

Part Two

Philosophy of Mind



Spinoza's Two Claims about the Mind-Body Relation

Alison Peterman

Introduction

How is a particular mind related to its body?¹ There are many ways to understand this question, and many different answers for those different ways. Spinoza makes a number of claims about this relationship, all of which are independently interesting. But it is not clear that they are compatible. In this chapter, I would like to focus on two of those claims, and to argue that although Spinoza sometimes run these two claims together, in fact he does not succeed in making them compatible with one another. I suggest that the illusion that they are compatible comes from an equivocation between two ways of using the phrase “insofar as” [*quatenus*], and that this type of equivocation runs deep in Spinoza's metaphysics.

Those two claims are:

- (1) **Parallelism:** the mind is causally and structurally linked to other minds in the same way that its body is linked to other bodies;
- (2) **Idea-of:** the mind is the idea of its body; or, the body is the object [*objectum*] of its mind.

In focusing on these two, I will ignore some of those other interesting things that Spinoza writes about the mind-body relationship. For example, I will for the most part ignore his account of it in the earlier *Short Treatise*, where he claims that love constitutes the union of the mind with the body.² But I will also ignore another of Spinoza's commitments that might look more relevant: that the mind and the body are “one and the same thing, understood in two different ways” (E2p7s). There is a lot that is interesting about this claim, but I think it is fair to

put it aside in thinking through the relationship between **Parallelism** and **Idea-of**.³ Here is a condensed argument for why.

Either Spinoza's dictum that the mind and the body are "one and the same thing" amounts to the claim that the mind and the body are numerically identical,⁴ or it does not. If it does not, then we will have to interpret it in light of Spinoza's other commitments about the mind-body relationship. But then it can't really be used to understand those commitments. If it does amount to the claim that the mind and the body are numerically identical, then although it delivers to us an interesting ontological fact, that fact does not tell us anything more about the metaphysical, causal or explanatory relationship between the mind and the body. Presumably a very important part of what we want to know when we ask how the mind relates to the body is an understanding of the properties and functions of the mind and the body, and of how the properties and functions of one relate to the properties and functions of the other. But if Spinoza thinks that the mind and body are identical, then he denies the indiscernibility of identicals for many of the properties and functions you might be interested in knowing about. For example, just because a body is in a certain place or has a certain speed does not mean that the mind that is identical to it does, and just because the mind can represent bodies doesn't mean that the body that is identical to it can. And indeed, Spinoza never really uses the claim that the mind and the body are one and the same thing to explain anything about the mind and the body—with one exception, which I will mention later.

In what follows, I'll outline Spinoza's justifications for these two claims about the relationship between the mind and the body, **Parallelism** and **Idea-of**, and show that the arguments are entirely independent of one another. Then I'll consider how Spinoza tries to connect them, show that he does not succeed, and draw a few lessons from that.

In the next section, I will make a few preliminary comments about E2p7 and its scholium, and about E1a4, which Spinoza claims entails E2p7. In Section II, I will outline the argument for **Parallelism**, and in Section III, I will outline the argument for **Idea-of**. Section IV shows that there is some precedent in Descartes for distinguishing between two approaches to discovering the mind-body connection.

I. E2p7 and E1a4

E2p7 and the accompanying demonstration, corollary and scholium are integral to understanding both **Parallelism** and **Idea-of**.

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. [E2p7]

This is clear from 1a4. For the idea of each thing caused depends on the knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect. [E2p7d]

The thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is not comprehended under this attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways [...] For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle [...] are one and the same thing, which is explained through different attributes. Therefore, *whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, i.e. that the same things follow one another.* [E2p7s]

Yitzhak Melamed has, I think convincingly, shown that E2p7 and the italicized portion of E2p7s are different claims and that Spinoza relies on them in different contexts. E2p7—what Melamed calls “Ideas-Things Parallelism”—tells us something special about ideas and about their relationships with their objects. Meanwhile, E2p7s—what Melamed calls “Inter-Attributes Parallelism”—tells us about modes of different attributes in general: a mode of any attribute has the same causal and structural connections with the other modes of its attribute as its “parallel” mode does with the other modes of its attribute. This is true for all modes of all the attributes—not just extension and thought—and it tells us nothing about the relation between an idea and its object [*objectum*], or what it is the idea of.⁵

I agree that these are distinct, but I think that Spinoza runs them together a bit more than Melamed allows. For example, Melamed claims that Spinoza only thinks that parallel modes in different attributes are one and the same thing, but not that an idea and its object are one and the same thing.⁶ In contrast, I think that Spinoza does imply, at E2p7s, that an idea and its object are one and the same thing. He writes that “a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing” and that the Hebrews saw this when they “maintained that God, God’s intellect, and the things understood by him are one and the same.” And Spinoza seems to be using these considerations to motivate a slide from one to the other.

In preparation for considering their uses in the proofs of **Parallelism** and **Idea-of**, I’d like to consider here how Spinoza justifies E2p7 and E2p7s.

E2p7 is, notoriously, laconically proven from E1a4:

This is clear from 1a4. For the idea of each thing caused depends on the knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect. [E2p7d]

E1a4 is doubtless one of the most fundamental commitments of Spinoza's metaphysics:

The knowledge [*cognitio*] of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause. [E1a4]

Taking these together and focusing on involvement for simplicity's sake, these suggest that Spinoza holds the following:

Involves: The idea of an effect involves the idea of its cause.

The meaning of **Involves** depends, of course, on the meaning of "involves" [*involvere*]. I cannot give a complete treatment of Spinoza's use of involve here,⁷ but would just like to observe that there are two very natural ways of reading **Involves**.⁸

Let's call the first one the *mechanistic* reading of **Involves** (**InvolvesM**). On **InvolvesM**, to say that the idea of A involves the idea of B is not to say much more than that the idea of B is at least a partial cause of the idea of A. E1a4 is used in this in the alternate demonstration of E2p5, where Spinoza is arguing that ideas can only be caused by other modes of thought; it is used similarly in the demonstration of E2p6.

The second reading is the *semantic* reading of **Involves** (I'll call it **InvolvesS**). On **InvolvesS**, to say that the idea of A involves the idea of B is to say that the content of the idea of A includes the content of the idea of B as a part. That Spinoza sometimes means *Involves* to have this sense is evident from certain applications of E1a4. For example, in the demonstration of E2p16, Spinoza cites E1a4 to show that the ideas of modes of affections of a given body "will necessarily involve the *nature* of each body [my italics]." The *nature*, not the idea, of each body. We know that there cannot be a direct **InvolvesM** relationship between the nature of the body and the idea of the body, since the body is a mode of extension and the idea is a mode of thought, and there can be no **InvolvesM** between modes of two different attributes.⁹

Rather, Spinoza is trying to show here that (for example) my mind represents my body when it represents any affection of my body. This is ultimately supposed to demonstrate that we have knowledge of our bodies through our affections, so it seems that Spinoza thinks that our bodies are represented as parts of the content of ideas of affections. On **InvolvesM**, there is no reason to think that the representational content of the idea of a cause is any part of the content of the idea of its effect. On **InvolvesS**, there is.

Of course, Spinoza clearly takes there to be a connection between **InvolvesS** and **InvolvesM**. But it is not obvious that this connection is justified by more

than just the fact that E1a4 can be read in both ways. There has been, in recent years, a lot of incredible work on Spinoza's account of representation, and how it relates to causal relationships.¹⁰ I take my contribution here to be very modest: to identify one particular argumentative gulf Spinoza needs to cross to connect these two claims with one another.

II. Parallelism

Parallelism says that a mind is causally and structurally linked to other minds in the same way as its body is to other bodies. First, I'll show that Spinoza holds it. Then, I'll outline what I take his justification for holding it to be.

Perhaps the best evidence that Spinoza endorses it as a general principle is E3p2s combined with E2p7s. In E3p2s, Spinoza ridicules Cartesian interactionism, and appeals to E2p7s as an alternative explanation of apparent interaction, concluding that it is:

more clearly understood from what is said in E2p7s, viz. that the Mind and the Body are one and the same thing ... The result is that the order, or connection, of things is one, whether nature is conceived under this attribute or that; hence the order of actions and passions of our Body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the Mind. [E3p2s]

In invoking E2p7s in the context of the mind-body relation, Spinoza is relying on his claim that a mind is just an idea, which he won't establish until E2p11.¹¹ That he concludes that the mind and its body are causally or structurally linked in the same way with other modes of their respective attributes is clear from Spinoza's claim that "the order of actions and passions" of the mind and the body are one.

What is Spinoza's justification for **Parallelism**? In particular, what is his argument for E2p7s—the claim there that "the order, or connection, of things is one, whether nature is conceived under this attribute or that"—what Melamed calls "Inter-Attribute Parallelism"? The fact that it is a scholium of E2p7 suggests that it relies on E2p7, but Spinoza makes no appeal to E2p7 in arguing for E2p7s. Instead, he implies this argument: my mind and my body are modes of one and the same substance, and hence are "one and the same thing," expressed in two ways. Because they are "one and the same thing [...] explained through different attributes," we find "one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes" when we conceive nature under any attribute.

I said earlier that Spinoza doesn't rely on the claim that the mind and the body are one and the same thing to show anything else about the mind and the body, with one exception. This is the exception that I had in mind: the "one and the same" claim seems to play an ineliminable role in establishing Inter-Attribute Parallelism and hence **Parallelism**. But rather than approach this fact by trying to determine what Spinoza takes the "one and the same" claim to be in general, and plugging that into the proof here, I am going to look at what the "one and the same" claim is doing in this particular spot. And at least here, Spinoza is emphasizing that a mode of extension and a mode of thought are modes of one and the same substance, expressed in two ways. Now I grant that this is true of a given mode of thought and *any* mode of extension, so it doesn't seem to tell us much about the relationship between the mind and its body—and this is a problem. But I think it *does* correctly point us to why Spinoza thinks that the order and connection of causes is the same in any attribute: it is because every attribute expresses the same substance.

Why think that the fact that every attribute expresses the same substance entails that every attribute is characterized by the same causal or structural facts? Spinoza doesn't tell us here. But I think that he is implicitly relying on an intuition he expresses earlier, in the corollary to E2p6. E2p6 and its demonstration establish that modes of an attribute are caused by God only insofar as God is considered under that attribute. But the corollary goes further, claiming that it follows from this that "the objects of ideas follow and are inferred from their attributes in the same way and by the same necessity as that with which we have shown ideas to follow from the attribute of Thought" (E2p6c). Now this concerns ideas and what they are of, so it seems related to what Melamed would call Ideas-Objects Parallelism and not Inter-Attribute Parallelism. But as I have said, I am not sure that Spinoza separates these *quite* so clearly as Melamed suggests. And it is also about modes and how they can validly be inferred from their attributes, in terms that do not appeal to the special relationship between an idea and its object. It's hard to know for sure how Spinoza relates the "way and necessity" of E2p6c with the "order and connection" of E2p7s. But their proximity and similarity of themes and language suggest that Spinoza associates the necessity of God's power with the order of modes in their respective attributes or God. If, as Spinoza claims in Part 1, "things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order, than they have been produced" (E1p33), then they were not produced by God in any other way in any of the attributes. The thought is something like this: if the order is necessary, it is the same in any attribute.

In short: Spinoza holds **Parallelism** about the mind-body relation on the basis of Inter-Attribute Parallelism in general, and he holds Inter-Attribute Parallelism in general because he thinks that the necessity of God's nature and God's power (somehow) guarantees that the causal order in any attribute is the same. The argument bypasses E1a4 and E2p7 entirely.

III. Idea-of

That the human mind is the idea of the human body is the point of E2p13:

The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else. [E2p13]

Spinoza claims that this shows “not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what should be understood by the union of mind and body.”¹²

E2p13 is established by a complex argument that begins with Axiom 4 of Part 2:

We feel [*sentimus*] that a certain body is affected in many ways. [E2a4]

We don't feel the affections of anything else (E2p5). Axiom 4 appeals to a first-personal observation: that we feel the affections of a particular body. Spinoza uses Axiom 4 interchangeably with several others, including:

We have* ideas of the affections of a body.

We perceive the affections of a body.

The ideas of the affections of a body are in* my mind.

I put a star on “have” and “in” to remind us that whatever sense of “to have an idea” or “in my mind” Spinoza intends by such claims, it is specific only to the special way that we have ideas of our own body. This is clear from its use to establish E2p13—that the object of the mind is the body. On a perfectly natural way of understanding “to have an idea,” we have ideas of the affections of lots of bodies besides our own: I have the ideas of croquet balls clacking against each other, or the rustle of leaves on a tree. But that doesn't show that my body is the tree or a croquet ball. Spinoza must think that we have ideas of the affections of our own body in a special way.

The argument for E2p13 is actually for three claims: that the mind is the idea of the body, that the body exists, and that the mind is not the idea of anything else. For the sake of simplicity, I'll focus on the first. The gist of the argument is this:

- (1) The ideas of the affections of a certain body (call it B) are in my mind (E2a4).
 - (2) If the object of my mind were not B, then the idea of the affections of B would not be in* my mind (E2p9c and E2p11c).
-
- (3) The object of my mind is B (1,2).

The question here is: Why should we accept Premise 2? How does Spinoza reason from the observation that I feel, or have* ideas of, certain affections to the claim that my body is the object of my mind?

Spinoza justifies Premise 2 by appeal to E2p9c and E2p11c. Let's look at E2p9c first, starting with E2p9 itself:

The idea of a singular thing which actually exists has God for a cause not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea of a singular thing which actually exists; and of this idea God is also the cause, insofar as he is affected by another third idea, and so on, to infinity. [E2p9]

Here is my reconstruction of the proof:

- (1) An idea of a thing is a mode of thinking. (E2p5 says that this is “known through itself”—at least, that the formal being of an idea is a mode of thinking.)
- (2) A mode of thinking has God for a cause not absolutely but “insofar as he is considered to be affected by another mode of thinking ... and so on, to infinity” (E1p28).
- (3) “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes [NS: things]” (E2p7).
- (4) “The cause of one singular idea is another idea, or, God insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea ... and so on, to infinity” (1–3).

The sense of the proof is this. E1p28 tells us that every finite thing must have a finite cause. Spinoza takes this to entail that God is the cause of a mode of thought insofar as he is affected by another mode of thought, and not absolutely. Since ideas are modes of thought, an idea must be caused by a mode of thought. To be honest, I find the use of E2p7 at this point somewhat obscure. What Spinoza still has to do is show that the mode of thought that causes the idea is also an idea, and that it is an idea of a singular thing which actually exists. Does Spinoza think that E2p7 achieves one or both of these? I myself cannot see how.

What I would like to focus on, putting aside the appeal to E2p7, is Spinoza's use of the phrase “insofar as” in (2) and (4). The reason it is important to start

here is that the phrase is introduced here and is integral to E2p9c, which in turn is used to demonstrate the critical Premise 2. Although Spinoza uses “insofar as” [*quatenus*] hundreds of other times in the *Ethics*, in diverse contexts, this is the first time Spinoza has invoked God insofar as he is considered to be affected by a finite mode.¹³ So we can only look to the meaning that this argument licenses, the meaning that Spinoza wants it to have in E2p13, and its use at E2p11. And it seems from these occurrences that when Spinoza writes that the cause of an idea—call it I_y —is in God insofar as God is considered to be affected by another idea, I_x , that just means that I_x causes I_y . So the conclusion of E2p9 is just something like this: every finite I_y is caused by some finite I_x . That is all that Spinoza is justified in concluding at this stage.

E2p9c is demonstrated from that in the following way:

- (1) For any affection (“A”) of a thing (“T”), there is an idea of that affection (“I(A)”) in God. (E2p3).
- (2) I(A) is in God only insofar as God is considered to be affected by another idea (“I(X)”) of a singular thing (“X”). (E2p9)
- (3) $X = T$. (E2p7)

-
- (4) I(A) is in God only insofar as God is considered to be affected by I(B).

Spinoza invokes E2p3: basically, God has an idea of everything, so there is an idea of every affection of a body. This idea is in God only insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea. Spinoza now introduces the claim that an idea is in God *only* insofar as God is considered to be affected by another idea: the “only” is new. What does it signify? The demonstration, as well as the use of E2p9, makes quite clear that the “only” is intended to rule out the possibility that a finite idea is caused by God *insofar as God is infinite*. Spinoza then invokes E2p7 to show that the finite idea in question is the idea of what is affected. So, for example, an idea of an affection of my body is in God only insofar as God has the idea of my body.

Again, the “only” here means “and not insofar as God is infinite.” It does not mean “and not insofar as God has the idea of anything else.” Nothing about this demonstration entails that God has the ideas of my affections only insofar as he has the idea of my body, and not insofar as he has the ideas of other bodies. And this is as it should be. Spinoza is treating the relationship between my body and its affections as a causal relationship here, and Spinoza explicitly and importantly holds that the affections of my body have many other causes besides my own body. This is, of course, the very ground of inadequate cognition,

according to Spinoza. E2p9 and E2p9c apply equally to all of the partial causes of the affections of my body—not just to my body.

Finally, let us consider how Spinoza wants to use E2p9c in the argument for E2p13:

- (1) The ideas of the affections of a certain body are in my mind (E2a4).
- (2) If the object of my mind were not my body, then the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in God insofar as God constituted my mind (E2p9c).
- (3) To say that the ideas of the affections of the body are in God insofar as God constitutes my mind is just to say that the ideas of the affections of the body are in my mind, or that my mind perceives the affections of my body (E2p11c).
- (4) If the object of my mind were not the body, then the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in my mind. (2,3)

(5) The object of my mind is the body that I feel the affections of (1,4).

Why does Spinoza feel entitled to rephrase E2p9c as Premise 2 here, or conclude Premise 2 on the basis of E2p9c?

To simplify things, let's consider just the singular version of Premise 2:

- (2') If the object of my mind were not my body, then the idea of any affection of that body would not be in God insofar as God constituted my mind (E2p9c).

But 2' is false. If I lean against a wall, the idea of the affection is in God insofar as God constitutes my mind but equally insofar as God constitutes the mind of the wall.

There are two ways to try to address this problem. One is to point out that Spinoza does *not* make the singular claim here. He makes the claim that if the object of my mind weren't my body, then all the ideas of the affections of that body would not be in my mind. And that is true. This certainly gets around the problem, and maybe it is the solution that Spinoza intended.

But this problem, and the alternative solution, I think reveal a deeper point about what is going on in this argument. To see this, we first need to see the role that Premise 2 plays in the argument for E2p13.

Remember that this argument is supposed to proceed from the claim that I have the ideas of certain affections to the claim that my mind is the idea of my body. And Premise 2 functions by motivating Premise 4: that if the object of my mind were not my body, then the ideas of its affections would not be in

my mind. In conjunction with Premise 1—that the ideas of the affections of a certain body are in my mind—we arrive at the conclusion.

But Premise 1 is supposed to be a restatement of E2a4: “We feel that a certain body is affected in many ways.” I think it is clear that Spinoza takes this axiom to be self-evident not because it immediately strikes the mind as true, but rather because everyone is evidently aware of the feelings of being affected. That is: its plausibility relies on the fact that we have a certain kind of self-evident, first-person experience of being affected. This experience is our only evidence that the ideas of the affections of the body are in God insofar as God constitutes my mind. So it is plausible to think that this is reflected in my mental contents, and indeed, in mental contents of which I am aware. That is to say: for this argument to work, the claim that an idea is in God “insofar as God constitutes my mind” implies something about the content of that idea: the content of that idea includes, in some sense, the content of the idea of my body.

So, in the proof of E2p13, the claim that “the ideas of the affections are in God only insofar as God constitutes my mind” means that the ideas of the affections of my body are part of the content of God’s idea of my body, and so there is awareness of the ideas of those affections only insofar as there is awareness of the body. But that is not the sense of “the ideas of the affections are in God only insofar as God constitutes my mind” that is licensed by E2p9c. The sense licensed by E2p9c is just that the idea of my body must be in God if the idea of my body’s affections are to be in God.

Following the terminology introduced in Section I’s discussion of E1a4, we might call the sense of “insofar as” that is licensed by E2p9c here the “mechanistic” sense, and we might call the sense that is required by E2p11c and E2p13 the “semantic” sense. In the mechanistic sense of “insofar as,” we can provide both physical and mental examples:

Physical: one billiard ball moves only insofar as another billiard ball moves.

Mental: one idea is in God (or exists) only insofar as another idea is in God (or exists).

It is a little more difficult to give a semantic example in the case of the physical, but there may be resources in Carrier’s or Garrett’s accounts of inherence¹⁴:

Physical: maybe inherence, if effects inhere in their causes?

Mental: the idea of John’s hand exists only insofar as the idea of John exists.

Spinoza does not obviously connect these two senses up with one another. It’s worth noting that until he does, we don’t have a reason to think that the body that

is “connected to” my mind in the “idea-of” sense and the body that is connected to my mind in the parallelism sense are the same body. And this is where E2p11c comes in. E2p11c is the claim that a particular sort of mental item that we can identify from the inside is identical with a particular sort of metaphysical item:

- (3) To say that the ideas of the affections of the body are in God insofar as God constitutes my mind is just to say that the ideas of the affections of the body are in my mind, or that my mind perceives the affections of my body (E2p11c).

And, unfortunately, Spinoza simply gives no argument for E2p11c.

Conclusion

Zooming out a bit here: to connect up E2p9c to E2p13, Spinoza needs to answer a very deep and a very hard question. We would like to know what mental experiences—ideas, phenomenal states, states of consciousness—are: What sort of metaphysical items are they? What properties do they have? How do they fit in among the other bits of furniture in the world? We would like to be able to study them objectively, or scientifically. But our starting point for characterizing these states seems to be first-personal. How can we move from this first-person perspective to the one from which we want to characterize the objective features of mental items?¹⁵

Spinoza’s way of grappling with this involves trying to square the **Parallelism** about the mind-body relation with **Idea-of**. These represent two different ways of approaching the question: How does the mind relate to its body? The first approach starts with some metaphysical commitments about the kinds of entities, properties, and interactions there are in the world. The second approach starts by attending to the experience of the embodied subject. Spinoza’s **Parallelism** arises from the first approach, and **Idea-of** arises from the second.

This distinction is, in fact, even clearer and it is explicit in Descartes.¹⁶ Descartes makes a number of metaphysical claims about minds, bodies, and their relationship to one another. On the basis of these, he argues that a human mind and body interact with one another, relying on an interactionist account in a number of works, especially those that develop his theory of the passions. But when Princess Elisabeth presses him on the problems that arise from positing interaction between the mind and the body, Descartes has a very different story to tell about the union between the mind and the body. That story is developed

from observing the special qualities of his own sensations, which indicate to him that the body in which he feels those sensations “more than any other, belong[s] to [him]” and can never be separated from him.¹⁷

In his exchange with Elisabeth, Descartes explicitly treats these as two different perspectives, approaches, or emphases. He tells her that she can think about the distinction between the mind and the body only in spite of having conceived their union, since:

It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of forming a very distinct conception of both the distinction between the soul and the body and their union; for to do this it is necessary to conceive them as a single thing and at the same time to conceive them as two things, and this is absurd.¹⁸

According to Descartes, it is our “metaphysical meditations” that teach us that the body and the soul are distinct. But he tells Elisabeth that it is only once we give up these metaphysical meditations, and observe the sensations in our own bodies, that we can conceive of the union between body and mind.

I have tried to show that in Spinoza, although it is less explicit, we can find a similar split. Like Descartes’s own union account, Spinoza’s starts with some first person premises. These premises concern, in particular, the felt quality of sensations—or, in Spinoza’s terms, ideas of affections, where affections are just states of the body arising from its interaction with other bodies. Meanwhile, we can compare Spinoza’s claim that the mind and body are parallel with Descartes’s treatment of the mind and body as interacting substances. Both accounts of embodiment start with the metaphysical claims that the mind and the body are conceived under different attributes. Both are aimed at explaining the appearance of mind-body interaction. Both see the problem of mind-body interaction as an instance of the more general problem of inter attribute interaction.

Ultimately, the relationship between the two senses of “insofar as” and the two pictures of embodiment will have to be traced back to the relationship between what I believe are two parallel uses of E1a4 and to its use in the arguments for E2p7 and E2p7c. This family of distinctions is, I suspect, grounded in two fundamentally different meanings for the claim that “cognition of an effect depends upon, and involves, cognition of its cause”—in particular two meanings of “depends upon and involves.” If Spinoza never connects up these two meanings, we may infer that there exists a very deep and basic rift driving Spinoza’s system, and thus we could approach a number of Spinoza’s claims and arguments by figuring out how they employ these two meanings.

Notes

- 1 Versions of some portions of this chapter appeared in a modified form in Alison Peterman, “Descartes and Spinoza: Two Approaches to Embodiment,” in *Embodiment: A History*, ed. Justin E. H. Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). That paper goes into more detail about Spinoza’s comments on embodiment in other works, like the *Short Treatise*, and also develops a comparison with Descartes in much greater detail. It focuses less than this chapter does on the details of Spinoza’s arguments for **Parallelism** and **Idea-of**.
- 2 For a more extended treatment of this account and its relationship to the two discussed here, see Peterman, “Descartes and Spinoza,” 236–238.
- 3 For more on the “one and the same” claim, see Colin Marshall, “The Mind and the Body as ‘One and the Same Thing’ in Spinoza,” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 17, no. 5 (2009): 897–919; Don Garrett, “The indiscernibility of identicals and the transitivity of identity in Spinoza’s logic of the attributes,” in *Spinoza’s Ethics: A Critical Guide*, ed. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Ursula Renz, “The Definition of the Human Mind and the Numerical Difference between Subjects (2P11–2P135),” in *Spinoza’s Ethics. A Collective Commentary*, ed. Michael Hampe, Ursula Renz, and Robert Schnepf (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
- 4 Of course, it cannot mean that the mind and the body are the same in kind, since they are understood under two different attributes.
- 5 Yitzhak Y. Melamed, “Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Thought: Parallelisms and the Multifaceted Structure of Ideas,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 86, no. 3 (2013): 626–683. See esp. 639–640.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 641.
- 7 Hübner has a brief but helpful discussion of Spinoza’s use of it, and references, in “Spinoza on Intentionality and Mental Dependence,” *Philosophers’ Imprint* (forthcoming).
- 8 Notice that the body is not part of the affection, even though the content of the idea of the body is part of the content of the idea of the affection. This undermines the extensional equivalence of **Parallelism** and **Idea-of**.
- 9 I don’t mean to argue just from there being no InvolvesM relationship to there being an InvolvesS relationship, since these don’t exhaust the possible interpretations of E1a4 or its use here; only that Spinoza can’t mean InvolvesM and is likely, for additional reasons, to mean InvolvesS.
- 10 See, for example, Michael Della Rocca, *Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Hübner, “Spinoza on Intentionality”; Don Garrett, “Representation, Misrepresentation and Error in Spinoza’s Philosophy of Mind,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza*, ed.

- Michael Della Rocca (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); Don Garrett, “Representation and Consciousness in Spinoza’s Naturalistic Theory of the Imagination,” in *Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays*, ed. Charlie Huenemann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Samuel Newlands, “Thinking, Conceiving and Idealism in Spinoza,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 94, no. 1 (2012): 31–52. Strictly speaking, the noun “*repraesentatio*” is absent from Spinoza’s *Ethics*; rather, one only finds the verb, “*repraesentare*.”
- 11 The mind is also a collection of ideas, according to E2p15. There is some tension here, between the claim that the mind is the idea of the body—i.e., the idea of a collection of things—and that the mind is a collection of ideas.
 - 12 This is the only place in the *Ethics* that Spinoza mentions a union of mind and body. This is a sign in addition to the Spinoza’s account in the *Short Treatise*, account that Spinoza thinks of the mind-body *union* as being primarily constituted by the idea-of (as opposed to, say, **Parallelism** or identity.)
 - 13 For illuminating studies of Spinoza’s use of *quatenus* in this and other contexts, see Alexander Douglas, “Quatenus and Spinoza’s Monism,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* (forthcoming); Mogens Lærke, “*Deus quatenus: Sur l’emploi de particules réduplicatives dans l’Éthique*” in *Lectures Contemporaines de Spinoza*, ed. Claude Cohen-Boulakia, Mireille Delbraccio, and Pierre-François Moreau (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris Sorbonne, 2012).
 - 14 See, for example, Don Garrett, “Spinoza’s Conatus Argument,” in *Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes*, ed. Olli Koistinen and John Biro (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), and John Carriero, “On the Relationship between Mode and Substance in Spinoza’s Metaphysics,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 33, no. 2 (1995): 245–273.
 - 15 I think the way I am putting this question has something in common with the challenge that Nagel sees for the scientific study of consciousness in Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?,” *Philosophical Review* 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–450. What looking at Spinoza (and Descartes) illuminates is that Nagel’s problem for studying consciousness only holds if we take the proper starting point for that study to be first-personal experience. But we don’t have to.
 - 16 This is articulated at greater length in Peterman, “Two Kinds of Embodiment,” esp. 216–224.
 - 17 CSMK III 52/AT III 692.
 - 18 CSMK III 227–228/AT III 695.