robustness Checks for Core Results

Three sets of robustness checks reinforce these findings: adding year or region fixed effects, altering the dependent variable, and changing the different cutoff dates. The latter includes interacting British colonialism with years since independence.

First, Appendix Table A.5 alters the set of covariates and demonstrates similar results when controlling for either region or year fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity in the cultural characteristics of specific regions or in the international climate toward democracy at different times.

Second, the results are similar across different dependent variable measures. Appendix Table A.6 considers both Cheibub's (2013) update of Przeworski et al.'s (2000) binary democracy variable and V-Dem's polyarchy measure, rather than *polity*2. Appendix Table A.7 shows that the findings are mostly similar for different subcomponents of democracy drawn from Polity IV and V-Dem.

Third, the chosen date cutoffs do not seem to affect the findings, either. Appendix Table A.8 demonstrates that the coefficient estimates from Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 are similar when analyzing average *polity*2 score over each country's first six years of independence, instead of just the first year. We address below why the coefficient estimates are somewhat smaller when expanding the initial post-independence period to six years. Additionally, the findings from Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 are qualitatively unchanged when defining "recent" years as either all post-30 years of independence or only 2012, rather than the post-1991 period. Finally, Appendix Table A.9 includes all years and interacts British colonialism with either year or years since independence. It provides evidence for a significant declining effect over time.

4.3 Selecting Better Colonies?

Many studies have proposed colonial or pre-colonial factors other than British colonization as predictors of democracy. Table 2 and Appendix Tables A.10, A.11, and A.12 evaluate prominent alternative historical accounts. These tables generate two main takeaways. First, alternative historical accounts do not explain away the Britain effect even though, as discussed below, many of them likely introduce post-treatment bias into the regression estimates. The Britain coefficient remains large and statistically significant in every regression in the first year of independence (Columns 3 and 4 of each panel), and the coefficient estimates from the whole-sample regressions are also minimally impacted (Columns 1 and 2). Second, the disaggregated time periods and samples we present suggest important qualifications to arguments about other colonial legacies. These findings mitigate concerns that Britain—which, as the world's leading naval power in the 19th century, was well-positioned to annex the most economically and strategically desirable colonies—simply colonized places that were inclined to become more democratic regardless of which European power colonized them.

Panels A and B of Table 2 assess the European settlers thesis—premised on the idea that settlers transplanted pro-democratic institutions—which does not explain away the temporally contingent Britain effect and itself receives circumscribed support. When examining post-1945 decolonization cases, the European settler coefficient is consistently small in magnitude and never statistically significant. Among all non-European countries, the settlers thesis receives support in all years and in post-1991 years but not at independence. Therefore, European settlers may explain some variation in post-colonial democracy, but these differences did not exist at independence. This finding contrasts with Acemoglu et al.'s (2001) and Hariri's (2012) hypothesis that colonial European settlers transplanted representative institutions from their home countries.

Table 2: Alternative Historical Explanations

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A. European settlers, post-1945 independence countries					
British colony	3.688***	2.501**	6.322***	6.543***	1.752	0.361
	(1.118)	(1.081)	(1.422)	(1.679)	(1.265)	(1.396)
ln(Eu. pop. %)	0.161	0.0156	0.0302	-0.313	0.459	0.281
	(0.257)	(0.262)	(0.299)	(0.299)	(0.291)	(0.319)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	73	69	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.074	0.169	0.218	0.385	0.039	0.154
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. European settlers, all non-European countries					
British colony	4.752***	4.830***	6.442***	6.387***	0.861	0.637
	(0.925)	(0.881)	(1.157)	(1.114)	(1.039)	(0.955)
ln(European settlers)	0.626***	0.426***	0.221	0.0398	0.855***	0.556***
	(0.101)	(0.116)	(0.139)	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.161)
Country-years	11,088	11,071	129	127	3,147	3,130
R-squared	0.198	0.236	0.239	0.302	0.169	0.279
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel C. State antiquity in 1500, post-1945 independence countries					
British colony	5.418***	4.177***	8.726***	8.163***	3.367***	1.754
	(1.125)	(1.098)	(1.339)	(1.661)	(1.244)	(1.360)
State antiquity in 1500	-0.192	-0.0824	1.962	4.482	-2.367	-2.994
	(1.697)	(2.165)	(1.985)	(3.011)	(1.993)	(3.128)
Country-years	3,333	3,246	62	60	1,471	1,423
R-squared	0.170	0.219	0.427	0.450	0.102	0.149
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel D. State antiquity in 1500, all non-European countries					
British colony	5.513***	5.671***	8.446***	8.308***	1.544	1.293
	(1.077)	(0.990)	(1.064)	(1.057)	(1.108)	(1.036)
State antiquity in 1500	-3.603***	-2.070	-0.400	0.846	-4.755***	-2.602
	(1.162)	(1.276)	(1.361)	(1.503)	(1.658)	(1.938)
Country-years	10,122	10,122	112	112	2,763	2,763
R-squared	0.179	0.221	0.393	0.410	0.082	0.183
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel E. Protestant missionaries, post-1945 independence countries					
British colony	2.885**	2.332**	5.253***	6.400***	0.795	-0.0189
	(1.174)	(1.048)	(1.548)	(1.594)	(1.299)	(1.345)
Protestant missionaries	0.923**	0.487	1.387***	1.329***	0.595	0.171
	(0.460)	(0.637)	(0.410)	(0.491)	(0.461)	(0.697)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	73	69	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.093	0.173	0.276	0.410	0.024	0.146
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel F. Protestant missionaries, all non-European countries					
British colony	1.510	2.466**	4.900***	5.125***	-0.976	-0.284
	(1.060)	(0.963)	(1.355)	(1.321)	(1.186)	(1.014)
Protestant missionaries	1.360***	0.700	1.526***	1.177***	0.901**	0.0135
	(0.431)	(0.427)	(0.365)	(0.405)	(0.419)	(0.425)
Country-years	10,395	10,395	121	121	2,980	2,980
R-squared	0.053	0.130	0.274	0.306	0.020	0.201
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table 2 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the main variables of theoretical interest, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The even-numbered columns in Panels A, C, and E additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel A. The even-numbered columns in Panels B, D, and F additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel B. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

In addition, the null results in Panel A suggest that pro-settler findings are driven entirely by comparing early independence cases in the New World to late-decolonizing Old World countries—a concerning basis for counterfactual comparison because many differences besides European settlers distinguish these areas of the world.

The thesis that areas with longer histories of statehood above the local level should be less democratic, evaluated in Panels C and D, receives even weaker support. Overall, the results are similar to those for European settlers: no support in the post-1945 decolonization sample; and, among all non-European countries, some support in all years and post-1991, but not at independence. Every specification for the first year of independence has a positive sign, i.e., opposite from theoretical prediction. Absent theoretical guidance, it appears concerning for a hypothesis about a historical legacy that the effect finds support only in very recent years. And even for the two specifications in which the state antiquity hypothesis receives support, the coefficient estimate diminishes considerably in magnitude when adding additional covariates (Panel D, Columns 2 and 6). Appendix Table A.10 demonstrates similar results as in Panels A through D of Table 2 when controlling for related pre-colonial or early colonial factors: European settler mortality rates (Acemoglu et al. 2001), historical population density (Acemoglu et al. 2002), years elapsed since a territory's Neolithic transition (Hariri 2012), and the date of colonial conquest.

The Protestant missionary hypothesis also cannot explain away the Britain effect at independence,[4] and itself appears to follow a similar temporal pattern. In both samples in Panels E and F, the hypothesis receives somewhat strong support in all years, and very strong support at independence but not after 1991. Additional theorizing is needed to explain this temporally contingent pattern because existing pro-missionary arguments rely on the types of structural cultural influences that seemingly should imply a long-term in addition to a short-term effect (Woodberry 2012; Lankina and Getachew 2012). Tables A.11 and A.12 show that two related human capital explanations (secondary education and literacy) also cannot explain away the Britain effect, nor can standard geographical controls.

Two theoretical considerations should be noted. First, it is not clear *a priori* whether these colonial-era factors are truly alternative explanations—implying that omitted variables bias the Britain coefficient estimate in regressions that do not include these factors—or are consequences of the Britain treatment, which would

[4]The magnitude of the coefficient estimate for British colonialism in Panel F relative to Panel B of Table 1 is somewhat attenuated because Woodberry (2012) is missing data for the four neo-Britains.

imply that controlling for them introduces post-treatment bias to the Britain coefficient estimate. For example, if colonies that factually had large Protestant missionary populations would have hosted similarly large missions even had they been counterfactually colonized by a different power, then Protestant missionaries are an alternative explanation for the Britain-democracy correlation. If instead large missionary populations were a consequence of British colonial rule, then Protestant missionaries are a mechanism connecting British colonialism and democracy. Because it is not clear theoretically whether concerns about omitted variable bias or post-treatment bias are more relevant for these data, it is reassuring that the Table 1 and Table 2 findings for British colonialism are quite similar.

Second, pre-colonial factors provide a poor theoretical explanation for the time-varying nature of the British colonialism-democracy relationship. Although Britain may have colonized areas with some inherent affinity for democracy, it seems implausible that Britain colonized areas more inherently likely to experience democracy at independence, but not to remain more democratic than the rest of the post-colonial world over time. At the very least, the literature provides no guidance for what such a selection mechanism might look like.

4.4 Heterogeneity Within the British Empire

Another possible concern with the Table 1 results is that because the British empire exhibited diverse forms of rule, it is uninformative to consider British colonialism as a whole. Certainly, the British empire was notable for the cultural and geographic diversity of areas it ruled and for the variety of institutional forms adopted to govern them. Various British bureaucracies—such as the Colonial Office, India Office, the Foreign Office, and for-profit corporations—established their own local institutions and followed divergent policies toward local inhabitants and traditional authorities. If the effects of British colonialism were concentrated only in colonies that received a specific institutional inheritance, it would be strong evidence of the importance of these institutions rather than factors common to all British colonies.

We demonstrate instead that even British colonies with "weak" institutional inheritances were more democratic than non-British colonies at independence. This is consistent with the temporally contingent pattern shown above, although in some models more intensely ruled British colonies (which is, of course, endogenous to many local traits) has a positive effect on democracy even after 1991. Table 3 examines the post-1945 decolonization sample and Appendix Table A.13 demonstrates that the results are qualitatively identical for all non-European countries.

Table 3: Heterogeneity Within the British Empire

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score. Sample: post-1945 decolonization countries					
	Panel A: Direct vs. indirect British rule					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British direct rule	7.835***	6.740***	10.61***	11.26***	4.942**	4.022
	(1.750)	(2.213)	(1.498)	(2.004)	(1.979)	(2.981)
British indirect rule	1.944	1.273	4.794***	5.526***	-0.0305	-0.627
	(1.240)	(1.077)	(1.671)	(1.754)	(1.368)	(1.314)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	73	69	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.145	0.224	0.287	0.434	0.072	0.189
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B: Metropolitan British rights vs. not					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Br w/ metropolitan rights	9.577***	9.236***	10.32***	10.83***	6.686***	6.431**
	(1.501)	(2.006)	(1.619)	(2.454)	(1.549)	(2.507)
Br w/o metropolitan rights	1.751	1.598	5.096***	6.230***	-0.354	-0.364
	(1.153)	(1.010)	(1.649)	(1.654)	(1.339)	(1.293)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	73	69	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.188	0.251	0.269	0.404	0.124	0.216
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel C: Long vs. short British rule					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Long British rule	7.422***	6.425***	8.653***	8.798***	5.001***	4.625***
	(1.248)	(1.500)	(1.656)	(2.010)	(1.345)	(1.737)
Short British rule	0.00197	-0.0376	4.058**	5.574***	-2.295	-2.336*
	(1.271)	(1.098)	(1.955)	(1.901)	(1.447)	(1.315)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	73	69	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.221	0.268	0.274	0.399	0.183	0.275
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel D: Exclude Middle East					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	4.259***	3.506***	8.290***	8.712***	1.998	0.842
	(1.114)	(1.140)	(1.342)	(1.489)	(1.231)	(1.517)
Country-years	3,338	3,194	64	60	1,532	1,461
R-squared	0.109	0.126	0.399	0.449	0.030	0.036
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel E: Only Africa					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	2.348**	1.683	7.682***	8.083***	0.435	-0.804
	(1.157)	(1.209)	(1.787)	(1.909)	(1.551)	(1.467)
Country-years	2,057	2,057	41	41	981	981
R-squared	0.036	0.053	0.366	0.380	0.002	0.064
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: See notes to Table 2 (Panels A, C, E).

Panels A through C present results for three measures of the directness or intensity of British rule. In Panel A, we code a British colony as experiencing direct British rule if less than 20 percent of its court cases in the 1950s were heard in customary courts, whereas British indirect rule composes the remaining British colonies (Lange 2004).[5] Panel B disaggregates British colonialism using Owolabi's (2015) dichotomous measure of whether colonial subjects possessed legal rights equivalent to metropolitan citizens'. Panel C disaggregates

[5]There is a natural break in Lange's variable around 20 percent.

British colonies into long British rule (at least 80 years, the median in the post-1945 decolonization sample) and short British rule (less than 80 years). The literature has proposed that time spent as a British colony may have provided greater exposure to "good" British cultural influence and institutions.

For all three measures, directly or intensely ruled British colonies appeared to exert more beneficial short-term effects on democracy at independence than indirectly ruled colonies (Columns 3 and 4 of Panels A through C). However, it is somewhat remarkable that the estimated effect is also substantively large and statistically significant for indirectly ruled colonies using all three measures. Existing pro-Britain theories do not anticipate indirectly ruled countries also enjoying higher levels of democracy at independence. Furthermore, as in Table 1, none of the three variants of indirectly ruled British colonies are systematically correlated with democracy after 1991 (Columns 5 and 6).

In some respects, the more institutionalized British colonies provide an exception to the overall pattern of diminishing legacies. Although the magnitude of the coefficient estimates are considerably attenuated in the post-1991 period, most of the estimates remain statistically significant. This may in part represent selection effects because Britain strategically chose where to impose those institutions. In addition, Sections 5 and 6 discuss how the existence of long-term structural advantages for a small number of colonies is compatible with the broader argument that Britain failed to exert long-term effects in the vast majority of its empire.

Table 3 also considers two sample alterations. Many accounts of British colonial rule, such as Lange (2009, 53) and Abernethy (2000, 410), mention Britain's Middle Eastern colonies as being atypical of the rest of the British empire. The colonies were either ruled extremely indirectly by local monarchs with very little colonial interference (Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait) or were acquired as mandates after World War I and therefore only briefly experienced colonial rule (Iraq, Jordan, and Israel). Panel D of Table 3 tests the effects of British colonialism in a sample that excludes all Middle Eastern countries. Predictably, given the prevalence of authoritarianism in the region, these models yield a higher estimated short-term effect of British colonialism than does Table 1. However, the coefficient estimate in the post-1991 sample remains small and statistically insignificant. This demonstrates that the weak post-1991 correlation in Table 1 is not an artifact of coding certain Middle Eastern countries as belonging to the British empire.

Panel E of Table 3 assesses a sample that consists only of African countries. This is a hard test of the

colonizer influence hypothesis because Britain's African colonies tended to experience short durations of colonial rule, and were poorly institutionalized and characterized by systems of rule that denied full legal rights to large sections of the population (Mamdani 1996). By contrast, most cases frequently cited as examples of positive British institutional legacies, such as India and the Caribbean nations, are outside of Africa (Diamond 1988, 6). However, the estimated short-term effect of British colonialism is in fact larger in Africa than among all post-1945 independence countries, and yields the same pattern of strong short-term but not long-term effects—contrary to Huntington's (1984, 206) assertion that British colonialism had no effect in Africa.

In sum, these results consistently demonstrate that British colonialism exerted a positive effect at least in the short-term across a wide variety of colonial experiences and geographical regions. This includes areas where the institutional legacies of British rule have frequently been characterized as weak or even negative.

4.5 Additional Robustness Checks: Post-Colonial Influence and Disaggregating European Colonizers

The appendix demonstrates that these results are qualitatively similar under two additional robustness checks. First, we examine the role of superpower rivalry during the Cold War and post-colonial military presence (Table A.14). Second, we disaggregate non-British colonies by their colonizer, showing that no single non-British colonizer drives the findings (Table A.15).

5 Mechanisms I: British Democratic Advantages at Independence

What explains this temporally contingent effect? Despite wide-ranging debates about British colonialism, no existing political science theories can explain the strong short-term yet weak long-term effect of British rule. The remainder of the paper presents an alternative theory that integrates Britain's relatively gradual and flexible approach to decolonization into traditional arguments, accompanied by statistical and qualitative evidence. The theory builds off more historically oriented research on decolonization (Smith 1978; Kahler 1984; Spruyt 2005). This section focuses on democracy levels at independence, and the next section explains why the effect declined over time, using the postwar sample.[6]

[6]The remainder of the paper only analyzes the post-1945 decolonization sample for three reasons. First, to explain change over time, it is important that countries gained independence within the same epoch so that years since independence roughly align with calendar years and shifts in the international climate for

To explain British colonies' democratic advantages at independence, we argue that relative to its imperial rivals, Britain was more adept at encouraging democratic preparation prior to granting independence and at tailoring the timing of independence to individual colonies' democratic development. Britain also tended to grant independence in response to strong local demands—which prevented having to relinquish the post-colonial state to guerrilla movements—although in some cases Britain was forced to rush its timetable to independence and these colonies did not enjoy the same advantages as other British colonies. By contrast, other colonizers alternated between an undignified hurry to relinquish colonial possessions and inflexibly opposing independence. Statistical evidence demonstrates these decolonization differences—which stemmed in part from Britain's relatively high level of democracy and less entrenched colonial lobby—help to explain divergent democratic inheritances.

5.1 Democracy as an "Honourable" Exit Strategy

Britain more actively encouraged democratic preparation prior to granting independence and tailored the timing of independence to individual colonies' democratic development (Young 1970). Britain generally followed its decolonization strategy of transferring "complete power to colonies as soon as the transfer could be made decently—that is, to a democratically elected government which could reasonably be held to represent a 'national will"' (Fieldhouse 1986, 8), although of course not every colony met this ideal. The final pre-independence election tended to culminate a longer process of democratic devolution to fulfill Britain's goal of an "honourable exit" (Young 1970, 482). This produced structures for democratically electing national officials. For example, India gained independence from Britain in 1947, but wealthy voters had elected national and provincial legislators since the early 1920s, and elected officials had controlled all the executive departments in some provinces since the 1930s. This required developing political parties, such as the Congress Party, that provided a foundation for democratic contestation at independence.

Even in poorer and less institutionalized Nigeria, Britain imposed a federal constitution in 1954 designed to balance sharp regional divisions and to prevent undemocratic power concentration by any one group. In the late 1950s, as France pushed out its African colonies, in Nigeria, "the Secretary of State for the Colonies

democracy promotion. Second, the modes of Western European colonial rule and decolonization among their older, primarily New World colonies were very different than for their more recent, primarily Old World colonies. Finally, as a practical matter, much of the colonial-era data we use below is unavailable for early decolonization cases.

refused to set a date [for independence] until regional self-government had been tested and other problems, especially the related questions of minority fears and the demand for new states, had been resolved" (Sklar and Whitaker 1966, 51). In India, Nigeria, and many other cases, Britain introduced elections well before independence but installed increasingly comprehensive reforms as independence became more likely.

This pattern contrasts starkly with France, the largest non-British colonizer. Despite implementing uniform electoral reforms in all its African colonies shortly after World War II, France planned to retain power for the long-term until circumstances changed in the late 1950s, after failures in Vietnam and Algeria had "progressively infected all French political life" (Young 1970, 471). Consequently, only two years after every French African colony except Guinea had voted to remain within the French colonial sphere, France simultaneously granted independence to all 14 of its Sub-Saharan African colonies with a population over 100,000. Similarly, Belgium quickly retreated from Africa after rioting in Leopoldville in 1959, granting independence to the Congo in 1960 and to Rwanda and Burundi in 1962. By contrast, British colonialism in Africa ended in stages throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

Table 4 assesses the effects of Britain's calculated independence timing. If Britain tended to hold onto its colonies longer to secure higher democracy levels, then it should be true that if Britain had let go of its colonies earlier, they would have not have enjoyed the relative democratic inheritance documented throughout the paper. Although British colonies held a democratic advantage relative to non-British colonies throughout the first half of the 20th century, this advantage grew precipitously in the last few years of colonial rule (see Appendix Figure A.1). The dependent variable in Table 4 is a "counterfactual" democracy measure at independence. For non-British colonies, this variable takes the value of the country's V-Dem polyarchy score in the first full year of independence. For British colonies, this variable takes the value of the colony's polyarchy score either five (Columns 1 and 2) or one year before independence (Columns 3 and 4). These regressions assess whether, had British counterfactually granted independence to its colonies earlier than it factually did—perhaps by following France's path of pushing all its colonies out in a single year—whether they would still have enjoyed a democratic advantage at independence. Strikingly, given the robust positive correlations between British colonialism and democracy in the first year of independence demonstrated throughout the paper (see Appendix Table A.6 for the original specifications using V-Dem), the coefficient estimate flips to negative and significant for the five-year counterfactual and is insignificant with an inconsistent sign in the one-year counterfactual. This suggests strongly that Britain's concerted

democracy promotion in the lead-up to independence was crucial for generating its colonies' democratic inheritance.

Table 4: British Colonialism and "Counterfactual" Democracy Level at Independence

	DV: "Counterfactual" V-Dem level at independence			
	Br. cols.: V-Dem 5 yrs. before		Br. cols.: V-Dem 1 yr. before	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
British colony	-0.0691**	-0.0993***	0.0209	-0.00454
	(0.0345)	(0.0346)	(0.0373)	(0.0382)
Countries	65	61	65	61
R-squared	0.060	0.223	0.005	0.104
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table 4 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates clustered by country in parentheses. Columns 2 and 4 control for the same standard democracy covariates as in Table 1, Panel A. The sample in every specification consists of post-1945 decolonization cases. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

5.2 Avoiding Violent Power Transfers

Another aspect of the British government's flexible approach to decolonization was that it usually ceded power before pressure for independence engendered violent rebellion, although Britain bequeathed a less strong democratic inheritance in colonies where more minor disruptions occurred. The rarity of major rebellions in British colonies contrasted with France's heavy-handed policies in Vietnam after Japan departed and its view that Algeria was an integral part of France—similar to how Portugal viewed its African colonies. Where these violent rebellions succeeded, they limited the colonizer's power to set the terms and timing of independence by increasing the costs of remaining in the colony and by creating powerful alternative claimants to state power. In this situation, independence arrangements resembled a negotiated surrender more than an exercise in constitution-making. These treaties tended to hand power to the former guerrilla movement in a hasty or disorganized fashion, and these rebel groups tended to establish authoritarian regimes (Wantchekon and Garcia-Ponce 2015, 9).

One consequence of Britain's more flexible decolonization policies was that it faced fewer major revolts in its colonies after World War II than other powers. Within our sample, 28 percent of non-British colonies experienced major decolonization violence versus 6 percent of British colonies. Even when the British did face such rebellions, as in Malaysia and Kenya, they successfully avoided handing over power to rebels through a combination of successful counterinsurgency and granting opportunities to non-violent nationalist groups. The variable does not score any violent takeovers in British colonies in our sample, compared to three French, three Portuguese, and Dutch Indonesia.[7] The absence of guerrilla takeovers in British colonies

[7]The sample does not include South Yemen because its subsequent merger with North Yemen does not

spared its new states "a potentially potent source of antidemocratic pressure" (Diamond 1988, 9).

Table 5 assesses the democratic implications of guerrilla takeovers. Columns 1 and 2 examine the guerrilla takeover correlation in isolation, with and without covariates. They show that this factor is negative and significantly correlated with democracy levels at independence, roughly the same magnitude of the coefficients for British colonialism shown throughout the paper. Columns 3 and 4 re-run these specifications while adding the British colonial dummy. Because no British colonies are coded as having guerrilla takeovers, British colonies and (non-British) guerrilla takeover countries are being compared to non-British non-guerrilla takeover countries. Both variables are statistically significant, although the Britain coefficient is somewhat attenuated from previous regressions, about 12%. Therefore, the absence of guerrilla takeovers in British colonies cannot by itself explain the Britain effect at independence, but appears to be one contributing factor to British colonies' more favorable democratic inheritance.

Table 5: Guerrilla Takeovers and Democracy at Independence

	DV: *polity*2 score in first year of indep.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Guerrillas inherit state	-6.554***	-7.618***	-3.567**	-3.818**
	(1.392)	(1.821)	(1.403)	(1.766)
British colony			5.633***	6.068***
			(1.498)	(1.692)
Countries	73	69	73	69
R-squared	0.082	0.244	0.240	0.398
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table 5 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and robust standard error estimates clustered by country in parentheses. Columns 2 and 4 control for the same standard democracy covariates as in Table 1, Panel A, and Appendix Table A.2 describes the guerrilla takeover variable. The sample in every specification consists of post-1945 decolonization cases. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

5.3 Explaining Divergent Decolonization Policies

Two factors appear particularly important for explaining Britain's better-planned decolonization policies. First, Britain itself was more democratic than most other decolonizing powers, consistent with existing research showing that democratic powers are more likely to spread democracy than are dictatorial powers. Narizny (2012, 362) argues that Britain tended to promote a liberal state-society relationship in its colonies to advantage British firms. More broadly, Gunitsky (2014, 569-71) argues that democratic great powers seek to expand their trade and patronage networks by democratizing client states, hence shifting the institutional preferences of domestic actors and coalitions, although the present argument departs somewhat from Boix's

allow comparisons in the post-Cold War period. Additionally, Zimbabwe gained independence from a rogue white settler government rather than directly from Britain.

(2011, 815) claim that democratic powers only seek to export democracy to wealthier states where they expect democracy to be stable. Whereas existing research focuses mainly on post-independence Western influence, we suggest that a similar phenomenon occurred during post-World War II decolonization—part of the Cold War period often thought to be a low tide for international democracy promotion. Across empires, the United States, Belgium, and Netherlands were also stably democratic, whereas Portugal and Spain were both authoritarian until the end of the decolonization era. France, although never fully authoritarian, went through a less democratic period during the 1950s and 1960s when Charles de Gaulle revised the constitution to personalize power after gaining office following a military revolt in Algeria.

Second, the political power of social groups that favored continued colonial rule—in particular, European settlers and business interests—were weaker in Britain. French citizens in Algeria could vote in French elections and their lobby often held the balance of power in unstable Fourth Republic governments. They successfully frustrated any moves towards decolonization until the late 1950s (Marshall 1973). Investors with interests in the colonies composed another pressure group that favored limiting devolution. France protected firms in its colonies against international competition (Kahler 1984) and Belgium's largest company, the Societe Generale de Belgique, controlled 60 percent of the Congo's economy (Peemans 1975, 182). By contrast, although pro-colonial interests were present in Britain, the country possessed a less powerful pro-colonial lobby than did other colonial powers (Spruyt 2005). For example, in Rhodesia, the British government pressured European settlers to grant broader rights to Africans, and in 1968 overcame pro-settler forces in the House of Lords to impose economic sanctions on the rogue settler regime (Coggins 2006).

Table 6 supports two empirical implications of colonizers' divergent democratization commitments. Panel A examines the metropole's *polity*2 score in each country's year of independence. Panel B uses the Manifesto Project's (Gabel and Huber 2000) measure of the degree to which metropolitan political parties' manifestos mentioned decolonization and anti-imperialism, a proxy for the power of colonial lobbies. Higher levels of metropole democracy and heightened political party attention to decolonization are each significantly correlated with ex-colonies' *polity*2 scores at independence (Columns 1 and 2). These factors also somewhat attenuate the British colonialism effect at independence, with the coefficient estimates ranging from 27 to 41 percent lower than in regressions that omit both intervening factors but use the same sample.

Table 6: Assessing Cross-Imperial Policy Differences

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score in first yr. indep.			
	Panel A. Colonizer Democracy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonizer *polity*2	0.899***	0.926***	0.516***	0.508***
	(0.213)	(0.212)	(0.175)	(0.176)
British colony			4.390***	5.030***
			(1.635)	(1.784)
Countries	73	69	73	69
R-squared	0.188	0.330	0.260	0.415
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. Decolonization Manifestos			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonizer Anti-Colonial Manifesto	7.352***	7.487***	4.145***	3.769**
	(1.636)	(1.983)	(1.197)	(1.508)
British colony			3.585**	4.433**
			(1.534)	(1.690)
Countries	66	62	66	62
R-squared	0.200	0.373	0.232	0.421
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: See notes to Table 2 (Panels A, C, E). Columns 2 and 4 control for the same standard democracy covariates as in Table 1, Panel A, and Appendix Table A.2 describes the colonizer anti-colonial manifesto data. The sample in every specification consists of post-1945 decolonization cases.

6 Mechanisms II: Why the Effect Declined Over Time

Although these decolonization factors bequeathed ex-British colonies with a more established electoral framework, they did not create the types of cultural or structural changes that would have endowed ex-British colonies with higher underlying demand for democracy. The decolonization thesis anticipates two contributors to mean reversion over time. First, and most directly implied by the theory, British colonies should experience mean reversion in the form of democratic reversals after independence because rulers should have been able to easily overthrow foreign-imposed electoral frameworks. Second, post-independence international shocks should contribute to mean reversion by disrupting authoritarian regime equilibria inherited at independence in non-British colonies and facilitating their democratization. We demonstrate that, empirically, both of these trends occurred—which contradicts long-run cultural or institutional explanations of British colonialism and democracy.

6.1 Post-Independence Longitudinal Trends

Figure 1 depicted two key longitudinal trends in democracy since independence, complementing the major cross-sectional patterns discussed above. First, although both British and non-British ex-colonies experienced democratic decline within the first years of independence, this pattern is stronger among ex-British colonies. Average *polity*2 score fell by more than twice as much in former British colonies compared to

others in the six years after independence, 2.7 points compared to 1.3. After 15 years of independence, non-British colonies had average *polity*2 scores only 0.1 less than at independence, whereas the average score in British colonies had fallen by 3.8 points.

Second, ex-British colonies have not benefitted from international trends toward democratization in the 1980s and 1990s as strongly as have other countries. In the three decades following the initial wave of democratic reversals, former British colonies have almost an identical level of democracy as they did a decade after independence—compared to a 1.5 point increase among other countries. Because many countries in the sample gained independence in the early 1960s, the period of 30-to-35 years after independence roughly corresponds to the peak of the "Third Wave" in the mid-1990s.

Tabular data in Appendix Table A.4 display a similar pattern. Over half of the British democracies at independence have had average *polity*2 scores less than 6 since 1991. Furthermore, not a single ex-British colony that was not democratic at independence has experienced an average *polity*2 scores of at least 6 since 1991—compared to 16 percent of non-British colonies.

Table 7 assesses these trends statistically by estimating a series of dynamic panel models. The basic model estimated is:

$$polity2_{it} = \beta_i + \theta polity2_{it-1} + \rho Ind.Years_{it} + \delta BritishColony_i \times Ind.Years_{it} + \beta X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where $polity2_{it}$ is the *polity*2 score for country *i* in year *t*, $polity2_{it-1}$ is the lagged dependent variable, δ is the main parameter of interest, β_i is a vector of country fixed effects, *Ind.Years* is the number of years since independence, and X_{it} is a vector of time-varying covariates that differs across the specifications. Controlling for country fixed effects enables estimating time trends without the confounding influence of any time invariant heterogeneity among countries. Regarding additional technical details, these models do not estimate the direct effect of *BritishColony* because it is perfectly collinear with the vector of country fixed effects. Year fixed effects are not included because they would make the time trend coefficients uninterpretable. Because dynamic panel models with unit fixed effects create the possibility of Nickell bias, Appendix Table A.16 instead uses Arellano-Bond dynamic panel models that instrument for the lagged variables and demonstrates similar findings. Finally, every model uses Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.

Table 7: British Colonialism and Democracy: Time Series Results

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score					
	All years	All years	1st 6 yrs. post-indep.	1st 6 yrs. post-indep.	After 6 yrs. post-indep.	After 6 yrs. post-indep.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post Ind. Years	0.0242***	0.0384***	-0.0741	-0.220***	0.0248***	0.0322***
	(0.00402)	(0.00594)	(0.0526)	(0.0696)	(0.00462)	(0.00714)
Post Ind. Years*British Col.	-0.0116**	-0.00951**	-0.255**	-0.350**	-0.0109**	-0.00996**
	(0.00474)	(0.00464)	(0.122)	(0.146)	(0.00479)	(0.00463)
Country-years	3,809	3,666	431	407	3,376	3,257
Number of countries	73	70	73	69	73	70
Country FE and LDV	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Marginal effects					
Post Ind. Years | Br. colony= 1	0.013***	0.029***	-0.329***	-0.569***	0.014***	0.022***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.103)	(0.156)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Post Ind. Years | Br. colony= 0	0.024***	0.038***	-0.073	-0.215***	0.025***	0.032***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.051)	(0.069)	(0.005)	(0.007)

Notes: Table 7 summarizes a series of dynamic time series regressions (described in Equation 2) by presenting coefficient estimates for the main variables of theoretical interest, and Driscoll-Kraay standard error estimates in parentheses that model a one-year lag. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The bottom panel presents marginal effect estimates calculated from the same model. Every specification includes country fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable. The even-numbered columns additionally control for the three time-varying standard democracy covariates in Table 1, Panel A. The sample in every specification consists of post-1945 decolonization cases. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 7, Column 1 demonstrates a positive trend in year-to-year changes in democracy score over time[8] but also that ex-British colonies have experienced less pronounced gains. Column 2 adds time-varying standard democracy covariates used in Table 1 and produces similar results. The remaining specifications demonstrate the temporal contingency of these findings. The marginal effects component of Columns 3 and 4 demonstrates that British colonies exhibited a statistically significant decline in democracy levels in the first six years of independence. Although the trend for all countries was anti-democratic during this period, it is larger in British colonies than in other countries. By contrast, the pattern after the first six years of independence resembles the full-sample pattern. Former British colonies gained in democracy levels over time, but not by as much as other ex-colonies.

6.2 Democratic Reversals Shortly After Independence

The decolonization thesis directly anticipates the democratic reversals shortly after independence demonstrated in Table 7. Because the bulk of democratic reforms occurred just prior to independence (see Table 4 and Appendix Figure A.1)—and therefore tended not to engender deep structural changes in society—it

[8]Note that including the lagged dependent variable in the time series regressions means that we are modeling trends in democratic changes relative to preceding years, rather than trends in the variable itself, as in Figure 1.

should have been relatively easy to overthrow foreign-imposed institutions after Britain left. Table 8 shows that domestic factors—military coups or incumbent consolidation—caused democratic reversal in all 10 British ex-colonies plus three related colonies that were democratic at independence but had suffered a reversal before the Third Wave (see Appendix Table A.4), as opposed to external regime-changing factors like British intervention or rebel civil war victory that would lie outside the scope of a decolonization-based theory. In most cases, the reversals occurred within a decade of independence. In contrast to our decolonization thesis, domestically triggered democratic reversals shortly after independence are inconsistent with long-term institutional and cultural mechanisms, which predict long-term democratic persistence.

Table 8: Reversal Events in Failed British Democracies

Country	Indep. year	Reversal year	Event
Burma	1948	1958	Military coup
Sri Lanka	1948	1978	Consolidation
Sudan	1956	1958	Military coup
Malaysia	1957	1969	Consolidation
Nigeria	1960	1966	Military coup
Somalia*	1960	1969	Military coup
Sierra Leone	1961	1967	Military coup
Uganda	1962	1966	Military coup
Gambia	1965	1994	Military coup
Botswana*	1966	1966	Consolidation
Lesotho	1966	1970	Consolidation
Fiji	1970	1987	Military coup
Zimbabwe*	1980	1980	Consolidation

Notes: Data from Polity IV and Geddes et al.'s (2014) dataset and codebook. Countries with an asterisk do not exactly match the Table 8 sample restrictions but illustrate similar patterns. Botswana's *polity2* score has never dropped below 6, but is coded by many (e.g., Geddes et al. 2014) as undemocratic since independence because of the persistent dominance of the BDP, i.e., they have used British elections to help consolidate authoritarian rule. Zimbabwe's *polity2* score was only 4 at independence but it did have high executive constraints from decades of autonomous European rule, and ZANU provides another case of authoritarian consolidation. Somalia gained independence from Britain (after Italian colonization) and exhibits democracy at independence followed by a coup.

6.3 How the "Third Wave" Broke Authoritarian Equilibria in Non-British Colonies

If decolonization-induced differences—rather than differences in cultural suitability for democracy or differences in societal demand for democratic reforms—primarily distinguished British colonies at independence, then another form of mean reversion should occur over time. Non-British colonies should experience greater democratic gains after independence than British colonies, which is also consistent with findings from Table 7. Here, we build on existing theories of Third Wave democratization that argue shocks to the international system—specifically, the end of the Cold War—can disrupt authoritarian equilibria, while also making a novel distinction based on colonizer identity. To exemplify the importance of the Cold War ending, Gunitsky (2014) argues that shocks to superpowers have ushered the different international waves of democracy,

and characterizes 1989 to 1995 as the only hegemonic shock since 1947. Haggard and Kaufman (2016, 9) show that the number of regime transitions in 1990 and 1991 far exceeded that in any other years between 1980 and 2008. This grounds why we distinguished the post-1991 period throughout the paper.

In five of the six non-British cases that had an average *polity2* score of at least 6 after 1991 (Benin, Cape Verde, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mali, Philippines; see Appendix Table A.4), five transitioned to democracy in or after 1991 and the other (Philippines) occurred in 1987. Thus, democratization in non-British colonies has been primarily triggered by international forces decades after independence that provided the first major shock to destabilize colonial-inherited regimes. Angola and Mozambique provide additional relevant examples for the theory because of their guerrilla origins, although each has fallen short of full democracy. Rebels seized control of the government in both countries at independence in 1975 after long decolonization wars with Portugal. These countries fit the general pattern in Table 5 that guerrilla regimes were undemocratic at independence. However, intense Cold War rivalries in these countries reached a detente in the late 1980s (Reno 2011, 76), which fostered a lasting liberalization of Mozambique's formerly one-party regime in the 1990s (Manning 2005) and (briefly) free and fair parliamentary elections in Angola in 1992 (Fituni 1995, 152). The effect of the end of the Cold War on liberalizing decolonization-induced dictatorships is therefore consistent with the diminishing British colonial legacy over time.

Arguing that international shocks can break colonially rooted authoritarian equilibria fits the data better than existing explanations. Long-term cultural and institutional theories of British colonialism seem to anticipate the opposite pattern. These theories posit that ex-British colonies should have superior cultural preconditions for democracy. Therefore, even British colonies that experienced democratic reversions after independence should still have more favorable preconditions for democratization and should therefore be advantaged—certainly not systematically disadvantaged—during pro-democratic international periods. Separately, many have argued that France has been more supportive of authoritarian rulers in its ex-colonies than have other Western powers after the Cold War (Levitsky and Way 2010), yet four of the six "late democratizers" among non-British colonies in our data were French (Benin, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mali).

6.4 Empirically Assessing Decolonization Mechanisms After the Cold War

A final implication of this focus on democratic reversals after independence and post-Soviet breakup shocks to the international system is that the decolonization mechanisms assessed in Tables 5 and 6 should correlate weakly with post-1991 democracy levels. Table A.17 supports this implication. In contrast to existing

arguments that revolutionary takeovers tend to engender highly durable authoritarian regimes, the coefficient estimate for guerrilla takeover at independence is small in magnitude and null in the post-1991 period (Panel A). Metropole democracy score exhibits a similar pattern (Panel B). The coefficient estimate for colonizer manifesto diminishes by 58 percent in Column 1 between the independence and post-1991 samples (Panel C). Although the estimate remains statistically significant, a handful of colonies in the small empires (U.S., Dutch, Belgian) drive the result (results available upon request).

7 Conclusion

Many scholars have argued that British colonial rule promoted post-independence democracy, but there has been considerable debate over the robustness of this result and its causes. Contradicting existing theories, we show that this relationship follows a strong temporal pattern. Although former British colonies were considerably more democratic than other countries immediately following independence, subsequent convergence in democracy levels has eliminated these differences in the post-Cold War period. Neither pre-colonial traits, geographical and policy variation among British colonies, post-colonial influences, nor existing theories of colonial influence account for this finding. We argue that divergent policy approaches to decolonization by European powers contributed to this pattern. Britain more consistently treated democratic elections as a prerequisite for gaining independence, leading to higher initial levels of democracy. However, these policies did not reflect differences in social or institutional support for democracy, leading to mean reversion and convergence over time.

These main contributions produce three additional, broader implications. First, they force a rethinking of which colonial legacies are most important for democracy and why. The effects of British colonial rule cannot be reduced to the types of people that populated British colonies—such as European settlers (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Hariri 2012) or Protestant missionaries (Woodberry 2012; Lankina and Getachew 2012)—contrary to arguments in these publications. Furthermore, after assessing correlations for other posited colonial-era legacies in various samples and time periods in Table 2, we raised important questions about theoretical underpinnings and statistical robustness of these factors. These considerations advance debates on colonialism and democracy and should help to spark additional research. But the results also modify triumphalist narratives of British superiority common in popular accounts of comparative development (e.g., Ferguson 2012) as well as more nuanced arguments focused on long-term structural changes induced by British colonialism. This should influence additional discussion of how and why British colonialism

mattered.

Second, the current paper's focus on different samples and time periods provides a set of best practices for other studies of colonial legacies, whether studying democracy or other outcomes such as economic development (Engerman and Sokoloff 2011; Acemoglu et al. 2001). Most theories about colonial factors implicitly or explicitly posit long-term effects, and often authors only study time periods well after independence. But assessing short-term effects is also crucial for assessing theories, at least absent a mechanism positing only increasing returns over time. Additionally, because Western Europe decolonized in two main periods that were highly correlated with global location—most Old World colonies in the 19th century and most New World colonies after World War II—results that rely entirely on comparing countries in one period to the other raise questions regarding the plausibility of the counterfactual comparisons. Studying different samples of colonies can yield crucial insights.

Third, the findings carry implications for understanding the efficacy of international democracy promotion. Even studies that have examined Western democracy promotion outside the Cold War era, such as Boix (2011), Narizny (2012), and Gunitsky (2014), have mainly focused on over-time variation in the international climate rather than within-era comparisons of countries. The results here show that nearly all of the variation among post-colonial nations during the "second wave" of democracy can be explained by British colonialism—because essentially all non-British colonies were non-democratic at independence (see Appendix Table A.4). However, despite the more concerted effort by Britain to promote democracy within its empire, these cases also highlight the frequent shortcomings of international democracy promotions. Although outsiders can create democratic institutions in otherwise unpromising contexts, the effects of these interventions may only be short-term unless they are accompanied by deeper structural changes that in effect increase societal demand for democracy.

Our findings of a substantial but non-durable effect of colonialism echoes findings concerning the mixed fortunes of post-colonial Western attempts at nation-building in occupied countries (Fearon and Laitin 2004; Krasner 2004). For example, political leaders in Iraq thwarted U.S.-implanted electoral institutions shortly after the United States began major disengagement (Dodge 2012)—similar to many ex-British colonies. Similarly, post-Cold War Western engagement has been successful at promoting greater electoral competition that frequently falls short of full-blown democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010). Contemporary democracy promotion faces similar challenges as did extrication from British imperial rule over fifty years ago.

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Online Appendix

A.1 Data Description and Statistics

Table A.1: Sample of Countries by Year of Independence*

Country	Year indep.	Country	Year indep.	Country	Year indep.
United States	1800	Pakistan	1947	Uganda	1962
Oman	1800	Bhutan	1947	Burundi	1962
Turkey	1800	Israel	1948	Kuwait	1962
Iran	1800	Korea, South	1948	Algeria	1962
Afghanistan	1800	Korea, North	1948	Rwanda	1962
Thailand	1800	Myanmar	1948	Kenya	1963
Nepal	1800	Sri Lanka	1948	Malawi	1964
China	1800	Indonesia	1949	Zambia	1964
Paraguay	1811	India	1949	Gambia	1965
Chile	1818	Taiwan	1949	Singapore	1965
Haiti	1819	Libya	1951	Guyana	1966
Colombia	1820	Japan	1951	Lesotho	1966
Mexico	1821	Laos	1953	Botswana	1966
Brazil	1823	Cambodia	1953	Equatorial Guinea	1968
Peru	1824	Vietnam	1954	Swaziland	1968
Argentina	1824	Sudan	1956	Mauritius	1968
Bolivia	1825	Morocco	1956	Zimbabwe	1969
Uruguay	1829	Malaysia	1957	Fiji	1970
Ecuador	1830	Tunisia	1958	Bahrain	1971
Venezuela	1830	Guinea	1958	Qatar	1971
Costa Rica	1838	Ghana	1959	United Arab Emirates	1971
Honduras	1838	Mauritania	1960	Bangladesh	1971
Nicaragua	1838	Senegal	1960	Guinea-Bissau	1974
Guatemala	1839	Nigeria	1960	Cape Verde	1975
El Salvador	1840	Gabon	1960	Suriname	1975
Dominican Republic	1844	Somalia	1960	Comoros	1975
Liberia	1847	Mali	1960	Papua New Guinea	1975
Ethiopia	1855	Niger	1960	Angola	1975
Canada	1867	Congo, DR	1960	Mozambique	1975
Australia	1901	Chad	1960	Djibouti	1977
Cuba	1902	Central African Republic	1960	Solomon Islands	1978
Panama	1903	Burkina Faso	1960	Namibia	1990
New Zealand	1907	Togo	1960	Turkmenistan	1991
South Africa	1910	Madagascar	1960	Armenia	1991
Yemen	1918	Cote d'Ivoire	1960	Azerbaijan	1991
Egypt	1922	Cameroon	1960	Uzbekistan	1991
Mongolia	1924	Congo	1960	Georgia	1991
Saudi Arabia	1926	Benin	1960	Kazakhstan	1991
Iraq	1932	Cyprus	1960	Kyrgyzstan	1991
Lebanon	1943	Tanzania	1961	Tajikistan	1991
Jordan	1946	Sierra Leone	1961	Eritrea	1993
Syria	1946	Trinidad and Tobago	1962	East Timor	2002
Philippines	1946	Jamaica	1962		

* For some countries, Table A.1 lists the first year with Polity IV data rather than year of independence.

Table A.2: Data Sources Not Described in Paper

Variable	Notes and description	Source
Standard democracy covariates		
Ethnic fractionalization	Computed as 1-Herfindahl index of ethnic group shares.	Alesina (2003)
Muslim percentage of population	Measured in 1980.	La Porta et al. (1999)
GDP per capita	Logged annual GDP per capita. We use Penn World Table (Feenstra et al. 2013) data and impute estimates from linear regressions using Maddison (2008) in years of missing Penn World Table data. Missing values pre-1950 and post-2011 are imputed from the country's score in 1950 and 2011, respectively.	Feenstra et al. (2013), Maddison (2008)
Population	Logged annual population. We use Penn World Table (Feenstra et al. 2013) data and impute estimates from linear regressions using Maddison (2008) in years of missing Penn World Table data. Missing values pre-1950 and post-2011 are imputed from the country's score in 1950 and 2011, respectively.	Feenstra et al. (2013), Maddison (2008)
Oil and gas production	Logged annual oil and gas production per capita	Ross (2013)
Alternative historical explanations		
European settlers	To capture Acemoglu et al.'s (2001) and Hariri's (2012) hypotheses about European settlers, we use the log of European population share at the date closest to independence with available data.	Easterly and Levine (2016)
State antiquity	A territory's combined years with government above local level. Following Hariri (2012), state antiquity is calculated in 1500.	Putterman (2008)
Protestant missionaries	Number of Protestant missionaries per 10,000 people in 1923.	Woodberry (2012)
Geographic variables	Indicator for landlocked countries, indicator for islands, distance to a coast, latitude.	Woodberry (2012)
Rainfall	Average precipitation is the long-term average in depth (over space and time) of annual precipitation in the country, measured in millimeters per year.	World Bank (2016)
Secondary education	Percentage of the population with some secondary education (averaged between 1960 and 1985).	Woodberry (2012)
Literacy	Following Owolabi (2015), we code adult literacy rates from United Nations (1980) for the year closest to 1960 with available data.	United Nations (1980)
Other		
Length of British colonial rule	Calculated by taking the difference between Hensel's (2014) independence year and Ertan, Fiszbein, and Putterman's (2016) colonial onset year.	Hensel (2014); Ertan, Fiszbein, and Putterman (2016)
Guerrillas inherit state	Fearon and Laitin's (2003) dataset provided a candidate list of conflicts. We consulted secondary sources to assess whether the group involved in violence gained control of the state at independence. Those cases are coded as 1, all others are 0.	Fearon and Laitin (2003), secondary sources
Colonizer anti-colonial manifesto	We averaged party-election-level data across all party-elections between 1945 and 1960, excluding political parties that never held office during this period. These scores reflect the power of colonial lobbies, with party commitment to decolonization much higher in Britain and Holland than in Belgium or France. This variable is not coded for Portuguese or Spanish colonies, where political parties were illegal, or for Italian colonies that were ruled as trustee states after World War II.	Gabel and Huber (2000)

Table A.3: Summary Statistics

Post-1945 independence countries			
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**N**
polity2	-1.501	6.617	3825
British colony	0.478	0.5	3825
Ethnic frac.	0.576	0.237	3825
Muslim %	35.963	38.15	3825
ln(Oil & gas/capita)	1.985	3.089	3825
ln(GDP/cap)	7.805	1.16	3681
ln(Pop.)	15.47	1.672	3825
ln(Eu. pop. %)	-2.298	2.272	3825
State antiquity in 1500	0.299	0.313	3333
Protestant missionaries	0.734	1.129	3825
ln(Settler mortality)	5.277	1.227	1687
Population density in 1500	5.285	6.75	2742
Years since Neolithic transition	4.358	2.537	3673
Colonial onset year	1849.263	95.384	3825
Secondary Education	8.964	8.817	2535
Literacy in 1960	30.374	25.178	3504
Distance to Coast	339.084	321.418	3825
Island	0.195	0.396	3825
Landlocked	0.22	0.414	3825
Latitude	15.392	10.296	3825
Precipitation	992.914	745.344	3825
(Precipitation)^2	1541270.831	1858844.619	3825
Communist Bloc	0.052	0.222	3825
French Community	0.179	0.383	3825
NATO Base	0.124	0.33	3825
Dem. 5 years before Ind.	0.158	0.124	3125
Guerrillas inherit state	0.092	0.289	3825
Colonizer Polity	8.202	3.1	3825
Colonizer Anti-Colonial Manifesto	0.973	0.419	3506
All non-European countries			
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**N**
polity2	-1.225	6.586	11088
British colony	0.246	0.431	11088
Ethnic frac.	0.481	0.247	11071
Muslim %	25.619	38.316	11071
ln(European settlers)	-0.866	3.513	11088
State antiquity in 1500	0.309	0.342	10122
Protestant missionaries	0.484	0.796	10395
ln(Settler mortality)	4.513	1.038	7810
ln(Pop. density in 1500)	0.65	1.743	10593
Years since Neolithic transition	4.485	2.504	10849
Colonial onset year	1718.66	163.038	8647
Island	0.157	0.363	11088
Landlocked	0.189	0.392	11088
Latitude	19.196	14.209	11088
Precipitation	1025.876	688.001	11022
(Precipitation)^2	1525724.483	1635237.11	11022
Communist Bloc	0.078	0.268	11088
French Community	0.031	0.174	11088
NATO Base	0.136	0.343	11088

A.2 Robustness Checks for Table 1

A similar pattern as shown in Figure 1 holds when examining tabular data. Table A.4 divides ex-colonies into four categories based on their post-independence democratic experience. "Democratic consolidation" countries had a *polity*2 score of at least 6 at independence and an average *polity*2 score of at least 6 between 1991 and 2012. "Failed post-colonial democracies" had a *polity*2 score of at least 6 at independence but an average *polity*2 score less than 6 between 1991 and 2012. "Late democratizers" had a *polity*2 score of at less than 6 at independence but an average *polity*2 score of at least 6 between 1991 and 2012. Finally, "never democratizes" countries had *polity*2 scores below 6 at independence and in the 1991 through 2012 period. Table A.4 exhibits two main patterns. First, over half of British colonies were democratic at independence, compared to only one non-British colony—Somalia, which Britain administered for 15 years after World War II. However, fewer than half of these British democracies were also consistently democratic throughout the Third Wave. Second, British colonies have benefitted less from international democracy promotion. Whereas six non-British colonies that were authoritarian at independence became fully democratic by or during the Third Wave, no British colonies that were undemocratic at independence were stable democracies during the Third Wave.

Table A.4: Cross-Tabulation of Regime Trajectories

Democracy in 1st year?	**British colony**	**Non-British**	**Regime trajectory**	**British colony**	**Non-British**
Yes	18 (51%)	1 (3%)	Democratic consolidation	8 (44%)	0 (0%)
			Democratic reversion	10 (56%)	1 (100%)
No	17 (49%)	36 (97%)	Late democratizer	0 (0%)	6 (16%)
			Never democratizes	17 (100%)	31 (84%)

Table A.5: Alternative Covariates for Table 1: Region and Year FE

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score					
	Panel A. Sample: post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	2.585**	3.511***	5.731***	7.974***	0.714	1.268
	(1.020)	(1.156)	(1.443)	(2.570)	(1.147)	(1.286)
Country-years	3,825	3,825	73	73	1,734	1,734
R-squared	0.203	0.194	0.321	0.581	0.200	0.048
Region FE	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Year FE	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. Sample: all non-European countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	4.364***	4.295***	5.954***	7.339**	0.822	0.439
	(1.060)	(1.347)	(1.197)	(2.935)	(0.992)	(1.169)
Country-years	11,088	11,088	129	129	3,147	3,147
R-squared	0.256	0.183	0.344	0.552	0.294	0.017
Region FE	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Year FE	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.5 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for British colonialism, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. In Panel A, the odd-numbered columns additionally control for a set of region fixed effects: Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, and the rest of Asia. Small (mostly island) countries not in any of these regions compose the omitted basis category. In Panel B, the odd-numbered columns additionally control for a slightly different set of region fixed effects to account for the broader global sample: Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, the rest of Asia, North and South America, and Oceania. Small (mostly island) countries not in any of these regions compose the omitted basis category. The even-numbered columns do not include the region fixed effects but do control for year fixed effects. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.6 alters the measurement of the dependent variable, democracy. Because of the limited time samples of Cheibub et al.'s (2013) and V-Dem's democracy measures relative to Polity IV, we only present results for the post-1945 decolonization sample (democracy at independence is unavailable for most early colonizers in V-Dem and Cheibub et al.). One consideration for interpreting Table A.6 is that Cheibub et al.'s (2013) binary democracy measure biases against finding a positive Britain effect immediately after independence. To be coded as a democracy, they require a country to have at least one democratic turnover in government. Therefore, countries such as Uganda and Sudan that had free and fair elections at independence—and, correspondingly, a high *polity*2 score—are not coded as democracies at independence by Cheibub et al. because in each country the military overthrew the first post-independence regime before a democratic turnover occurred. Also, note that the coefficient estimates in Panel A are logged odds ratios.

Table A.6: Alternative Democracy Measures

	Panel A. DV: Cheibub et al. democracy, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	1.079***	0.761*	1.148**	1.081*	0.576	0.190
	(0.407)	(0.394)	(0.570)	(0.651)	(0.446)	(0.527)
Country-years	3,390	3,264	73	69	1,299	1,246
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. DV: V-Dem polyarchy, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	0.106**	0.0508	0.112***	0.0869**	0.0586	-0.0187
	(0.0420)	(0.0367)	(0.0415)	(0.0378)	(0.0482)	(0.0479)
Country-years	3,523	3,379	68	64	1,550	1,479
R-squared	0.061	0.161	0.105	0.308	0.018	0.100
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.6 summarizes a series of logit regressions (Panel A) and OLS regressions (Panel B) by presenting coefficient estimates for British colonialism, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The odd-numbered columns only control for British colonialism and the even-numbered columns additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel A: logged annual GDP per capita, logged annual population, logged annual oil and gas production per capita, Muslim percentage of the population, and ethnic fractionalization. $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{*}p < 0.1$.

Most of the results in this paper follow the existing literature by focusing on aggregate democracy scores. However, there are many hybrid regimes that combine certain features commonly associated with democracy—such as elections—without others, such as checks and balances or widespread political participation. It is possible that British colonialism more strongly affected some aspects of democracy than others, although we do not have strong theoretical views for which. Table A.7 examines the relationship between British colonialism and four theoretical concepts considered integral to democracy: constraints on the executive, electoral competition, liberal democratic freedoms, and political participation. Despite the variety of differing concepts used, the results are mostly similar to those in Table 1. British colonialism is strongly associated with higher levels of the democratic components immediately after independence, but weaker in the post-1991 period. Intriguingly, many of the correlations for contestation components of democracy remain somewhat strong even post-1991, whereas there is no systematic relationship for political participation (Panel F). This could perhaps capture stronger British effects on norms of representation and parliamentary constraints on the executive, as argued by Emerson (1960, 232) and Abernethy (2000, 367), or perhaps reflect shifting international norms over time toward full representation in all countries (Miller 2015). This could potentially be useful to analyze further in future research.

Table A.7: Subcomponents of Democracy

	Panel A. DV: Polity IV executive constraints, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	6.469***	5.381**	8.910**	8.621**	7.675***	5.541*
	(1.760)	(2.252)	(3.901)	(4.044)	(2.657)	(3.139)
Country-years	3,858	3,709	73	69	1,752	1,679
R-squared	0.030	0.035	0.063	0.141	0.035	0.050
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. DV: Polity IV executive constraints, all non-European countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	3.842***	4.002***	6.452***	6.922***	3.589**	3.724**
	(0.764)	(0.721)	(2.033)	(2.264)	(1.387)	(1.430)
Country-years	11,088	11,071	129	127	3,147	3,130
R-squared	0.011	0.016	0.038	0.058	0.009	0.032
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel C. DV: Polity IV electoral competition, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
British colony	6.402***	5.304**	9.417**	9.399**	6.921**	4.903
	(1.813)	(2.281)	(3.925)	(4.065)	(2.768)	(3.268)
Country-years	3,858	3,709	73	69	1,752	1,679
R-squared	0.028	0.033	0.070	0.137	0.027	0.040
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel D. DV: Polity IV electoral competition, all non-European countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
British colony	3.032***	3.240***	5.796***	6.265***	3.029**	3.093**
	(0.945)	(0.871)	(2.098)	(2.309)	(1.479)	(1.520)
Country-years	11,055	11,038	129	127	3,147	3,130
R-squared	0.007	0.016	0.030	0.047	0.006	0.030
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel E. DV: V-Dem liberalism, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
British colony	0.116***	0.0699**	0.116***	0.0959***	0.0858*	0.0120
	(0.0355)	(0.0305)	(0.0323)	(0.0319)	(0.0431)	(0.0418)
Country-years	3,523	3,379	68	64	1,550	1,479
R-squared	0.105	0.221	0.171	0.307	0.050	0.173
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel F. DV: V-Dem political participation, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
British colony	0.0680**	0.0271	0.0709***	0.0537**	0.0399	-0.0146
	(0.0270)	(0.0229)	(0.0236)	(0.0226)	(0.0322)	(0.0309)
Country-years	3,523	3,379	68	64	1,550	1,479
R-squared	0.060	0.177	0.129	0.304	0.020	0.114
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.7 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for British colonialism, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The even-numbered columns in Panels A, C, E, and F additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel A. The even-numbered columns in Panels B and D additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel B. The dependent variables are Polity IV's executive constraints index (Panels A and B), Polity IV's political competition index (Panels C and D), V-Dem's liberal democracy index (Panel E), and V-Dem's political participation index (Panel F). $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Alternative "Early" and "Late" Post-Colonial Periods

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score					
	Panel A. Sample: post-1945 independence countries					
	First Six Years Since Independence		More than 30 Years Since Independence		2012	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	5.957***	6.347***	1.970	0.420	0.929	0.746
	(1.344)	(1.423)	(1.360)	(1.398)	(1.361)	(1.685)
Country-years	438	414	1,646	1,613	73	70
R-squared	0.196	0.318	0.025	0.151	0.007	0.149
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. Sample: all non-European countries					
	First Six Years Since Independence		More than 30 Years Since Independence		2012	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	5.882***	5.877***	5.102***	5.274***	0.712	0.623
	(1.122)	(1.038)	(1.447)	(1.149)	(1.189)	(1.044)
Country-years	776	766	7,337	7,337	128	126
R-squared	0.198	0.291	0.095	0.204	0.003	0.180
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.8 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for British colonialism, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The even-numbered columns in Panel A additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel A: logged annual GDP per capita, logged annual population, logged annual oil and gas production per capita, Muslim percentage of the population, and ethnic fractionalization. The even-numbered columns in Panel B additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel B: Muslim percentage of the population and ethnic fractionalization. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.9: Interactive Effects of British Colonialism and Time

	DV: *polity*2 score. Sample: post-1945 decolonization countries			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
British colony	5.845***	5.593***	8.085***	9.039***
	(1.504)	(1.489)	(2.319)	(2.050)
Years since indep.	0.128***	0.135***		
	(0.0263)	(0.0310)		
British Colony*Years Since Indep.	-0.0838**	-0.103**		
	(0.0394)	(0.0425)		
Year			0.141***	0.151***
			(0.0278)	(0.0289)
British Colony*Year			-0.108**	-0.153***
			(0.0430)	(0.0424)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	3,825	3,681
R-squared	0.128	0.222	0.138	0.242
Covariates?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.9 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the coefficients of theoretical interest, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The even-numbered columns additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel A: logged annual GDP per capita, logged annual population, logged annual oil and gas production per capita, Muslim percentage of the population, and ethnic fractionalization. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

A.3 Robustness Checks for Table 2

Table A.10: Additional Pre-Colonial and Early Colonial Alternative Explanations

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score					
	Panel A: Settler mortality, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	6.014***	6.226***	10.01***	10.52***	3.331**	3.187*
	(1.256)	(1.336)	(1.884)	(1.679)	(1.528)	(1.745)
ln(Settler mortality)	-0.297	0.0705	0.0236	-1.368	0.0724	0.422
	(0.440)	(0.678)	(0.781)	(1.394)	(0.631)	(0.916)
Country-years	1,687	1,641	30	29	725	703
R-squared	0.242	0.280	0.566	0.657	0.088	0.098
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B: Settler mortality, all non-European countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	3.827***	4.321***	6.022***	6.062***	-0.377	-0.159
	(1.053)	(0.922)	(1.248)	(1.142)	(1.165)	(0.990)
ln(Pop. density in 1500)	-0.836***	-0.458*	-0.163	0.184	-0.914**	-0.361
	(0.300)	(0.232)	(0.317)	(0.345)	(0.359)	(0.308)
Country-years	10,593	10,593	118	118	2,906	2,906
R-squared	0.129	0.216	0.216	0.289	0.050	0.258
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel C: 1500 Population density, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	4.430***	3.957***	8.282***	8.052***	2.025	1.607
	(1.160)	(1.218)	(1.437)	(1.738)	(1.356)	(1.596)
ln(Pop. density in 1500)	0.0233	0.0290	0.0557	0.147	-0.0703	-0.0431
	(0.0865)	(0.0894)	(0.0739)	(0.118)	(0.0990)	(0.119)
Country-years	2,742	2,694	52	51	1,246	1,222
R-squared	0.118	0.143	0.424	0.455	0.036	0.040
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel D: 1500 Population density, all non-European countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	3.827***	4.321***	6.022***	6.062***	-0.377	-0.159
	(1.053)	(0.922)	(1.248)	(1.142)	(1.165)	(0.990)
ln(Pop. density in 1500)	-0.836***	-0.458*	-0.163	0.184	-0.914**	-0.361
	(0.300)	(0.232)	(0.317)	(0.345)	(0.359)	(0.308)
Country-years	10,593	10,593	118	118	2,906	2,906
R-squared	0.129	0.216	0.216	0.289	0.050	0.258
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Table A.10, continued

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score					
	Panel E. Date of agricultural transition, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	3.892***	2.926***	6.568***	7.213***	2.073*	0.542
	(1.122)	(1.031)	(1.472)	(1.621)	(1.215)	(1.287)
Years since Neolithic transition	-0.170	-0.127	-0.236	0.128	-0.526	-0.375
	(0.321)	(0.304)	(0.399)	(0.367)	(0.342)	(0.372)
Country-years	3,673	3,564	69	66	1,639	1,591
R-squared	0.086	0.198	0.229	0.394	0.062	0.190
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel F. Date of agricultural transition, all non-European countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	4.302***	4.596***	6.402***	6.355***	0.559	0.472
	(1.084)	(0.999)	(1.157)	(1.117)	(1.099)	(0.992)
Years since Neolithic transition	-0.764***	-0.430**	-0.476*	-0.225	-0.878***	-0.382
	(0.161)	(0.209)	(0.242)	(0.283)	(0.230)	(0.260)
Country-years	10,849	10,849	122	122	3,006	3,006
R-squared	0.174	0.220	0.272	0.305	0.111	0.237
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel G. Colonial onset date, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	3.227***	2.647***	6.194***	7.100***	1.103	0.528
	(0.986)	(0.846)	(1.415)	(1.550)	(1.116)	(1.108)
Colonial onset year	-0.0260***	-0.0259***	-0.0149**	-0.0137**	-0.0270***	-0.0287***
	(0.00420)	(0.00523)	(0.00598)	(0.00655)	(0.00355)	(0.00532)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	73	69	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.210	0.281	0.264	0.408	0.197	0.310
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel H. Colonial onset date, all non-European countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	5.243***	4.881***	6.130***	5.812***	1.371	1.037
	(1.122)	(1.045)	(1.218)	(1.218)	(0.967)	(0.923)
Colonial onset year	-0.0124***	-0.00658**	-0.00601**	-0.00112	-0.0233***	-0.0184***
	(0.00251)	(0.00315)	(0.00297)	(0.00357)	(0.00279)	(0.00378)
Country-years	8,647	8,647	103	103	2,551	2,551
R-squared	0.143	0.175	0.217	0.254	0.285	0.324
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.10 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the main variables of theoretical interest, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The even-numbered columns in Panels A, C, E, and G additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel A: logged annual GDP per capita, logged annual population, logged annual oil and gas production per capita, Muslim percentage of the population, and ethnic fractionalization. The even-numbered columns in Panels B, D, F, and H additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel B: Muslim percentage of the population and ethnic fractionalization. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.11 only uses the post-1945 independence sample because the secondary education variable that Woodberry uses is averaged between 1960 and 1985 and therefore is measured well after independence for early decolonizers. Similarly, the literacy variable (following that used in Owolabi 2015) is measured in the 1960s.

Table A.11: Human Capital

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score					
	Panel A. Secondary education, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	2.780**	1.903	6.020***	5.516**	0.440	-1.285
	(1.271)	(1.240)	(1.817)	(2.073)	(1.610)	(1.659)
Secondary Education	0.127	0.162	0.0233	0.111	0.0301	0.0382
	(0.0949)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.130)	(0.0972)	(0.133)
Country-years	2,535	2,413	48	45	1,149	1,078
R-squared	0.090	0.197	0.192	0.362	0.004	0.167
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. Literacy, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	2.070*	1.581	5.255***	5.381***	-0.273	-0.779
	(1.150)	(1.138)	(1.699)	(1.775)	(1.447)	(1.382)
Literacy in 1960	0.0938***	0.110***	0.0817***	0.127***	0.0847***	0.110***
	(0.0229)	(0.0323)	(0.0291)	(0.0288)	(0.0266)	(0.0387)
Country-years	3,504	3,417	66	64	1,581	1,533
R-squared	0.203	0.254	0.359	0.478	0.117	0.222
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.11 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the main variables of theoretical interest, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The even-numbered columns additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel A: logged annual GDP per capita, logged annual population, logged annual oil and gas production per capita, Muslim percentage of the population, and ethnic fractionalization. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.12 controls for three geographical covariates from Woodberry (2012)—dummy for island nations, dummy for landlocked countries, and latitude—and rainfall and rainfall squared, as evaluated in Haber (2012).

Table A.12: Geography

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score					
	Panel A. Post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	2.918***	2.383**	6.000***	6.826***	0.758	0.191
	(0.954)	(0.974)	(1.388)	(1.618)	(1.097)	(1.181)
Island	5.476***	4.774***	2.167	1.971	5.925***	5.444***
	(1.490)	(1.618)	(1.666)	(1.708)	(1.607)	(1.710)
Landlocked	-0.855	-1.970	-1.100	-1.339	0.0175	-2.059
	(1.219)	(1.247)	(1.721)	(1.650)	(1.547)	(1.605)
Latitude	0.0166	0.0141	0.0407	0.115	-0.0405	-0.0164
	(0.0650)	(0.0657)	(0.100)	(0.106)	(0.0707)	(0.0808)
Precipitation	0.00435*	-8.88e-07	0.00589*	0.00368	0.00548**	-0.000426
	(0.00254)	(0.00258)	(0.00333)	(0.00339)	(0.00257)	(0.00248)
(Precipitation)^2	-1.59e-06*	-3.48e-07	-1.53e-06	-7.01e-07	-2.28e-06***	-4.64e-07
	(8.31e-07)	(8.61e-07)	(1.05e-06)	(1.14e-06)	(7.78e-07)	(8.33e-07)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	73	69	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.210	0.255	0.322	0.435	0.208	0.277
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. All non-European countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	4.812***	4.369***	6.047***	5.942***	0.548	0.0967
	(1.185)	(1.058)	(1.158)	(1.192)	(1.070)	(1.025)
Island	2.240**	1.791*	2.353*	1.864	3.073**	2.343
	(1.090)	(1.066)	(1.333)	(1.343)	(1.421)	(1.483)
Landlocked	-1.171	-1.404	0.425	-0.000516	-0.938	-1.641
	(0.884)	(0.902)	(1.180)	(1.194)	(1.251)	(1.235)
Latitude	0.0114	-0.00450	-0.0135	-0.0141	0.0379	0.0178
	(0.0405)	(0.0383)	(0.0394)	(0.0379)	(0.0448)	(0.0412)
Precipitation	0.00619***	0.000551	0.00342	0.000243	0.0103***	0.00428
	(0.00177)	(0.00220)	(0.00231)	(0.00303)	(0.00212)	(0.00275)
(Precipitation)^2	-1.79e-06**	-5.43e-08	-6.50e-07	3.43e-07	-3.33e-06***	-1.56e-06
	(7.37e-07)	(8.51e-07)	(8.75e-07)	(1.07e-06)	(7.54e-07)	(9.91e-07)
Country-years	11,022	11,005	128	126	3,122	3,105
R-squared	0.188	0.223	0.319	0.336	0.205	0.264
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.12 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the main variables of theoretical interest, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The even-numbered columns in Panel A additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel A: logged annual GDP per capita, logged annual population, logged annual oil and gas production per capita, Muslim percentage of the population, and ethnic fractionalization. The even-numbered columns in Panel B additionally control for the standard democracy controls used in Table 1, Panel B: Muslim percentage of the population and ethnic fractionalization. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

A.4 Robustness Checks for Table 3

Table A.13: Table 3 Specifications with all non-European Countries

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score. Sample: all non-European countries					
	Panel A: Direct vs. indirect British rule					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British direct rule	8.747***	8.108***	10.20***	9.769***	4.164**	2.845*
	(1.444)	(1.241)	(1.081)	(1.105)	(1.644)	(1.490)
British indirect rule	1.294	1.986*	4.418***	4.641***	-1.465	-1.074
	(1.160)	(1.013)	(1.478)	(1.392)	(1.263)	(1.061)
Country-years	11,088	11,071	129	127	3,147	3,130
R-squared	0.164	0.249	0.288	0.349	0.056	0.248
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B: Metropolitan British rights vs. not					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Br w/ metropolitan rights	10.15***	9.238***	10.02***	9.250***	6.016***	4.136***
	(0.886)	(0.851)	(1.134)	(1.168)	(1.124)	(1.133)
Br w/o metropolitan rights	0.625	1.485	4.701***	5.079***	-2.105*	-1.492
	(1.054)	(0.968)	(1.460)	(1.390)	(1.237)	(1.103)
Country-years	11,088	11,071	129	127	3,147	3,130
R-squared	0.211	0.276	0.277	0.331	0.111	0.272
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel C: Long vs. short British rule					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Long British rule	8.235***	7.721***	8.332***	7.900***	4.145***	3.054***
	(1.121)	(0.959)	(1.360)	(1.325)	(1.201)	(1.032)
Short British rule	0.511	1.374	4.541***	4.964***	-3.005**	-2.333*
	(1.453)	(1.300)	(1.666)	(1.586)	(1.388)	(1.262)
Country-years	11,088	11,071	129	127	3,147	3,130
R-squared	0.171	0.254	0.256	0.319	0.100	0.277
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel D: Exclude Middle East					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	5.297***	5.489***	7.566***	7.747***	1.090	0.813
	(1.212)	(1.135)	(1.117)	(1.115)	(1.152)	(1.094)
Country-years	9,362	9,345	109	107	2,668	2,651
R-squared	0.119	0.150	0.334	0.352	0.007	0.105
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel E: Only Africa					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	2.402**	2.554**	6.320***	6.632***	0.894	1.047
	(1.142)	(1.056)	(1.788)	(1.859)	(1.483)	(1.369)
Country-years	2,451	2,447	44	43	1,075	1,071
R-squared	0.040	0.047	0.249	0.262	0.007	0.045
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.13 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the main variables of theoretical interest, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The even-numbered columns additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel B: Muslim percentage of the population and ethnic fractionalization. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

A.5 Additional Robustness Checks: Postcolonial Influence and Disaggregating European Colonizers

Superpower rivalry strongly impacted regime dynamics during the Cold War, the time period during which nearly every country in the post-1945 decolonization sample gained independence. It is possible, although unlikely, that Britain colonized territories that would have formed international alliances favorable for democracy promotion at independence regardless of their European colonizer. Although this consideration is probably more appropriately theorized as a mechanism rather than as an alternative explanation, we provide statistical evidence that it does not drive any of the results.

Three major differences, both highly correlated with colonizer origin, stand out as being both testable and potentially important. First, British colonies appear less likely than other countries to be ruled by communist or Soviet-backed regimes, which in turn appear to be less likely to be democratic than other countries. Second, compared to other colonial powers, France conducted a highly interventionist policy in its former African colonies. France often supported dictators sympathetic to French strategic and economic interests, for example, sending in soldiers to reverse a successful coup in Gabon in 1964 to restore a preferred dictator. Third, countries in which colonizers retained military bases may have faced less pressure to democratize than other nations.

Table A.14 shows that the effects of all these post-colonial factors are relatively small, and that none of them qualitatively change the estimated effect of British colonialism. Panel A includes dummies for countries under Soviet influence (operationalized as countries that were at any time full or observer members of COMECON) and countries with a strong French influence (operationalized as countries that joined de Gaulle's French Community at independence). Since both factors are potentially endogenous to democracy levels (since dictators might find either of these clubs more attractive) this represents a very favorable test for finding evidence of post-colonial influence. However, neither factor has a statistically significant relationship with democracy, although the estimated effect of communist influence is negative and moderately large at independence—and, perhaps surprisingly, more negative after the Cold War ended than before. The estimated effects of British colonialism on post-independence democracy are smaller than the Table 1 estimates, but remain strongly statistically significant.

Panel B of Table A.14 tests another version of the post-independence influence hypothesis: some colonial powers retained military bases in their former colonies, which both increased their interest in these countries and increased their ability to influence their politics, although it is not necessarily clear if this would positively or negatively affect democracy. We constructed a dummy variable for whether a foreign military power had base facilities (as distinct from a training mission) in the countries at independence. These countries appear to be little different than the rest of the sample, and their inclusion does not alter the estimated effects of British colonialism from Table 1.

Another plausible hypothesis about colonialism is that British-colonized countries are more democratic because of the influence of the Commonwealth of Nations, though many dictatorships were also members of this organization. Because nearly all British colonies in the sample joined the Commonwealth of Nations (and those that did not, chiefly in the Middle East, were not randomly selected), it is impossible to separate the influence of this organization from the overall influence of British colonialism. However, there is no clear reason why the influence of the Commonwealth would change so dramatically over time.

Table A.14: Post-Independence Colonizer Influence

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score					
	Panel A. Cold War Alliances, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	3.360**	2.565**	5.438***	5.980***	1.242	0.0752
	(1.291)	(1.189)	(1.642)	(1.753)	(1.476)	(1.563)
Communist Bloc	-1.408	-3.118	-2.905	-4.188	-3.151	-4.954*
	(1.379)	(2.057)	(2.110)	(2.680)	(2.440)	(2.881)
French Community	-0.0618	1.093	-1.597	-1.240	0.938	1.475
	(0.979)	(1.178)	(1.594)	(1.947)	(1.470)	(1.602)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	73	69	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.073	0.184	0.230	0.394	0.030	0.187
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. Cold War alliances, all non-European countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British colony	4.388***	4.667***	6.271***	6.290***	0.156	-0.0848
	(1.207)	(1.001)	(1.181)	(1.104)	(1.156)	(0.956)
Communist Bloc	-1.678	-0.0811	1.143	1.806	0.207	0.410
	(1.381)	(1.152)	(2.692)	(2.658)	(2.978)	(1.764)
French Community	-2.712	-4.538***	-4.545	-5.698*	-6.680*	-8.461***
	(1.804)	(1.699)	(2.974)	(2.907)	(3.468)	(2.933)
Country-years	11,088	11,071	129	127	3,147	3,130
R-squared	0.103	0.214	0.241	0.321	0.043	0.288
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel C. Military bases, post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
British colony	3.609***	2.646**	6.167***	6.846***	1.320	0.302
	(1.155)	(1.058)	(1.476)	(1.628)	(1.305)	(1.364)
NATO Base	1.136	1.328	-1.712	-0.694	0.901	1.880
	(1.783)	(1.308)	(2.290)	(2.002)	(1.975)	(1.454)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	73	69	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.074	0.173	0.225	0.377	0.013	0.155
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel D. Military bases, all non-European countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
British colony	4.154***	4.356***	6.307***	6.316***	0.364	0.204
	(1.206)	(1.025)	(1.190)	(1.119)	(1.156)	(0.984)
NATO Base	1.711	1.531	0.451	0.509	0.739	0.567
	(1.362)	(1.148)	(1.399)	(1.252)	(1.601)	(1.455)
Country-years	11,088	11,071	129	127	3,147	3,130
R-squared	0.094	0.205	0.227	0.302	0.003	0.223
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.14 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the main variables of theoretical interest, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The even-numbered columns in Panels A and C additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel A: logged annual GDP per capita, logged annual population, logged annual oil and gas production per capita, Muslim percentage of the population, and ethnic fractionalization. The even-numbered columns in Panels B and D additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel B: Muslim percentage of the population and ethnic fractionalization. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 1 contrasted British colonies with the quite heterogenous excluded category of "non-British colonies." Perhaps very low levels of post-colonial democracy among a single non-British power drives the result, in which case we would be estimating a "not French" or "not Portuguese" effect rather than a truly pro-British effect. Table A.15 examines this possibility more closely by presenting results from models that include a full set of other European colonizer dummies (French, Portuguese, Spanish, U.S., Dutch, Belgian, Italian) with British colonies composing the excluded category. The differences in average democracy level relative to British colonies in the year after independence are consistently significantly lower for most of the rival empires: French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Belgian. These differences weaken somewhat in the full temporal sample, and have mostly dissipated after 1991—reinforcing the Table 1 pattern.

Table A.15: Disaggregating European Powers

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score					
	Panel A. Post-1945 independence countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
French colony	-4.105***	-3.008***	-6.983***	-7.144***	-1.985	-0.992
	(1.165)	(1.085)	(1.570)	(1.862)	(1.359)	(1.356)
Portuguese colony	-0.762	0.0604	-8.843***	-9.669***	2.107	2.258
	(1.820)	(1.658)	(1.509)	(1.813)	(2.269)	(2.033)
Spanish colony	-6.379***	-5.988***	-9.343***	-11.57***	-6.445***	-4.376
	(1.040)	(2.082)	(1.283)	(1.738)	(1.046)	(2.921)
U.S. colony	2.870***	-0.762	-0.343	-3.992**	6.722***	4.823**
	(1.040)	(1.761)	(1.283)	(1.773)	(1.046)	(2.030)
Dutch colony	-0.711	0.673	0.157	-0.537	2.576*	4.550***
	(1.965)	(2.383)	(2.271)	(2.015)	(1.328)	(1.696)
Belgian colony	-4.260***	-4.971***	-5.010***	-7.727***	-1.501	-2.764
	(1.234)	(1.576)	(1.796)	(1.999)	(2.049)	(2.835)
Italian colony	-4.611**	-0.0733	-2.343	-0.151	-3.938	-0.0453
	(2.048)	(1.731)	(5.400)	(5.984)	(2.538)	(1.790)
Country-years	3,825	3,681	73	69	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.106	0.197	0.279	0.445	0.082	0.198
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. All non-European countries					
	All years		First yr. indep.		Post-1991	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
French colony	-2.557**	-2.149**	-4.688***	-4.010***	-1.761	-0.733
	(1.004)	(0.979)	(1.215)	(1.247)	(1.145)	(1.212)
Portuguese colony	-0.251	-2.000	-6.511***	-8.126***	3.135	1.739
	(1.223)	(1.448)	(1.071)	(1.133)	(1.967)	(1.817)
Spanish colony	0.681	-1.577	-3.333***	-5.317***	4.899***	2.449*
	(1.110)	(1.302)	(1.071)	(1.200)	(1.300)	(1.381)
U.S. colony	4.288***	2.128*	1.889**	0.328	6.783***	4.302***
	(0.885)	(1.183)	(0.869)	(1.174)	(0.784)	(1.117)
Dutch colony	0.777	0.740	2.389	1.774	2.763**	2.740***
	(1.852)	(1.319)	(2.021)	(1.497)	(1.068)	(0.679)
Belgian colony	-2.832**	-4.812***	-2.778*	-4.642***	-1.417	-3.518*
	(1.107)	(1.218)	(1.502)	(1.386)	(1.908)	(1.927)
Italian colony	-3.148	1.004	-0.111	3.490	-3.666	1.290
	(1.975)	(1.982)	(5.184)	(5.378)	(2.416)	(2.618)
Country-years	11,088	11,071	129	127	3,147	3,130
R-squared	0.031	0.131	0.131	0.242	0.121	0.258
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES


Notes: Table A.15 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the main variables of theoretical interest, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The other coefficient estimates are suppressed for expositional clarity. The even-numbered columns in Panel A additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel A: logged annual GDP per capita, logged annual population, logged annual oil and gas production per capita, Muslim percentage of the population, and ethnic fractionalization. The even-numbered columns in Panel B additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel B: Muslim percentage of the population and ethnic fractionalization. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

A.6 Additional Tables and Figures for Mechanisms Sections

Appendix Figure A.1 compares V-Dem polyarchy scores in British and non-British colonies, indexed by years prior to achieving independence. V-Dem data, unlike Polity IV, is available in many pre-independence years. The figure exhibits two main patterns. First, British colonies in our sample were consistently more democratic than other colonies throughout the 20th century, although the Britain line is somewhat biased upward relative to our core sample because V-Dem excludes many highly authoritarian British Middle Eastern colonies. This pattern is consistent earlier arguments such as Weiner's (1987) that British democratic advantages extended deep into the colonial era. However, this first takeaway also requires a qualification. To properly interpret the long-term advantages, it is crucial to analyze the absolute level of democracy among British colonies rather than only the difference from other colonies. Forty-five years before independence, not only is the mean polyarchy score very low among British colonies, but only two colonies featured franchises of at least 10 percent of the colonial population. Even Jamaica, the colony with the highest polyarchy score at this time, had a lower polyarchy score than the *average* polyarchy score among British colonies one year before independence. Thus, despite the advantage relative to non-British colonies earlier in the colonial era, considerable reforms were still required during decolonization to help explain the large number of British colonies that became democratic by independence (see Appendix Table A.4).

The second main pattern in Figure A.1 is that British colonies became dramatically more democratic during the decolonization era and their democratic advantage relative to other colonies increased. The difference in the last year of colonial rule is 72 percent larger than 30 years before. Table 4 shows the relevance of calculated independence for democracy levels at independence. Had Britain counterfactually granted independence an average of five years earlier than it actually did, then British colonies would not have enjoyed a democratic advantage prior to independence. Similarly, France could have conceivably promoted higher levels of democracy in its colonies had it not liquidated almost its entire African empire in 1960.

Figure A.1: British Colonies Versus Other Countries, by Years Before Independence



Notes: The vertical axis in Figure A.1 shows the average V-Dem polyarchy score for British colonies and for other countries in the post-1945 decolonization sample, averaged across the number of years before a particular colony achieved independence.

Table A.16: British Colonialism and Democracy: Arellano-Bond Time Series Results

	Dependent variable: *polity*2 score					
	All years	All years	1st 6 yrs. post-indep.	1st 6 yrs. post-indep.	After 6 yrs. post-indep.	After 6 yrs. post-indep.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post Ind. Years	0.0225***	0.0418***	-0.0488	-0.223*	0.0252***	0.0455***
	(0.00535)	(0.00944)	(0.0776)	(0.116)	(0.00452)	(0.0116)
Post Ind. Years*British Col.	-0.0167**	-0.0141**	-0.267*	-0.379**	-0.0122*	-0.00811
	(0.00653)	(0.00710)	(0.149)	(0.177)	(0.00645)	(0.00745)
Country-years	3,733	3,593	364	343	3,369	3,250
Number of countries	73	70	73	69	73	70
Country FE and LDV?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Marginal effects					
Post Ind. Years | British colony= 1	0.006	0.028***	-0.316	-0.603**	0.013*	0.037**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.138)	(0.233)	(0.005)	(0.015)
Post Ind. Years | British colony= 0	0.022**	0.042*	-0.049	-0.223	0.025**	0.046*
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.078)	(0.116)	(0.005)	(0.012)

Notes: Table A.16 summarizes a series of Arellano-Bond dynamic time series regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the main variables of theoretical interest, and robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The bottom panel presents marginal effect estimates calculated from the same model and standard errors. Every model includes country fixed effects and the IV estimates for one period of the lagged dependent variable. The even-numbered columns additionally control for the three time-varying standard democracy covariates in Table 1, Panel A. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.17: Assessing Negotiated Decolonization Mechanisms Post-1991

	DV: *polity*2 score. Years: post-1991			
	Panel A. Disturbances to Colonial Rule			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Guerrillas inherit state	-1.205	-0.0862	-0.596	-0.0724
	(1.504)	(1.606)	(1.586)	(1.653)
British colony			1.141	0.0331
			(1.349)	(1.376)
Observations	1,734	1,663	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.003	0.145	0.011	0.145
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel B. Colonizer Democracy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonizer Polity	0.0566	-0.116	-0.0803	-0.165
	(0.174)	(0.186)	(0.230)	(0.235)
British colony			1.554	0.656
			(1.571)	(1.636)
Country-years	1,734	1,663	1,734	1,663
R-squared	0.001	0.149	0.012	0.150
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES
	Panel C. Decolonization Manifestos			
	Full sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonizer Anti-Colonial Manifesto	3.115**	2.804*	4.181***	4.312***
	(1.357)	(1.410)	(0.947)	(1.099)
British colony			-1.197	-1.942
			(1.258)	(1.238)
Country-years	1,567	1,496	1,567	1,496
R-squared	0.044	0.151	0.048	0.162
Covariates	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Table A.17 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates for the main variables of theoretical interest, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses. The even-numbered columns additionally control for the standard democracy covariates used in Table 1, Panel A. The sample in every specification consists of post-1945 decolonization cases and, temporally, only post-1991 country-years. In Panel C, the regressions in Columns 1 and 2 cannot be estimated when adding a British colonial dummy because this variable is perfectly collinear with colonizer manifestos (because only British and French colonies are in the sample). $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

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